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CONTENTS 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this thesis we are concerned with systems of logic, systems of types and the 
relations between them The systems of types should be understood here as 
systems of typed lambda calculus, so in fact this thesis takes up the study of the 
relation between typed lambda calculus and logic This is not a new subject 
a lot of research has been done, most of which is centered around the so called 
'formulas-as-types embedding' from a logical system into a typed lambda calculus 
This embedding will also be the main topic of this thesis 
The first to describe the formulas-as-types embedding was Howard, who also 
introduced the terminology 'formulas-as-types', [Howard 1980] The manuscript 
of this paper goes back to 1968 and a lot of ideas behind the embedding go 
back even further, especially to Curry (see [Curry and Feys 1958]), who was the 
first to note the close connection between minimal proposition logic and combi 
natory logic The article of Howard is mainly concerned with giving a formal 
explanation of the intuitionistic connectives In this way it is an attempt to 
formalize the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of the intu­
itionistic connectives, as it can be found in the original work [Kolmogorov 1932] 
and [Heyting 1934], but also in the recent book [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988] 
In that interpretation a connective is explained in terms of what it means to have 
a proof of a sentence built up by that connective Howard gives a formal inter 
pretation of proofs (and hence of connectives) in terms of typed lambda calculus, 
by giving an interpretation to the introduction and elimination rule of the logic 
For Э and V, the introduction rule corresponds to λ abstraction and the elimi 
nation rule to application The ideas in [Howard 1980] were used and extended 
further by Martin-Lof in his Intuitionistic Theory of Types [Martin-Lof 1975], 
[Martin-Lof 1984] and by Girard who extended it to higher orders [Girard 1972], 
[Girard 1986], [Girard et al 1989] All this work can be united under the heading 
of 'proof-theory' 
Another approach was taken in the research project Automath by de Bruijn 
[de Bruijn 1980], who independently defined a kind of formulas-as-types embed­
ding from logic into typed lambda calculus which is of a different nature and, 
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maybe more important, which has a different purpose The difference in nature 
lies m the fact that the typed lambda calculus is not meant to represent one 
particular system of logic as close as possible, but to serve as a framework for 
mathematical reasoning in general The purpose of this work is to clarify and 
formalize the underlying principles that all mathematicians use and agree on In 
a sense this is an attempt to put on stage the part of mathematics that comes 
'before logic', the part that every mathematician is informally aware of, such as 
how to use and give definitions A practical off-shoot of this program is the pos­
sibility of doing mathematics on a computer by implementing the formal system 
of typed lambda calculus Let's point out here that the difference between the 
two approaches is not always as sharp as this discussion might suggest It is very 
well possible to use both approaches in one system 
The most interesting part of the various embeddings is not that formulas are 
interpreted as types, but that proofs are interpreted as terms (which obviously 
comes as a consequence of 'formulas as-types', if we understand a type as a set in 
some weak sense) This makes that the proofs become first class citizens in the 
type system On the one hand this provides for a whole world of new options, like 
the possibility to formalize meta-reasoning (reasoning about proofs) in the system 
or the possibility to let terms depend on proofs (like a function that extracts from 
a proof of an existential sentence a 'witnessing object' of the sentence) On the 
other hand this requires a well-understood notion of what a proof is if we claim 
that the terms of some typed lambda calculus represent proofs, this statement 
implicitly contains a definition of the notion of proof A workable approximation 
of the notion of proof is the notion of 'derivation' in a specific formal system of 
logic 
The formulas-as-types embedding described by Howard goes from first order 
predicate logic in natural deduction style to an extension of the simply typed 
lambda calculus It yields an isomorphism on the level of proofs (derivations), if 
we identify derivations that only differ in some specific trivial way The systems 
described by de Bruijn provide the possibility to embed a large variety of formal 
logics, hence we can not expect to have an isomorphism on the level of deriva­
tions only some of the proof-terms correspond to a derivation in the logic In 
both systems, the interpretation of proofs-as-terms does provide an equivalence 
relation on the proofs, signifying which derivations are to be understood as being 
equal 
We have already mentioned as a practical application of the formulas-as-types 
embedding the possibility of doing mathematics on a computer This was one of 
the main starting points for de Bruijn in setting up the Automath project In 
Automath the computer was mainly used as a proof-checker the user types in a 
proof (in the form of a λ-term) and the formula it is supposed to be proving (in 
the form of a type) and the computer checks whether the proof proves the for­
mula, that is whether the term is of the given type Later, other research groups 
enlarged the job of the computer by developing interactive theorem provers The 
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pioneering work on LCF [Gordon et al 1976] has been very important here, be­
cause it has lead to the interactive meta-language ML This language is very well 
suited for implementing a typed lambda calculus that is to be used for interac­
tive theorem proving, because it allows the user to program tactics for proof-
search Important developments in the field are the Calculus of Constructions 
[Coquand 1985] [Coquand and Huet 1985], [Coquand and Huet 1988] and its re­
cent extension Coq [Dowek et al 1991], which are implemented in a language 
closely related to ML Further we want to mention the work in Edinburgh on 
ECC (Extended Calculus of Constructions, [Luo 1989] and its implementation 
in ML 'LEGO' [Luo and Pollack 1992] and the work at Cornell on the system 
Nuprl [Constable et al 1986], which is an implementation of Martin-Lof's type 
theory The work on LCF itself grew into the system HOL [Gordon 1988], a proof-
assistant for classical higher order logic, which does not use the formulas-as-types 
embedding but implements Church's simple theory of types [Church 1940] 
Another important practical application of the formulas-as-types embedding, 
in particular the one described by Howard, is the possibility to extract programs 
from proofs This conforms to the BHK-interpretation of connectives and proofs 
in constructive mathematics, according to which, for example, a proof of the 
sentence Vx e АЗу Ε Βφ(χ, у) contains a construction of an element b
a
 E В 
for every о E A such that φ(α, b
a
) holds for every о € A. In the formulas-
as-types interpretation of Howard, the proof-term contains an algorithm in the 
form of a λ-term This was extended to higher order logic by Girard, who also 
emphasized the consequence of this approach, namely that cut-elimination in the 
logic corresponds to evaluation of a program As a calculus for typing the λ-terms 
that were extracted from the proofs he introduced the systems Fn (n > 2) and Fc<; 
[Girard 1972], which can be seen as very rudimentary programming languages. 
Also Martin-Lof made contributions to the idea of extracting programs from 
proofs, not by going to higher orders but by adding an inductive type forming 
operator [Martin-Lof 1984] 
The programs-from-proofs notion has been extended and refined a lot over the 
years, notably by the Projet Formel group in Paris (Calculus of Constructions and 
Coq, [Coquand and Huet 1985], [Coquand and Huet 1988], [Mohnng 1986] and 
[Paulin 1989]), the Nuprl project at Cornell [Constable et al 1986], the Equipe 
de Logique group in Pans [Knvine and Pangot 1990], [Pangot 1992] and the re­
search group in Goteborg [Nordstrom et al 1990] The crucial feature of the 
programs-from-proofs approach is that the proofs are preserved in the formal 
system in some 'algorithmic' form If one just wants to do mathematics on a 
computer this is less important, because it will often be sufficient to know that 
a formula is provable Note however that also in the latter case it can be an 
advantage to preserve proofs, for example if one wants to set up a library of 
mathematics which is reproducible in book form 
In this thesis we are mainly concerned with the formulas-as-types embedding 
itself, with some emphasis on the Howard approach So we do not for example 
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discuss technical details of the programs-from-proofs notion, nor do we discuss 
technical problems that arise when trying to set up a library of mathematics 
The reader can find a detailed description of the logics that are subject to the 
formulas-as-types interpretation These logics are chosen in such a way that we 
can easily define a collection of typed lambda calculi for which the embedding 
is an isomorphism on the derivations of the logic (modulo some easy equivalence 
relation) Then we discuss the two approaches to formulas-as-types by studying 
some examples Further we study and prove Strong Normalization and Conflu­
ence of the reduction relation in the typed lambda calculi, which are important 
properties for these systems Most of the typed lambda calculi that are looked 
at in this thesis are instances of so called 'Pure Type Systems' This is a general 
framework for describing typed lambda calculi that will be discussed in detail 
here Most of the meta-theory that one would like to have for the typed lambda 
calculi can be proved once and for all for the whole collection of Pure Type 
Systems 
An important issue of the formulas-as-types embedding is its completeness on 
the level of provability even if there is no isomorphism on the level of derivations, 
it would be really undesirable if the typed lambda calculus would prove more 
sentences than the logic This issue will be discussed in detail for the Calculus of 
Constructions On the one hand the embedding is not complete, but on the other 
hand this is not so dramatic, because there is a completeness result for sentences 
of a specific form 
We give a short overview of each of the chapters 
1 Chapter 2 describes the logics in a generic way, from first order predicate 
logic to higher order predicate logic, and relates them to more standard 
presentations of these logics The logics are minimal in the sense that 
we only have Э and V Also the propositional variants will be described 
We discuss the conservativity relations between these systems The most 
interesting result in this Chapter is probably the proof of conservativity of 
higher order propositional logic over second order propositional logic (both 
classical and intuitionistic ) The proof for the intuitionistic case is given by 
describing a semantics in terms of complete Heyting algebras As far as we 
know this is a new result 
2 Chapter 3 discusses the formulas-as types embedding Here we distinguish 
two approaches, one 'à la Howard' and one 'à la de Bruijn' We give a de-
tailed description of the embedding of minimal first order predicate logic in 
a typed lambda calculus (à la Howard) and show completeness on the level 
of derivations This means that the embedding constitutes an isomorphism 
between the derivations in the logic and the terms in the typed lambda cal-
culus Then we discuss the formulas-as-types embedding (à la de Bruijn) 
in Automath systems and in LF [Harper et al 1987] 
5 
3 Chapter 4 treats the notion of 'Pure Type System' We prove a list of 
meta-theoretic properties and give examples of instances of Pure Type Sys­
tems The properties we prove are the ones that are well- known from 
[Geuvers and Nederhof 1991], but now extended to Pure Type Systems 
with /^η-reduction 
4 In Chapter 5 we give a proof of Confluence of βη reduction in normalizing 
Pure Type Systems Confluence of /3-reduction is quite easy, but Confluence 
of ^-reduct ion is remarkably complicated Confluence in fact states the 
consistency of the type system as a calculus (in the sense that it shows 
that two different values are indeed distinguished by the system) The 
importance of this property lies further in the fact that it is one of the 
main tools for proving decidability of equality and from that decidability 
of typing (Under the formulas-as-types embedding, to decide whether a 
term is of a certain type is the same as to decide whether a proof proves a 
certain formula ) 
5 In Chapter 6 we discuss the Calculus of Constructions (CC) and its fine 
structure in the form of the so called 'cube of typed lambda calculi' We 
study the formulas-as types embedding from (subsystems of) higher order 
predicate logic into (subsystems of) CC We also look at conservativity with 
respect to provability between the type systems of the cube A new result 
here is the conservativity of Fw over F, which comes as a Corollary of the 
fact that higher order propositional logic is conservative over second order 
prepositional logic, which result was proved m Chapter 2 
6 In Chapter 7 we give a proof of Strong Normalization of /îrç-reduction in 
CC (Strong) Normalization is the other main tool for proving decidability 
of equality and from that decidability of typing It is also the main tool for 
showing consistency of a type system as a logic (in the sense that not all 
types are inhabited by a closed term) To be a bit more precise the con-
sistency of CC itself is quite easy, but if one wants to show the consistency 
of a context of CC, (Strong) Normalization comes in 
7 In Chapter 8 we briefly discuss some issues that have been left and list some 
open problems that may be of interest for further study 
Some of the work reported in this thesis has already appeared somewhere 
or will do so later, notably Chapters 4 and 7, which is can an extension of the 
work in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] to the case that includes r?-reduction (In 
[Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] we only considered /3-reduction) Chapter 6 has 
appeared in a slightly different form (with some mistakes) as [Geuvers 1992] and 
both Chapters 4 and 6 contain work that has also been reported in [Geuvers 1990] 
and [Geuvers 199+] 
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Chapter 2 
Natural Deduction Systems of 
Logic 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we want to discuss the logical systems that will be used in the 
context of the Curry-Howard isomorphism In the original paper by Howard 
[Howard 1980] on this formulas-as-types isomorphism, there are interpretations 
of all the standard connectives of intuitionistic logic As we are mainly inter­
ested in second and higher order systems (in which cases all connectives can be 
coded in terms of Э and V), we shall restrict our attention mainly to D and V 
The Curry-Howard isomorphism gives an interpretation of derivations as lambda 
terms in a typed lambda calculus, but it only does so for derivations in natu­
ral deduction style (As already pointed out, the D- and V-introduction rules 
correspond to λ abstraction and the D and V-ehmination rules correspond to 
application) Consequently, the representation of our logical systems will also be 
in natural deduction style 
This doesn't yet settle the whole question of what the precise formulation of 
the system should be If we would only be interested in provability the choice 
for the formalization of the logic should be determined by the questions about 
provability that we want to tackle In our case however, we are interested in 
the formal proofs (derivations) themselves and it depends heavily on the formal 
presentation that we have chosen, how many distinct derivations of a proposition 
we have (This is also a reason for not choosing Gentzen's sequent calculus to 
describe the formulas-as-types embedding, because in that system distinctions 
between derivations are often due to an inessential difference in bookkeeping) 
So our choice for the formal system of logic will be determined by the formulas-
as-types interpretations of the proofs in typed lambda calculus that we want to 
do later 
7 
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2.2. T h e Logics 
One issue that we want to stress here is the choice of the so called 'discharge 
convention' that has to be made. This issue was drawn to our attention by the 
book of [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988], where the crude discharge convention, 
CDC, is used throughout the book, except when it comes to the formulas-as-
types interpretation. Let's briefly state the problem by an example in minimal 
implicational propositional logic PROP, which we shall describe in two formats, 
to be called РЫОРд and PROPB, both natural deduction style. This example 
also shows how our choice for the formalisation of the logic is determined by 
the Curry-Howard isomorphism. In fact the isomorphism clearly visualizes the 
differences between the formalizations. 
2.2.1. DEFINITION. The systems PROPA and PROPB have as formulas the ele­
ments of the set FORM, given in abstract syntax by 
Form ::= Var | Form Э Form, 
where Var is a countable set of variables. 
The derivation rules of PROP¿ are the following. (In the rules, φ and ф are 
formulas and Γ is a finite set of formulas). 
(ax) P¡T^ if Ψ e Γ 
(D.I) i l i — Ι (э-Е) -— 
ГЬ φΌφ ТЬф 
The derivation rules of P R O P B are the following, (φ and ф are formulas). 
φ Э ф 
The formula φ in the Э-І rule is said to be discharged (or cancelled). The [φ] does 
not refer to one single occurrence of φ, but to arbitrary many (zero or more) tp's. 
With the derivation rules one can form deduction trees, starting from a single 
formula being the most basic form of a deduction tree. Then we say that Γ l· φ 
is derivable if there is a derivation tree with root φ and all open formulas of the 
tree in Γ. (A formula is open in a derivation tree if it occurs as a leaf in non 
discharged form). 
In practice the name of the rule will of course not be mentioned explicitly. 
( > E ) φ D Φ ψ 
Φ 
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In the system PRC-Рд there is in general no canonical node in a derivation 
tree to which a specific cancelled formula corresponds Look for example at the 
following derivation 
2 2 2 EXAMPLE 
Ы 
The discharging of φ can ambiguously either belong to the first or to the 
second use of the O-I rule To make the proofs more readable this ambiguity is 
often solved by writing a number on top of the discharged formula and writing the 
same number besides the line where the discharging took place In that case the 
derivation tree above in fact corresponds to two different derivation trees One 
can also solve the ambiguity by using the so called crude discharge convention 
(CDC), which says that at the Э-І rule in the definition of PROPB all open 
occurrences of φ are discharged If we adopt CDC, the derivation tree above is 
canonical φ is discharged at the first Э-І rule 
In view of the Curry-Howard isomorphism, it is preferable to choose for 
the discharge convention which attaches a number to the discharged formula-
occurrences and to the rule where the formula has been discharged This is not 
for reasons of soundness but for the completeness of the Curry-Howard embed­
ding The example above represents two proofs of φ D φ D φ λχφ \у* x (the 
discharged φ corresponds to the second D-I) and \χ* \yv у (the discharged ψ 
corresponds to the first D-I) If the formal logical system has CDC, only the 
latter term can be obtained as the interpretation of a proof This is why, in 
[Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988] CDC is dropped when discussing the formulas-
as-types isomorphism 
The system РРіОРд already has a sequent-like notation that is familiar from 
typed lambda calculi, but it is nevertheless more inconvenient then P R O P B for 
describing the Curry-Howard isomorphism (And therefore it is even more re­
markable that this is the kind of formalization that is often used for describing 
the isomorphism) The problem lies partly in the fact that the judgements Γ h φ 
are not really sequents in the sense of Gentzen, because in that case the Γ would 
have to be a (ordered) sequence instead of a set We adopt the example above 
to the formalism of PROP^ to see what the problem is 
2 2 3 EXAMPLE 
Μ Ι" Ψ 
{φ} h φ э ψ 
f- φ D (φ D φ) 
10 Natural Deduction Systems of Logic Ch 2 
The first application of the Э-І rule sort of 'splits' the assumption φ into two 
copies of φ, reading {φ} as {φ} U {φ} It is impossible to recover the two possible 
proofs of φ Э φ D φ (λχψ \y* χ and Χχφ \yv у in typed lambda calculus format) 
from the derivation above one could say that the first version is obtained by 
letting the ψ in the succèdent correspond to the 'right copy' of φ and the second 
version by letting the succèdent correspond to the 'left copy' of φ, but this is the 
type of forced solution (with no motivation at all in the logic) that we want to 
avoid Note that replacing the Э-І rule by the two rules 
Γ\-φ Γ\-ψ 
(>Ιι) (>I 2) 
Г\- ipDi¡J Γ\{φ}l·φЭф 
to solve this problem is not only very unpleasant but on the other hand doesn't 
give the general solution So we conclude that presenting natural deduction in a 
way similar to PROP^ is not what we are looking for 
In the original paper by Howard [Howard 1980] the defects of РЯОРд do 
not appear because there the format of the natural deduction system uses real 
sequents, which are of the form Γ l· ψ with φ a formula and Γ a finite sequence of 
formulas The rules of first order propositional logic (we call this version PROPc) 
are then as follows 
2 2 4 DEFINITION The formulas of the system PROPc are the same as for 
PROP.4 and PROPB The derivation rules of PROP c are the following (In 
the rules, ψ and ψ are formulas and Γ is a finite sequence of formulas, Γ, Δ is the 
concatenation of Γ and Δ) 
(ax) 
(Э-І) 
(weak) 
гь/1^1 
Γ,φ\-·φ 
Γl·φ 
Τ,φ\-ψ 
(Э-Е) 
(perm) 
Г Ь φ Д Ь і ^ Э ^ 
Γ, Al· ф 
Γ,φ,ф,Al·χ Γ,φ,φ,Al· χ 
Γ,φ,φ,Α^Χ Γ > , Δ Η χ 
It is clear how a derivation in the system PROPc corresponds to a lambda 
term (construction in the terminology of [Howard 1980]) of the simply typed 
lambda calculus The weakening rule amounts to an extension of the context 
with one new declaration, the permutation rule does not change anything (the 
contexts of the simply typed lambda calculus are a kind of 'multisets' of formu­
las) and the contraction rule amounts to substituting in the lambda term one free 
variable for another Now there are many more derivations then there are distinct 
lambda terms of the corresponding type, due to the structural rules of weakening, 
permutation and contraction So we can view the Curry-Howard embedding as 
Sec 2 2 The Logics 11 
splitting up the set of derivations in equivalence classes (Where two derivations 
are equivalent if they are mapped onto the same image under the Curry-Howard 
embedding) In fact the embedding only takes care of the 'computationally in­
teresting' part of the derivation, it extracts the construction from the derivation 
and in that sense it is a satisfying formal treatment of the BHK-interpretation 
of proofs-as-constructions In our case, however, we do not just want to recover 
the construction behind the proof, but also find a unique (up to certain trivial 
changes) proof that corresponds to the construction For that purpose, PROPc 
is not so convenient as the following example will illustrate 
2 2 5 E X A M P L E Look at the following derivations of h φ D φ D φ in PROPc 
φ h ψ φ h φ 
l· φ D ψ φ,ψ\- φ 
(1) — (2) 
φ\- φ D φ φ h φ D φ 
\- φΟ φ Э φ \- φ D φΌ φ 
φ\- Ψ 
φ,φ\-φ 
ψ, ψ Υ- φ 
(3) φ, φ Υ-φ (4) ψ,ψ,ψ\-φ 
φ,φΥ-φ 
φ\-ψ 
φ, φ h ψ 
ψ, \- ψ
φ Ь φ D φ 
Ι- φ D φ D φ φ h φ D φ 
\- φ D φ D φ 
From the logical derivations it is not very obvious that the first and the third 
derivation should be considered equivalent and distinct from the second deriva­
tion The Curry-Howard embedding makes this apparent (1) and (3) correspond 
to \χψ \ι/φ y, while (2) corresponds to \χφ Xy* χ The situation for derivation (4) 
is even more complicated the lambda term it corresponds to depends on which 
two occurrences of φ in the sequence φ, ψ, φ have been contracted in the appli­
cation of the contraction rule So, disregarding completeness, even to make the 
soundness of the embedding work we have to make the contraction rule more ex­
plicit, either by annotating in the sequent the formulas that are being contracted 
or by restricting the contraction to the last two formula occurrences 
From the discussion above it may have become clear that we have a strong 
preference for the format of the system РИОРд, with annotations to fix the 
formula occurrences that are being discharged at a specific application of a rule 
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2 2 6 DEFINITION For η a natural number, the system of nth order predicate 
logic, notation PREDn is defined by first giving the nth order language and then 
describing the deduction rules for the nth order system as follows 
1 The domains are given by 
V =B\Pmp\ÇD-*T>), 
where В is a specific set of baste domains 
We let the brackets associate to the right, so Prop—»(Prop—»Prop) will 
be denoted by Prop—»Prop—»Prop and so every domain can be written as 
D\—> —*DP—*D, with D\, , Dp domains and D a basic domain or the 
domain Prop 
2 The order of a domain D, ord(D), is defined by 
ord(B) = 1 for ß e ß, 
ord(Prop) = 2, 
ord(£>i-> -»Dp-»B) = max{ord(A) 11 < г < ρ}, if В 6 В, 
ord(D,-» -»Dp—Prop) = maz{ord(Д) 11 < ι < ρ} + 1 
Note that ord(£>() = 1 iff D does not contain Prop So the 'functional' 
domains (like for example (B—*B)—*B) are of order 1, whereas one might 
expect them to be of a higher order or not being part of any of the log­
ics This use of the orders confirms however with the formulas-as-types 
interpretation that will be studied in the following Chapters The orders 
are defined in such a way that in n-th order logic one can quantify over 
domains of order < η 
3 For η a fixed positive natural number, the terms of the nth order language 
are defined as follows (Each term is an element of a specific domain, which 
relation is denoted by e) 
• There are countably many variables of domain D for any D with 
ord(D) < n, 
• If M e D2, x a variable of domain D¡ and ord(Di—»£>2) < n, then 
\xtDl Mt £>i-+£>2, 
• If M € Di-»D2, N t Du then MN e D2, 
• If φ e Prop, χ a variable of domain D with ord(D) < n, then VxeD ψ e 
Prop 
• If ψ t Prop and φ e Prop, then ψ Э Ψ с Prop 
The system PREDI is a special case In addition to the rules above we 
have as rules 
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• There are countably many variables of domain D if ord(D) = 2, 
• If M e D2, χ a variable of domain D\ and ord(Di—»D2) = 2, then 
\xcDl.M e Di^D2. 
The first states that we have arbitrary many predicate symbols. The sec­
ond allows the definition of predicates by λ-abstraction, e.g. \x e Β.φ e 
ß—Prop. 
4. On the terms we have the well-known notion of definitional equality by β-
conversion. This equality is denoted by =. The terms φ for which φ e Prop 
are called formulas and Form denotes the set of formulas. 
5. For η a specific positive natural number, we now describe the deduction 
rules of the nth order predicate logic (in natural deduction style) that allow 
us to build derivations. So in the following let φ and ф be formulas of the 
nth order language. 
(D-I) ; (3-Е) 
ψ D ф φ 
Φ φ 
φ D φ 
φ хеБ.ф 
( -І) — - — ( * ) (V-E) iÏteD 
ЧхеО.ф φ[ί/χ] 
φ 
(conv) — if φ = ф 
Ψ 
The formula occurrences that are between brackets ([—]) in the Э-І rule are 
discharged. The superscript г in the D-I rule is taken from a countable set 
of indices I. The index ι uniquely corresponds to one specific application 
of the Э-І rule, so we do not allow one index to be used more than once. 
The use of the indexes allows us to fix those formula occurrences that are 
discharged at a specific application of the D-I rule. 
(*): in the V-I rule we make the usual restriction that the variable χ may 
not occur free in a non-discharged assumption of the derivation. 
For Γ a set of formulas of PREDn and φ a formula of PREDn, we say 
that φ is derivable from Γ in PREDn, notation Г Ьрн£ 0
п
 φ, if there is a 
derivation with root φ and all non-discharged formulas in Γ. 
The system of predicate logic of finite order, notation P R E D O J , is the union of all 
PREDn. We follow the usual convention of not writing the number in case of a 
first order system, so for PREDI we write PRED. 
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2 2 7 R E M A R K The choice for the connectives Э and V may seem minimal 
It is however a well-known fact that in second and higher order systems, the 
intuitionistic connectives &, V, -• and 3 can be defined in terms of D and V as 
follows (Let φ and ф be formulas) 
φ & ф = VaeProp (φ D ф D α) D а, 
φ V ф = VaeProp (ψ D α) D (ф D α) D α, 
-L = VaeProp а, 
^ψ = φ D -L, 
3χ e Οφ = VaeProp ÇixtD φ Э a) D а 
Similarly we can define an equality judgement (the /^-equality =, the definitional 
equality of the language, is purely syntactical) by taking the so called Leibniz 
equality for t,q e D, 
t=Dq = VPe£>—Prop Pt Э Pq, 
which says that two objects are equal if they satisfy the same properties (It is 
not difficult to show that =p is symmetric) 
It is not difficult to check that all the standard logical rules hold for &i 
, V, _L, -ι, 3 and = In the following we shall freely use these symbols 
2 2 8 R E M A R K In each PREDn (n > 2), the comprehension property is satis­
fied That is, for all φ(χ) Prop with χ = xìt ,xp a sequence of free variables, 
possibly occurring in φ (χ, e Д ) , we have 
3 P e Ζλ— Dp-+Prop 4xeD(<p ~ Px
x
 xp) 
(Take Ρ = λχι e Di λχ
ρ
 e Dp φ(χ) ) 
The above definition has some peculiarities that we want to bring into the 
spotlight We have allowed countably many variables of all domains of order 
< 2, which includes for example countably many variables of domain Prop For 
first order logic it may seem more natural to allow only variables of domains of 
order 1, but the slight extension we give here doesn't do us any harm (It is 
a conservative extension ) We have also forced the possibility of forming new 
predicates by λ-abstraction in first order predicate logic This is unusual (in 
second and higher order cases this feature is called 'comprehension') and it has 
only been added to make the formulas-as-types embedding complete on the level 
of the proofs Finally we do not have constants, but only variables This may 
seem strange but it confirms with the feature that we allow variables of domains 
of order 2 in first order logic a binary relation on В is represented by a variable 
of domain B—»ß-+Prop That we don't have constants is also related to the fact 
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that in our presentation a logic is not introduced via a similarity type that fixes 
the language (mainly by declaring of the constants) Instead what we described 
above is more a general presentation of the logic that captures all of the logics-
with-similanty-type 
In paragraph 2 3 we show some easy conservativity results to justify the choice 
of our 'extended' systems 
2.2.1. Extensionality 
The definitional equality on the terms is /3-equahty There is no objection to 
taking βη equality instead all the properties remain to hold In fact it would 
make a lot of sense to do so, especially for predicates, where we tend to view 
λ-abstraction as the necessary mechanism to make comprehension work (And 
so both Ρ e ß—»Prop and \x e В Px describe the collection of elements ί of 
domain В for which Pt holds) 
This is related to the issue of extensionality terms of domain D—»Prop are to 
be understood as predicates on D or also as subsets of D (an element t being in 
the set Ρ t D—»Prop if Pt holds) But if we take this set theoretic understanding 
serious, we have to identify predicates that are extensionally equal 
(Vf f χ D gx & gx D fx) Э ƒ =D 9 (1) 
Obviously, this formula is in general not provable However, in the standard 
models where predicates are interpreted as real sets, the formula is satisfied, so it 
is an important extension A difficulty is, that extensionality in the form of (1) 
is in general not expressible in PREDn we can not express extensionality for ƒ 
and g of domain D if ord(£>) = n, because ƒ =D g is not a formula of PREDn (it 
uses a quantification over D—»Prop) This means that we shall have to express 
extensionality by a schematic rule The most obvious choice is the following 
Vx fx D gx Vx gx э f χ φ{/) 
ψ{9) 
where ƒ and g are arbitrary terms of the same domain Di—» —>£)„—»Prop and 
v?(ƒ) stands for a formula φ with a specific marked occurrence of ƒ For reasons 
to be discussed presently our choice for the scheme will be a different one, namely 
the one given in the following definition 
2 2 9 DEFINITION The extensionality scheme, (EXT), is 
fx D gx gx D fx ψ{}) 
(EXT)^ , / (*) 
where ƒ and g are arbitrary terms of the same domain D-y—* —*D
n
—»Prop and 
φ{}) stands for a formula φ with a specific marked occurrence of ƒ (*) signifies 
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the usual restriction that the variables of £ may not occur free in a non-discharged 
assumption of the derivations of f χ D дх and of gx D fx. 
The extension of a system with the rule (EXT) will be denoted by adding the 
prefix E-, so E-PREDn is extensional nth order predicate logic. 
N O T A T I O N . For f,g e D = DÌ—* *Dn—»Prop, if quantification over D b . . , Dn 
is allowed in the system we can compress the first two premises in the rule (EXT) 
to Vx.fx D gx & gx D fx. For convenience this will also be denoted by ƒ ~ D g, 
so 
ƒ ~D g - Vf. f χ Э gx к gx Э f χ, 
where the D will usually be omitted if it is clear from the context. 
2.2.10. L E M M A . The extensionahty scheme for D = Prop is admissible in any of 
the predicate or propositional logics, ι e. 
φΟψ,ψΖ) φ,χ{φ) Η χ(ψ) 
is always provable. 
P R O O F . By an easy induction on the structure of χ. Η 
Of course there is also a scheme for extensionlity of functions: 
fx =в gx ¥?(ƒ) . . 
Гл
 W 
ΨΚ9) 
where ƒ and g are arbitrary terms of the same domain D\—» >D
n
—>B (B e В) 
and further as in Definition 2.2.9. We shall not be working with this scheme and 
hence not introduce it as a new definition. (Note that, if h fx = gx, then 
ƒ =β
η
 S)· 
2.2.2. S o m e useful var iant s of t h e s y s t e m s 
For the systems PREDn of Definition 2.2.6, the scheme (EXT) is equivalent to 
the scheme that we gave just before Definition 2 2.9. The reason for taking the 
more general scheme lies in the fact that for reasons of semantics we want to look 
at slight extensions of the systems in which the two versions of the scheme are not 
equivalent, these extensions come into consideration quite naturally when one 
notices that the term language of each of the PREDn is a subsystem of the simply 
typed lambda calculus, found by restricting to terms below a certain order. So 
for an interpretation of the term language one is tempted to take a model of 
the full simply typed lambda calculus. (The interpretation of the logic is then 
given by describing a binary relation between sets of formulas and formulas.) 
The syntactical analogue is to allow the term language to be the full simply 
typed lambda calculus and to put the order-restriction only on quantifications. 
Then we can show that there is no problem with this extension by establishing a 
conservativity result between the two systems. 
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2 2 11 DEFINITION For L one of our logical systems, say of order n, L based 
on the full simply typed lambda calculus, notation LT, is obtained by taking as 
description of the term language of Definition 2 2 6 the following 
• There are countably many variables of domain D for any D € X>, 
• There are countably many constants of domain D for any D € V, 
• If M e D2, χ a variable of domain D\, then XxeD\ M e Di~*D2, 
• If M e D^D2, N e Du then MN e D2, 
• If φ e Prop, χ a variable of domain D with ord(£>) < n, then VxeZ) φ e Prop 
• If φ e Prop and ф e Prop, then φ D φ e Prop 
One can now do without the last two cases by taking (for D with ord(Z?) < 
n) a special fixed constant д e (D—»Prop)—»Prop and similarly a special fixed 
constant De Prop—»Prop—»Prop We do not feel that this is useful thing to do, so 
we don't do it 
By an easy restriction we define nth order propositional logic from nth order 
predicate logic 
2 2 12 D E F I N I T I O N For η a natural number, the nth order prepositional logic, 
notation PROPn, is defined by removing in the definition of the nth order pred­
icate logic, the set of basic domains В 
2 2 13 L E M M A The rule (EXT) implies (convp^) in prepositional logic, ι e in 
E-PROPn, 
Ψ =βη Φ =>·" ψ Э Φ 
P R O O F We only have to show that if φ —•,, ф, then l· φ D ф (This is so 
because of CR for βη for the term language and the fact that φ = φ implies 
h φ D ф Now let φ —», ф, say φ = C[\xeD Mx] — » , C[M] = ф Now 
M e D—» —»Prop and Mx D (XxtD Mx)x and vice versa by the (conv) rule, 
so h C\\xtD Mx] Э C[M] by (EXT) H 
The first order predicate and propositional logics are very minimal they do 
not have a connective for negation (The second order logics do not either but 
in that case intuitiomstic negation can be defined by letting J. = VaeProp a and 
-ιφ = φ D J.) This implies that we can not specialize PROP or PRED to a 
classical variant Therefore, to define classical first order logic, we have to add 
negation to the system (Because of the ideological completeness of { Э , ± } in 
classical logic, this is sufficiënt for a treatment of the full classical proposition 
and predicate logic For the intuitiomstic case, the extension with just J. is still 
quite minimal) 
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2 2 14 D E F I N I T I O N First order prepositional and predicate logic with negation, 
notation PROP· 1 and P R E D 1 are defined by adding to PROP and PRED the 
following 
1 A fixed constant -L e Prop, 
2 The derivation rule 
1 
(-L) -
Ψ 
The classical variants of the logics can be defined in several ways, by adding 
a rule or an axiom We choose for a rule in the first order case and an axiom in 
the higher order case 
2 2 15 D E F I N I T I O N The classical systems of proposition and predicate logic are 
defined by adding the following 
1 For P R O P 1 and P R E D 1 by adding the rule 
2 For the other systems PROPn and PREDn by adding the axiom 
VaeProp -i-ία D a 
N O T A T I O N the classical variants of the systems will be denoted by addin g a 
subscript с So for example P R O P 1 , P R E D 1 , PROPn
c
 and PREDn
c
 They 
also have extensional variants, which are defined by adding the scheme (EXT) 
and which are denoted by adding the prefix E-
Just as in the first order case there is a faithful translation of the systems 
of classical higher order logic into the systems of intuitionistic higher order 
logic This extends the Godei translation The definition we give is the one 
in [Coquand and Herbehn 1992], where it was described more generally in the 
form of a so called 'A translation' in a typed lambda calculus framework 
Let in the following L be one of the intuitionistic logics defined in Definitions 
2 2 6, 2 2 12 and 2 2 14, but not one of the minimal systems PROP or PRED, 
and let L
c
 be the classical variant of L, as defined in Definition 2 2 15 
2 2 16 D E F I N I T I O N The Godei translation ( - ) " from the terms of L to itself is 
defined inductively by 
(i)" 1 = x, for χ a variable or the constant -L, 
{PQT = (PUQT, 
{XxeD Py = XxeD(Py, 
(φ Э ФУ = -<->{<РУ Э ^{4>У, 
{VxtD φ)" = V I E D -Н-.( > Г 
This mapping extends straightforwardly to sets of formulas 
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So, for example in the higher order systems (±)" = Va -i->a, which is logically 
equivalent to 1 In the first order systems we have ( ± ) " = (J. D 1) D -L, which 
is also logically equivalent to _L Further it is convenient to remark that (-і-к^)" 
is logically equivalent to - |_ i(v?)^ 
2 2 17 L E M M A We have the following properties for ( —)"" Let t and q be terms, 
χ a variable and D a domain 
1 teD=> {ty e D 
2 (t[qlx)T = (tr[(qr/*) 
3 t=0q=>(ty=0(qy 
P R O O F The first two by an easy induction on the structure of terms The third 
by showing the statement for a one step β reduction and applying the Church-
Rosser property Η 
2 2 18 T H E O R E M For φ a formula of L,T a set of formulas of L, 
г b L c ψ «*. -,-,(гг b L -.-.( г 
PROOF From right to left is easy by the fact that (φ)~' is logically equivalent to 
φ in classical logic 
From left to right is by induction on the derivation, using Lemma 2 2 17 One 
also uses the general facts 
-i-i(v? Э ijj)\-L φ Э —·—1-0 
and 
-i-i(Vi£U φ) h/, WxeD -¡-¡φ 
Further one has to note that the rule (->->) is sound in L for formulas of the form 
->->( ) (if L is first order) and that (Va -i-ία Э a)"1 is provable in L (if L is 
higher order) IS 
2.3. Some easy conservativity results 
This paragraph contains a number of syntactic proofs of conservativity results 
The results are relatively easy and not surprising Most of the work therefore 
lies in a precise formulation of the notions First we show that (E)-PREDnT (see 
Definition 2 2 11) is conservative over (E)-PREDn. This means that the extension 
of the logical language of order η to the full simply typed lambda calculus does 
not affect the provability 
Furthermore we show that our first order predicate logic with all function 
domains is conservative over the system that has only function constants (which 
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is more standard) This system, in which it is still possible to define predicates 
by λ abstraction, is again conservative over the 'standard' system, where one 
has only basic predicates The proof of the latter result will only be outlined 
In section 6 5 3 we give a precise proof m terms of typed lambda calculi, using 
the formulas-as-types embedding In order to achieve our goals, we first have 
to give some definitions, writing P R E D - ^ for PRED without function domains 
and P R E D ~ ' r for PRED without function domains and definable predicates So 
PRED~^ r is the standard minimal first order predicate logic, which has only 
function constants and predicate constants 
We first turn to the conservative of (E)-PREDnT over ( E ) - P R E D T I We 
define a mapping from (E)-PREDrcT to (E)-PREDn which preserves provability 
2 3 1 D E F I N I T I O N Let η e N The mapping (-)* on (E) PREDrT IS defined 
by substituting in a term of (E)-PREDnT for all free variables and constants 
of a domain D of order > η the fixed closed term do of domain D, where for 
D = D\—» D
m
—»Prop, dp is defined by 
dD = \xitDl \xmtDm ± 
The image of a term of (E)-PREDnT will only contain free variables and 
constants of domains of order < η Furthermore, if t t D, then t' e D We now 
want to take /3-normal forms and long-/37?-normal forms Recall that a long-a­
normal form is obtained by first taking the /J-normal form and then doing all 
^-expansions, where C[q] ^-expands to C[\xtD qx] if τ ^ FV(g) and this does 
not create a /3-redex (This is well defined by normalization of β and the fact that 
if C[q] η-expands to C[\xeD qx], we can not expand on q or XxeD qx anymore ) 
The long-/?77 normal form of M is denoted by long-/??? nf(M) 
2 3 2 L E M M A If t e (E)-PREDn7" with 11 D and ord(D) <, then ß-nj{t') and 
long-ßv-nf(t') are in (E)-PREDn 
P R O O F By induction on the structure of /?-nf(i*), respectively the structure 
of \ο^-βη-τι{(Γ) We only treat the proof of the statement that /3-nf(i*) is in 
(E)-PREDn t' contains no free variables or constants of domains of order > η 
So 
/?-nf(H = XxltDi Ax m eD m pQx QT 
with ρ a constant, a free variable or one of the i , Now, all the domains 
Di, , D
m
 are of order < n, so the domain of ρ is of order < η By IH, the 
terms Qi, , Q
r
 are in (E)-PREDn, and hence /3-nf(i*) is И 
2 3 3 P R O P O S I T I O N For η G N or n = ω we have the following 
Г г - p R w V => /З-пт(Г) Ь
Р Н Е О п
 /3-п%·), 
Г r-E-pRED^ φ => long-βη-η^Γ') l - E . P R E D n long-βη-η^φ') 
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PROOF By induction on the derivation First remark that φ = ψ ^· ψ' = ψ* 
and φ'[Ρ'/χ] = (φ[Ρ/χ])' Then all cases are easy except for the case when the 
last rule is (EXT) So say we have 
f χ D gx gxD f χ φ{/) 
as the last step in the proof By IH we have 
long-/3rç-nf(r) h \ong-ßV-n{({fx)') D long ßV-ni{{gx)'), 
long-/?77-nf(r) h long-/?7;-ni((5£)*) Э long-^nf((/f)*), 
long-/3r?-nf(r*) h long βη-ηί((φ{/))·) 
Now we take a fresh variable ζ of the same domain as ƒ and g and replace ƒ by 
ζ in φ(/) We look at the term φ*(ζ), which is the same as (φ{ζ))* except for 
the possible substitution of a term for z, which is not performed Now 
(\οη
Ε
-βη-η{(φ'(ζ)))[Γ/ζ} =
βη
 φ*(ζ)[Γ/ζ] = (ψ{/)Υ =
βη
 long-^nf((V(/))·) 
So the third part of the IH can be read as 
long-/?77-nf(r) h (long βη τιΐ(φ'(ζ)))[Γ/ζ] 
and we are done if we prove 
long-/fy-nf(P) l· (\οηζ-βη-τι{{φ'(ζ)))\9'/ζ] 
All occurrences of ζ in tong-Z^-ní^^z)) are of the form zq\ qp with zq\ qp e 
Prop We have extensionahty on the level of Prop (Lemma 2 2 10, so 
fq^g'q g-qPfq ф(Гд) 
Ф(д'д) 
Now, for each occurrence of ζ in long βη ηΐ(φ*(ζ)), the first two premises of (1) 
are satisfied by IH So all occurrences of ƒ* in (long-/37; nf(^*(z)))[/*/z] can be 
replaced by g" by consecutive applications of rule (1) As conclusion we obtain 
that (long-/?J7-nf(i¿*(2)))[$7z] holds El 
234 COROLLARY For all n e N u {ω}, (E) PREDn7" is conservative over 
(E)-PREDn 
2 3 5 REMARK The Proposition and Corollary remain to hold if we replace 
PRED by PROP everywhere 
2 3 6 COROLLARY //(E)-PROP(n+l)T is conservative over(E)-PROPnT then 
(E)-PROP(n+ 1) is conservative over (E)-PROPn 
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We now turn to the issue of the functional domains and define a subsystem 
of first order predicate logic (PRED) that only has the simplest domains for 
functions (Usually these domains are called 'first order' but this conflicts with 
our terminology, so we shall refrain from using that term ) 
2 3 7 DEFINITION The language of the system P R E D - ƒ is defined as follows 
1 The domains are given by 
V = Б | Prop | Z>—^  —2)-»Prop 
So there are basic domains (the ones in B) and predicate domains (the ones 
that contain Prop) 
2 The functional domains are given by 
(We assume every functional domain to be built up from at least two basic 
domains ) Note that Τ £ V 
3 The order of a domain D, ord(D), is defined as it is done for PRED in 2 2 6 
(So the functional domains have no order, which confirms with the intention 
that m P R E D - ' there is no quantification over functional domains ) 
4 There are countably many function-constants cf for every function domain 
F € Τ in P R E D " ' 
5 The terms of the language of P R E D - ' are described as follows 
• There are countably many variables of each domain D, 
• If c[ is a function constant of domain F Ξ ÖI—> —»ßp+i and ί, e В
г 
for 1 < г < ρ, then cf ίι, , tp с Bp+i, 
• If t e Д>, χ a variable of domain Di and ord(Di—»ГЬ) = 2, then 
XxeDx te D i - > £ 2 , 
• If t e Di—>D2, q e Di, then tq e D2, 
• If φ e Prop, χ a variable of domain D with ord(£>) = 1, then VieD φ t 
Prop 
• If φ £ Prop and ф e Prop, then φ Э ф e Prop 
The derivation rules of P R E D - ' are the same as for PRED, so the quantification 
is restricted to the domains of order 1 (the D € B) 
It is convenient to let PRED also have constants c^ for functional domains F, 
because then P R E D " ' is formally a subsystem of PRED We have the following 
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2 3 8 P R O P O S I T I O N PRED is conservative over P R E D _ / , that is, for Г о set 
of formulas and ψ a formula of PRED~f, 
Γ b P R E D φ => Γ b p R E D - / φ 
P R O O F The proof is by cut-elimination and normalization The notion of cut-
elimination will only be discussed in section 3 2 3, so we can only sketch this 
proof One can show that, if Γ is a set of formulas and φ a formula of P R E D - ^ 
such that Γ HPRED ψ is derivable with derivation Θ, then the derivation Θ', 
which is obtained from Θ by cut elimination and normalization of all first order 
expressions, is a derivation of Γ l· φ in P R E D " ^ In section 6 5 3 we discuss 
two typed lambda calculi that correspond to PRED respectively PRED --^ by the 
formulas-as-types embedding The proof of Proposition 6 5 28 can therefore be 
seen as a detailed proof of this Proposition И 
This is not yet the end of the story in the usual first order system one can 
not define predicates by λ-abstraction, so we want to show that this extension is 
conservative too 
2 3 9 D E F I N I T I O N The system P R E D " / r is P R E D _ / minus the clause 
'If M e D2, χ a variable of domain D\ and ord(£>i—*D2) = 2, then XxeD^ Μ ε 
in the term formation rules, and the clause 
'If t e Di—>D2, q e Dlt then tq e D2\ 
replaced by 
'If t e Di—• —>Dp—»Prop, q, t Д for 1 < ι < ρ, then <<?i qp e Prop' 
In P R E D - · ^ there are no more λ-abstractions It is the 'usual' system of 
minimal first order predicate logic the set of terms of the object language is 
inductively defined from variables and constants by function application, and 
the set of formulas is inductively defined from the basic formulas by applying 
connectives (Where the basic formulas are of the form xDt\ tp, with U terms 
of the object language, and allowing for ρ = 0) The conservativity of P R E D - ^ 
over P R E D - ' 1 " is now proved by normalizing out all λ-abstractions, just like we 
normalized out all relevant λ-abstractions in the proof of conservativity of PRED 
over P R E D _ / 
2 3 10 P R O P O S I T I O N For Γ a set of formula and φ a formula of P R E D - / , 
r
 ' " P R E D - ' Ψ =>• П Л Г ) !"PRED-^ пкч>) 
P R O O F Easy induction on the derivation H 
2 3 11 COROLLARY For Г a set of formulas and φ a formula of P R E D - ' r , 
Γ
 h P R E D - ' Ψ => Γ r - p R E D fr- ψ 
P R O O F By the fact that for φ a formula of P R E D ~ / r , φ = ηΐ(φ) IS 
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2.4. Conservativity between the logics 
Having justified the systems PREDn in relation to more standard presentations of 
predicate logic, we now want to say something about the conservativity relations 
between the systems themselves This gives a better understanding of the logics 
while at the same time these results will be useful later for reference when we 
discuss the conservativity relations between systems of typed lambda calculus in 
Chapter 6 1 So this paragraph may be skipped for now if one is merely interested 
in the typed lambda calculi The conservativity relations betweem the logics can 
be collected in the following diagram 
PROPw PROPw c PREDu; PREDuv 
PROP3 • PROP3
c 
PROP2 • PROP2
c 
P R O P x • PROP:f 
PRED3 
PRED2 
PRED3C 
PRED2C 
PRED-1- • PRED^ 
PROP PRED 
where a dotted arrow depicts a non conservative inclusion and an ordinary arrow 
depicts a conservative inclusion The (non-)conservativities between predicate 
logic and prepositional logic follow by the fact that any predicate logic on the 
right is conservative over its propositional variant on the left, and further by 
transitivity of conservativity and the fact that if L2 is not conservative overLi 
and Li С ¿3, then L3 is not conservative overig 
We do not present this diagram as a theorem, because for some of the depicted 
arrows we have no proof In this section, only a small part of the diagram above 
will be proved formally One of the things we do not prove is the whole tower of 
Sec 2 4 Conservativity between the logics 25 
vertical arrows in the propositional part We only prove the conservativities for 
extensional versions of the systems This implies the conservativity of PROPn 
over PROP2 for any π > 2 (and similarly for the classical variants) 
Also the vertical tower of arrows in the predicate part of the diagram will 
not be proved For η > 2, we believe that non-conservativity can be proved by 
looking at a structure for Arithmetic in each of the logics Then one obtains nth 
order Heyting Arithmetic on the left side and nth order Peano Arithmetic on the 
right side Then Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem says that each of those 
systems can not prove its own consistency Then the non-conservativity can be 
established by showing that (n + l ) th order Arithmetic can prove the consistency 
of nth order Arithmetic 
A similar method should apply to the systems PRED2 and P R E D 1 , respec­
tively PRED2C and P R E D
1
 For the classical variants this is straightforward 
P R E D 1 may seem minimal, but due to classical logic, all connectives can be 
defined in terms of Э, V and ± Hence we can look at Robinson's system Q for 
Arithmetic, for which Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem already applies 
The non-conservativity of PRED2 over P R E D 1 can then be derived from the 
non-conservativity of PRED2C over P R E D
1
 by applying a version of the Godel's 
double negation translation This is a faithful mapping from PRED2 respectively 
P R E D 1 to PRED2C respectively P R E D
1
 (See section 6 5 3 ) 
The conservativity of PROP2 over PROP and of PRED2 over PRED will be 
discussed later when we look at typed lambda calculus versions of the systems 
Then we shall describe mappings from the larger system to the smaller one that 
also take into account the proofs From the conservativity of PROP2 over PROP 
and of PRED2 over PRED it immediately follows that P R O P 1 is conservative 
over PROP and that P R E D 1 is conservative over PRED 
The non-conservativity of P R O P 1 over PROP is easy ((a—»/?)—»a)—»a is 
provable in P R O P 1 , but not in PROP A derivation of it in P R O P 1 is 
[Q Э β] (α D β) D a [^Q] [a] 
a [-IQ] _L 
-L β 
^{аЭ β) aD β 
_L 
a 
It can easily be seen that ((a—*ß)—*ct)—*a is not provable in PROP by notic-
ing that there is no closed term of type ((a—>ƒ?)—»а)—»a in the simply typed 
lambda calculus (which is saying the same as 'there exists no cut-free proof of 
((a-+0)—*a)—*a in PROP') The example ((α—*β)—*a)—*a also applies for show­
ing the non-conservativity of P R E D 1 over PRED 
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It is obvious that the conservativity of the classical version of the logic over 
the intuitionistic version never holds, hence the dotted arrows from left to right 
in the diagram 
Note further that any predicate logic is conservative over its prepositional 
version This is easily seen by defining a mapping [—] from formulas of the 
predicate logic to the propositional logic that preserves denvabihty and is the 
identity on the propositional logic It can be defined as follows 
2 4 1 DEFINITION Let L2 be a system of predicate logic and L\ its propositional 
variant The mapping [—] is defined on predicate domains of L2 (the ones of 
the form —»Prop) by just removing all the basic domains, so for example 
[(B—»Prop)—»Prop] = Prop—»Prop Then [-] Form(L2) —> Form(Li) is defined 
as follows 
kD] 
[φ э ] 
[ixt Α ψ] 
[XXÍA M] 
[PM] 
= x
[D] 
= МэМ, 
= ІЕ[Л] [φ] if Л Ξ 
= [φ] else, 
= Xxe[A] [M] if Л Ξ 
= [Μ] else, 
= [P][M] if M A = 
= [Ρ] else, 
This map is very similar to the one in Definition 6 5 23, which shows the 
conservativity of dependent typed lambda calculus over non-dependendent typed 
lambda calculi 
It is easily shown that this map satisfies the requirements 
The proof of conservativity of extensional PROP(n + 1) over extensional 
PROPn is given by semantical methods We give a notion of model in terms of 
complete Heyting algebras that is sound and complete for each of the E-PROPn 
We shall also describe a Kripke semantics for PROPn (non-extensional) We 
had hoped to prove the conservativity of PROP(n + 1) over PROPn by using 
this semantics However, although we have a sound and complete model notion 
for each of the PROPn, we haven't been able to derive conservativity because a 
Kripke model of PROPn is not immediately a Kripke model of PROP(n + 1) 
The proof of conservativity of E PROP (η + l)
c
 over E-PROPn
c
 follows di­
rectly from the proof of conservativity of E-PROP(n + 1) over E-PROPn (Just 
add the axiom аа ->α everywhere) Nevertheless we also describe a truth table 
semantics for E-PROPn
c
, because it is the basic semantics for classical proposi­
tional logics Further it shows not only the conservativity of E-PROP(n+l)
c
 over 
E-PROPn
c
, but also the decidability of E-PROPn
c
 (for any η > 2) This should 
be contrasted with intuitionistic versions of propositional logic all the systems 
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PROPn (τι > 2), extensional or not, are undecidable This is a consequence 
of the undecidabilty of PROP2, shown by [Lob 1976], and the conservativity of 
(extensional) PROPn over PROP2 for all η > 2 
2.4.1. Truth table semantics for classical propositional logics 
The method of deciding the validity of a judgement Γ h φ in classical logic 
by using truth tables immediately extends to the second order case by letting 
the value of a vary through {0,1} in the interpretation of φ For higher orders 
we have to be a bit more careful The straightforward thing to do is to let 
for example the value of variables of domain Prop—»Prop vary through the set of 
functions from {0,1} to {0,1} This, however, gives a model that is not complete, 
because it is too extensional compared with the syntax, in the sense that e g for 
all ƒ,5 e Prop-»Prop, 
(VQíProp JaD да к да Э fa) D (ƒ =prop^Prop s) 
is satisfied in it (The equality is the definable Leibniz' equality) We shall show 
that the truth table model is complete for the extensional version of the logic 
Extensionality is not derivable in any of the logics This can for example be 
seen from the fact that if 
I-PR0P4C V/, £eProp-»Prop ( ƒ ~ g) D f = g, 
then (for Ρ a variable of the appropriate domain) 
P(Xa a D a D a), - ιΡ(λα a D a) r-pROp4= -L 
by the fact that Xa a D a D a and Xa a D a satisfy the assumption for ƒ and g 
m the extensionality Now by applying the Godel's -i-i-translation of Definition 
2 2 16, we obtain 
- ι - ι Ρ ( λ α -i-iQ Э - I - I ( - I - I Q Э - I - > Q ) ) , - ι Ρ ( λ α -i-iα D ->-IQ) bP RoP4 -L 
This, however can only be the case if λα -I-IQ Э -I-I(-I-IQ D -I-IQ) =β Xa —>—«α; D 
-I-IQ, which is clearly not the case 
2 4 2 D E F I N I T I O N For every domain D we define the set VD of possible values 
for the terms of domain D as follows 
^Prop = R i } , 
УЬі—D-Ì = VDJ —• V£)2,the set of functions from VDl to VQ2 
The interpretation of terms as values (modulo a valuation of the free variables) 
is now straightforward, given the following definitions 
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2 4 3 D E F I N I T I O N Any valuation υ that maps variables to values of the appro­
priate set extends immediately to an interpretation υ on all terms as follows 
v(\xtD P) = λα e VD v[x = o\(P), 
v(PQ) = v(P)v(Q), 
υ(φ Эф) = 0 if υ{φ) = 1 and (ф) = 0, 
= 1 otherwise, 
viyxtD φ) = 1 if for all а 6 Ь, v[x = α](φ) = 1, 
= 0 otherwise 
Here v[x = α] denotes the valuation with v[x = a](x) — a and v[x = a](y) = 
v(y) \іхфу 
As was to be expected, the value of a closed term does not depend on the 
particular choice for υ and values are stable under /377-equality 
2 4 4 D E F I N I T I O N For Γ a set of formulas and φ a formula of any of the propo-
sitional logics, we define 
Γ (= φ = for all valuations ν, ν(Γ) = 1 => ν{φ) = 1, 
where υ(Γ) = 1 if (ф) = 1 for all φ G Γ 
We say that φ is true if f= φ 
(The subscripts will usually be omitted) 
2 4 5 P R O P O S I T I O N (Soundness) For Γ a set of formulas and φ a formula of 
E-PROPn;, 
Г Ь
Е
 PRoPn; φ =*• Γ (= φ 
P R O O F By an easy induction on the derivation Η 
2 4 6 L E M M A For any domain D, all values ofVD are λ definable in E-PROPnJ 
That is, for all F 6 Vp there is a closed term t of domain D m E-PROPnJ such 
that 
v(t) = F 
(for any valuation v) 
P R O O F By induction on the structure of D The proof uses the fact that, due 
to the extensionahty, one can define a function by cases in the logic For example 
the value in ({0,1} —» {0,1}) —> {0,1} that maps the identity and the swop 
function to 0 and the two constant functions to 1 can be defined in the syntax by 
Л/£Ргор-»Ргор (ƒ ~ λα α V ƒ ~ λα -·α) Э 1 & (ƒ ~ λα 1 V ƒ ~ λα Τ) D Τ 
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In general, a function F : VDl—• >VDP—*{0,1} can be described in the format 
Fv\, • · • Vp = 0 if vi = t\ and . . . and vp = tp, 
= l i f · · . , 
where we just go through all the possible input values. By IH we know how to 
Α-define all the elements of Volt..., ц>р, so we can translate the format for F 
into a λ-term by replacing the i t by its defining element and = by ~, where χ ~ y 
for χ and y of domain Dj—> • DJ—»Prop is defined by f\{xt'~ yt) with /\ the 
finite generalised conjunction that lets t vary through the sequences of defining 
elements of D i , . . . , DJ. В 
For example 0 can be defined by J_ and 1 by T. 
Due to the previous lemma we can internalize a valuation ν in the syntax. 
This is done by substituting for the free variable χ the term that λ-defines v(x). 
We introduce the following notation. 
N O T A T I O N . For г> a valuation, the substitution that replaces a free variable χ by 
the closed term that λ-defines v(x), will be denoted by Σ„. (So, for example, for 
ν with u ( a P r o p ) = 0, Σ„ substitutes ± for a). 
The lemma also states that any д can be summed up by closed terms, i.e. we 
can always write VD = { {и), {іт)
І
 • • •, *4<P)}, for some closed terms <i, Í2, · · · , i P , 
where υ is totally arbitrary. This fact can even be proved inside the logic. 
2.4.7. L E M M A . In E-PROPn
c
, if ord(D) < η and VD = {w(ii), v{t2),..., v{lp)}, 
then 
h V/eD. ƒ = Í! V ƒ = t2 V • · · V ƒ = tp. 
P R O O F . By induction on the structure of D, by proving 
f¿UDf¿t2D---Df¿ fp-i Df = tp. 
The proof uses extensionality in the form of 
ƒ φ U h 3x.(fx & ->t,x) V (-.ƒ£ & t,x) 
which is provable from the extensionality axioms. 
The reason that the lemma does not hold for all domains of the logic is simply 
because for domains of order η the formula 
l· VftD.f = ij V ƒ = t2 V · · · V ƒ = tp 
is not in the language of E-PROPn
c
. Η 
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The lemma says, among other things, that h VaeProp.(a = Τ V а = J.) 
is provable in E-PROP3
c
. Let's shortly digress on how one proves this fact as 
an illustration of the proof. Extensionality in E-PROP3
c
 implies the following 
axiom. 
Va,/JeProp.(a~ β) D a = β 
Now α l· α ~ Τ and ->Q l· α ~ J_, hence а V -ι α h a = T V a = l b y 
extensionality, and so h VaeProp.(a = T V u = l ) . 
We have a version of Lemma 2.4 7 for domains of order η in E-PROPn
c
 It 
is strong enough for our purposes. 
2.4.8. L E M M A . In E-PROPn
c
, ifVD = {v(U),... ,v(tp)}, then 
VfeD.f ~ U V · · · V ƒ ~ tp. 
P R O O F . For domains of order < η the lemma follows immediately from the 
previous one (Lemma 2.4.7) For domains D of order η we have to do a case 
analysis and use the previous Lemma. What one really proves is 
I- WfeD.(3x.fx φ US) D • • • D {3S./S φ tp-iS) D (WS. f S = tpx) 
which is sufficient. We give some details for the case of the domain Prop—»Prop 
in E-PROP3
c
. We have to prove 
h V/eProp->Prop.(3a./a φ α) D (За./а φ -.a) D (За.f α φ Τ) Э (Va fa = _L). 
This is easily done by deriving a contradiction from 3a.f α φ a, 3a.f α φ -ία, 
За.f α φ Τ and (/Τ = Τ) V ( ƒ ! = Τ). ΚΙ 
2.4 9. P R O P O S I T I O N . In E-PROPn
c
, for ν a valuation, 
υ(ψ) = 1 => 1 - Σ . Μ , 
υ(φ) = 0 => г--.Е„( >), 
P R O O F . Simultaneously, by induction on the structure of the normal form of φ. 
For φ = VxeD.ip we distinguish two subcases: ord(D) = η and ord(D) < n. We 
treat both subcases for ν (φ) = 1. 
Suppose viyxeD.-ф) = 1 and ord(I>) < n. Then v[x := F](ip) = 1 for all F € VD. 
Say VD = {v(ti),..., v(tp)} (which is justified by Lemma 2.4.6). Then by IH 
h Σ
ν
[χ := tt](i>) 
for all t, (1 < ι < ρ). By Lemma 2.4.7 we know that 
l· χ = U V · · · V χ = tp, 
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so we can do a case analysis to find 
Now Σ„ does not substitute anything for x, so χ is still free in Σ
υ
(φ) We may 
conclude 
h E„(VieD φ) 
Suppose now that г>( і t D φ) = 1 with ord(Z>) = η Then again v[x = F](ip) = 
1 for all F eVD (Say VD = {ufo), ,v(tp)} ) Again by IH 
l·Σ
υ
[x =и](ф) 
for all ί, (1 < г < ρ) By Lemma 2 4 8 we know that 
h χ ~ <i V V i ~ i p 
This is not as strong as what we had in the first case, but it still suffices because 
we may assume that in φ all occurrences of χ appear in the form (xq\ q
r
) with 
x<7i qT e Prop, ι e χ occurs only as a real function (If φ is not yet of this shape 
we 77-expand it) We can do a case analysis to find 
Again χ is free in Σ„(^) and we can conclude 
h Е„( іб£> φ) Η 
2 4 10 COROLLARY (Completeness) In E-PROPn
c
, for φ a formula 
\= Ψ => Γ- φ 
PROOF (= ψ means г> υ (φ) = 1, so by the Proposition h Σ,
ν
(φ) for any valuation 
ν Hence h ψ because we can make all the necessary case distinctions by Lemma 
2 4 7 and Lemma 2 4 8 Η 
2 4 11 COROLLARY All E-PROPn
c
 are decidable 
PROOF Immediate from the previous Corollary and the Soundness (Proposition 
2 4 5) by the fact that the validity of a formula can always be checked in a finite 
part of the truth table model El 
2 4 12 PROPOSITION E-PROP(n+l)
c
 is conservative over E-PROPn
c
 (η ф ω), 
and hence E PROPa>
c
 is conservative over each of the E-PROPn
c 
PROOF By the fact that the truth table model is a model for all the E-PROPn
c 
SI 
2 4 13 COROLLARY PROPn
c
 is conservative over PROP2
c
 for each η 
PROOF Immediate from the fact that PROP2
c
 and E-PROP2
c
 are the same 
system (By Lemma 2 2 10) И 
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2.4.2. Algebraic semantics for intuitionistic propositional logics 
In this section we describe à semantics for our systems of intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic in terms of Heyting algebras It is well-known how this is done 
for the full first order propositional logic, giving rise to a completeness result 
For second and higher order propositional logic we need to refine the notion of 
Heyting algebra to also allow interpretations for the universal quantifier It is 
easily seen that complete Heyting algebras are strong enough to satisfy our pur-
pose complete Heyting algebras have arbitrary meets and joins, so for example 
V/ e Prop—»Prop φ can be interpreted as Л{[ ]г/=FI I F € Л-+Л} It is how­
ever not so easy to show the completeness of complete Heyting algebras over 
E-PROPn (for any n), because the Lindenbaum algebra defined from E-PROPn 
is not a complete Heyting algebra The way out was suggested by Theorem 
13 6 13 of [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988], stating that any Heyting algebra can 
be embedded in a complete Heyting algebra such that Э, -L and all existing V 
and Λ are preserved (and hence the ordering is preserved) The embedding ι that 
is constructed in the proof is also faithful with respect to the ordering, that is, 
if i(a) < г(6) in the image, then a < b in the original Heyting algebra All this 
implies completeness of complete Heyting algebras with respect to E-PROPn, for 
any η Hence we have conservativity of E-PROP(n + 1) over E-PROPn 
In fact the argument that we use gives a completeness result for the systems 
E-PROPnT, which is E-PROPn based on the language of the full simply typed 
lambda calculus This is only done to make things slightly easier and it does not 
have any effect on the results (See also Remark 2 3 5) 
At this point we do not know how (if at all possible) to conclude the conser­
vativity of PROP(n + 1) over PROPn from the conservativity of E PROP(n + 1) 
over E-PROPn However, we do have the conservativity of PROPn over PROP2 
for any n, because PROP2 and E PROP2 are the same system 
It is obvious that extensionahty is required in the syntax because the model 
notion is extensional if, for example, F, G A—*A (where A is the carrier set of 
the algebra) and F(a) = G{a) for all α ζ A, then F = G 
The method of showing conservativity by semantical means seems to be quite 
essential here Most of the other conservativity proofs in this chapter use map­
pings from the 'larger' system to the 'smaller' system that are the identity on the 
smaller system These mappings also constitute a mapping from derivations to 
derivations that is the identity on derivations of the smaller system For the case 
of intuitionistic propositional logics, this method seems to be essentially impossi­
ble there are formulas of PROP2 that have more and more cut-free derivations 
when we go higher in the hierarchy of propositional logics 
2 4 14 D E F I N I T I O N A Heyting algebra (or just Ha) is a tuple (Л,Л, , ± , Э ) 
such that {А, Л, V) is a lattice with least element _L and Э is a binary operation 
with 
a Ab < с •&• a < b Э с 
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Remember that (А, A, V) is a lattice if the binary operations Λ and V satisfy 
the following requirements 
α Α α = α, O V Í = о, 
a Ab = b Aa, o V 6 = 6Vo, 
α Л (6 Л с) = (о ЛЬ) Л с, aV{bVc) = (α V Ь) V с, 
о V (а Л 6) = а, а А (а V о) = α 
Another way of defining the notion of lattice is by saying that it is a poset (A, <) 
with the property that each pair of elements a, 6 € A has a least upperbound 
(denoted by a V b) and a greatest lowerbound (denoted by α Λ 6) By defining 
a < b = о Λ i = α we can then show the equivalence of the two definitions of 
lattice 
2 4 15 D E F I N I T I O N A complete Heyhng algebra (cHa) is a tuple (А, Д, V. -Ц Э) 
such that (А, Л, V) is a complete lattice and (A, A, V, J_, э ) is a Heyting algebra 
(So V and Л are mappings from p{A) to A such that ΐοτ X С A, \l X is the 
least upperbound of X and l\X \s the greatest lower bound of X The binary 
operations Л and V are defined by (for a, b e A) a A b = /\{a,b} and a V b = 
V{a,6}) 
An important feature of Heyting algebras which is forced upon by the presence 
of the binary operation D, is that they satisfy the infmitary distributive law 
(D) aA\JX = { а Л б | б € X } , if VA' exists 
(The inclusion 2 holds in any lattice, for the inclusion Ç it is enough to show 
that a Ac Ç V{a Л 6 | b 6 X} for any с Ç. X, due to the properties of Э) 
Two other important facts are the following 
2 4 16 F A C T 1 If a complete lattice satisfies the infinitary distributive law 
(D), it can be turned into a cHa by defining 
b 3 c =\/{d\dAb<c} 
2 Any Heyting algebra is distributive, ι e any Ha satisfies 
a A (b V с) = (о Л b) V (а Л с) 
For the first statement one has to show that a A b < с <$ a < \/ {d\ d A b < c} 
From left to right is easy, from right to left, notice that if a < \J{d \ d A b < c}, 
then оЛб < bA\/{d\ dAb < c} and the latter is (by D) equal to V{í>Ac¿| dAb < c}, 
which is just с The second is easily verified 
We are now ready to give the algebraic semantics for the systems E-PROPnT 
(A logical system LT is based on the full simply typed lambda calculus, see Def­
inition 2 2 11) Let in the following (А, Д, V, -L, Э) be a cHa We shall freely use 
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the notions V and Λ, as they were given in Definition 2 4 15 The interpretation 
of the terms of E-PROPn will be in A and its higher order function spaces We 
therefore let [~—] be the mapping that associates the right function space to a 
domain D, so 
ГРгорІ = A, 
Г£>і-»£>2І = ГОЛ - \D2], 
where the second —• describes function space In the following we shall freely 
speak of the 'interpretation of E-PROPnT in (А, Л, V, -Ц Э)\ where of course this 
interpretation includes the mapping of higher order terms into the appropriate 
higher order function space based on A 
2 4 17 DEFINITION Let η e N U {ш} An algebraic model of E-PROPnT is a 
pair ( ,С), with Θ a cHa and С a valuation of the constants in Θ such that, if с 
is a constant of domain D, then C(c) € \D~\ 
2 4 18 DEFINITION The interpretation of E-PROPTIT in the algebraic model 
((Д A,V>-L, Э),С), [—J, is defined modulo a valuation ρ for free variables that 
maps variables of domain D into \D~\ So let ρ be a valuation Then [—] is 
defined inductively as follows 
ICL = £(c)> f°r c a constant, 
ÎQL = P(Q)> f°r a a variable, 
[PQh = [P]P[Q]P, 
[Xx(DQ]p = Xte\D]lQJ^x=t), 
[votf], = ІР]
Р
Э[Ф]
Р
, 
№cD4>]p = Л{Нр(«-.)І*еГо1} 
It is easily seen that [—] satisfies the usual substitution property and that 
interpretations are stable under ¿fy-equality, ι e 
and 
P=ßvQ=> [P}„ = IQ}„ 
2 4 19 DEFINITION For Γ a finite set of formulas of E-PROPnT, φ a formula 
of E-PROPnT and (Q,C) an algebraic model, φ is (Q,C)-vahd m Γ, notation 
Γ \=(e,c) Ψ, if for all valuations p, 
Л{М,І іКГ}<ы 
If Γ is empty we say that φ is ( ,С)-valid if \=( ,с) Ψ 
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Note that A{(VJ,, ΙΦ € Γ} exists, beacuse Γ is finite. In the following we just 
write [Γ]
ρ
 for Λ { Μ , Ι ^ € Γ } . 
Our definition is a bit different from the one in [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988], 
where Г (=( ,с) Ψ is defined by 
W>er[M, = T] => [φ]
ρ
 = τ. 
Our notion implies the one above, but not the other way around. However, they 
are the same if Γ = 0 and they also yield the same consequence relation. One 
disadvantage of our notion is that we have to restrict to finite Γ. This is easily 
overcome by putting 
Г И( ,с) Ψ if for all finite Г' С Г, Г' \=( ,с) ψ-
2.4.20. DEFINITION. Let Γ be a (finite) set of formulas of E-PROPnT and φ a 
formula of E-PROPnT. We say that φ is a consequence ofT, notation Γ (= φ, if 
Г (=( ,с) Ψ for all algebraic models (0,C). 
2.4.21. PROPOSITION (Soundness). For Γ a finite set of formulas of E-PROPnT 
and ψ a formula of E-PROPnT, 
Γ r-E-pROPr^ φ=> Γ \= φ. 
PROOF. Let (Θ, С) be a model. By induction on the derivation of Г h φ we show 
that for all valuations ρ, [Γ] < \φ\ . None of the six cases is difficult. We treat 
the cases for the last rule being (Э -E) and (V-I). 
(Э -E) Say φ has been derived from ф D φ and ф. Let ρ be valuation. Then by IH 
ΪΠρ < Ш„ and [Г], < [φ D φ]
ρ
. The second implies [ Л
р
Л [ ^ < M , · 
So, by [Г]
р
 < [ф]
р
 we conclude [Γ]
ρ
 < [φ]
ρ
. 
(V-I) Say φ = V/eD.V» and Г' С Γ is the finite set of non-discharged formulas 
of the derivation with conclusion ψ. Then by IH, р[[Г'] < {Φ}.], so 
VpVF e lD~\[[rjp < [Φΐρσ=Ρλ because / І FV(r'). This immediately 
implies that [T\p < [V/ ε 0.φ]ρ. Kl 
To show completeness we first construct the Lindenbaum algebra for E-PROPnT. 
This is a Ha but not yet a cHa. The construction in [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988] 
tels us how to turn it into a cHa which has all the desired properties. 
2.4.22. DEFINITION. For η € N U {ω}, we define the Lmdenbaum algebra for 
E-PROPn, C
n
. First we define the equivalence relation ~ on Sent(E-PROPrT) 
by 
φ ~ φ : = I-E-pRopnT φ Эф к ф D φ. 
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We denote the equivalence class of φ under ~ by [φ]. C
n
 is now defined as the 
На (Л,Л, V, J., D) where 
A = (Sent(E-PROPnT))„., 
[φ]Α[φ] = [ψ к V], 
[φ] У [Φ] = [φνψ], 
[φ] D [φ] = [ψ D φ), 
W = [-L]. 
Note that the &, V, Э and J- on the right of the = are the logical connectives: 
D is basic and the others were defined in Remark 2.2.7 by 
φ S¿ ф 
φ V ψ 
1 
= VaeProp(<¿> Э ф D α) D а, 
= VaeProp(</3 D et) D {φ D α) D а, 
= VaePropa. 
Each C
n
 is obviously a Ha: [ψ] < [φ] iff φ Ι"
Ε
-ρ
Η
ορ
η
τ ф. Further each C
n
 can 
trivially be turned into a model by taking as valuation of the constants С the map­
ping that associates to a constant its equivalence class. We shall not distinguish 
between the Lindenbaum algebra £
n
 and the model (C
n
,C). 
2.4.23. LEMMA. For Γ α finite set of sentences of E-PROPnT and φ a sentence 
O/E-PROPTT, 
Γ bE-pRopn ' ψ ·» Γ <φ in £„). 
PROOF. Immediate by the construction of C
n
. Η 
2.4.24. THEOREM ([Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988]). Each Ha Θ can be embed­
ded into a cHa с such that Л, V, _L, Э and existing Λ o-nd V are preserved and 
< is reflected. 
PROOF. Let Θ = (Α, Λ, V, _L, Э) be a Ha. A complete ideal of θ , or just c-ideal, 
is a subset I С A that satisfies the following properties. 
1. 1 6 7, 
2. I is downward closed (i.e. if b g I and a < b, then a € I), 
3. I is closed under existing sups (i.e. if X С I and V^ exists, then V^ € / ) . 
Now define с to be the lattice of c-ideals, ordered by inclusion. Then с is a 
complete lattice that satisfies the infinitary distributive law D, and hence с is 
a cHa by defining 
/ Э J:=\J{K\K/\I С J). 
To verify this note the following. 
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• с has infs defined by /\q£QIq = fl,eg Iq 
• с has sups defined by V?eQ^? = {V-^  I X С Uge<? V V^ exists}, the set 
{V^ I -^ С UJEQ Iq,\IX exists} is indeed a c-ideal and it is also the least 
c-ideal containing all ƒ, 
• Ι Π \¡4SQI4 = V{^ Π /, | q e Q} and so D holds 
The embedding ι from Θ to с is now defined by 
г(а) = {χ Ε Α Ι χ < α} 
The embedding preserves J_, Э and all existing Д, V For the preserving of Vi 
let X С A such that V-^  exists in Θ We have to show that i(\/X) = \/
xe
xi(x), 
ι e show that 
{yeA\y<\JX} = {\/Y\Yc (J t(i),V^exists} 
ι ε χ 
For the inclusion from left to right, note that X С {у € A \ 3x € X[y < x}} and 
so X С Uiex г(х) This implies that V * € {VV I V С \J
xeX г{х), V^exists} and 
so we are done because the latter is а с ideal For the inclusion from right to left, 
let ζ = \JY(¡ with Уо С U*ex г(х) Then ζ < \JX so we are done 
Finally, the embedding ι reflects the ordering, ι e 
г(а) С г(6) ^ а < 6 й 
2 4 25 COROLLARY (Completeness) ForT α finite set of sentences o/E-PROPnT 
and φ a sentence of E-PROPn1", 
Γ |= φ =>• Г Ь
Е
_
РІЮ
рпт φ 
PROOF Following the Theorem, we embed the Lindenbaum algebra of E-PROPnT, 
C
n
, in the cHa cC
n
 This cHa cC
n
 is then turned into an algebraic model of 
E-PROPnT by taking as valuation of the constants, C, just the embedding of the 
equivalence classes of constants in cC
n
 This algebraic model (cC
n
,C) is com­
plete with respect to the logic for Γ a finite set of sentences and φ a sentence of 
E P R O P T T , we have 
Γ \=(cc
n
 ΟΨ => Γ < φ in C
n
 => Γ r-E-pRop„- φ В 
2 4 26 COROLLARY (Conservativity) For any η > 2, E-PROP(n + l) is conser­
vative over E-PROPn, and hence E-PROPo; is conservative over E-PROPn 
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PROOF By Corollary 2 3 6, it suffices to show the conservativity of E-PROP(n.+ 
1)T over E-PROPnT For Γ a finite set of sentences and φ a sentence of E-PROPnT, 
Γ r-E PROP(n+i)r Ψ => Γ f= φ => Γ H E . P R op n T φ 
by soundness and completeness of the algebraic models for any of the E-PROPnT 
The conservativity of E-PROPu; over E-PROPn is now immediate any deriva­
tion in E-PROPu; is a derivation in E-PROPm for some m G Ν Η 
2 4 27 COROLLARY For any η e MU {ω}, PROPn is conservative over PROP2 
PROOF By the fact that PROPn is a subsystem of E-PROPn and the fact that 
PROP2 and E-PROP2 are the same system Η 
2.4.3. Kripke semantics for intuitionistic propositional logics 
In the previous section we saw an algebraic semantics for the systems E-PROPnT 
(which is at the same time a semantics for the systems E PROPn) In this 
paragraph we want to give a Kripke semantics for the systems PROPn, so without 
extensionahty In fact this was our first starting point for the research into the 
conservativity of PROP(n+1) over PROPn However, as it did not seem to work 
for our purpose, we considered using an algebraic semantics instead This, as the 
previous paragraph shows, works only for the extensional case So, although we do 
not know how to use the Kripke semantics for solving the conservativity problem, 
we do want to describe it here, because it gives a complete model notion for the 
PROPn For convenience we describe the models as a semantics for PROPnT, 
but we know that there is no problem in that slight extension 
The exposition we give here owes much to [Smorynski 1973], where extensions 
of Kripke models to higher orders are suggested 
The basis of a Kripke model is a partial order, which is in practice usually a 
well-founded tree, <K, Ç >, whose elements are called nodes There is a relation 
II- between the set of nodes and the set of formulas of the propositional logic, 
such that certain conditions are satisfied (Roughly that 'knowledge' grows with 
the increasing of the order and that _1_ is not satisfied at any of the nodes) Now, 
if one adds first order quantification to the logic, the partial order <K, С > 
has to be extended with a function W that assigns to every node к a set W(k) 
(the 'world' at node k) such that W is monotone (Our knowledge of the world 
grows) The case for many-sorted logics is not really different, in that case we 
have a number of monotone functions W
u
 as many as we have sorts in the logic 
For second order propositional logic the situation is not very different from 
that for first order predicate logic, except that now the domain of quantification is 
the set of closed formulas, Sent, and so W К —* Sent Higher order propositional 
logic can now just be treated in a 'many-sorted' way for every domain D in the 
logic we have a function Wp К —» D, where D is in fact just obtained by 
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replacing Prop by Sent everywhere in D So we see that the sets over which is 
quantified in the model are just sets of syntactic objects of the same domain It 
is a bit peculiar to let the sets that one quantifies over in the model only be a 
subset of the set of all syntactic objects of the corresponding domain shouldn't 
Wp
ro
Jk) be Sent for all к € К7 (All formulas are known to us at any specific 
node) It turns out that this is the right choice it conforms with the Kripke 
semantics for higher order predicate logic and, more importantly, this is the way 
to get a notion of model that is sound and complete with respect to the logics 
It is obvious that the kind of model that we get by this construction is very 
syntactical Moreover it doesn't seem to use the partial order structure of the 
Kripke model in an essential way One way to make it a bit less syntactical is by 
letting the world not be Sent at any point but an arbitrary model of the language 
of PROPrT, that is an arbitrary model of the simply typed lambda calculus We 
shall not follow this possibility here because at the one hand it doesn't seem to 
give us a lot of extras while at the other hand it will be quite obvious from our 
definitions how to do it 
2 4 28 DEFINITION To every domain D of PROP^ we associate a set of terms, 
D, which is just {i|< e D, t is closed} 
So, for example Prop = Sent The definition is very trivial, but we want to be 
specific about this, because it is easy to confuse the object language of the logic 
and the language of the model 
2 4 29 DEFINITION A Kripke model for PROPrT is a triple <K, C,\l· >, where 
<K, С > is a partial order and II· is a binary relation between elements of К and 
sentences that satisfies 
A; Ih φ к φ =β -ψ => к II· ψ, 
к\і-іркІЭк => /II· φ, 
к\УірЭф <S> il Ώ k[l II· φ => / II· ф], 
k\VixDψ ο· it 6 ¿»[fclr-^í/i]], 
where the I and к range over the nodes (the set Κ), φ and ф are formulas and 
D is a domain over which quantification is allowed in PROPrT 
Note that the V/ and Vi in the definition are in the meta-language of the 
model 
2 4 30 REMARK AS condition on the relation II· with respect to the V connective, 
one usually finds 
A: II· 4xDip & V/ 3 kit e D[l II· φ[ί/χ]], 
but as the range of quantification in the model does not grow with the increasing 
of the ordering Ç, this is equivalent to the second condition in Definition 2 4 29 
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In some definitions of Kripke model (like the one in [van Dalen 1983]) the 
relation Ih is between the nodes and the atomic formulas As the systems we are 
considering are all impredicative this method does not work here 
To interpret formulas we have to close them by substituting closed terms for 
the free variables We denote such a substitution by * and we always assume that 
for all variables it substitutes a closed term of the right domain 
2 4 31 D E F I N I T I O N Let ψ be a formula of P R O P T T and Γ a set of formulas of 
P R O P T T 
1 For <K, E, Ih > a Kripke model for P R O P T T , we say that ψ is <K, Ç, II· >-
valid m Γ, notation Г \\-<ксп-> <Л if 
for all substitutions *, VJfc € K[k Ih (Г)* => k Ih (φ)'], 
where k II· (Γ)" obviously means that k Ih ф for all φ e (Γ)* 
2 We say that φ is valid in Γ, notation Γ |= φ, if 
Γ lh<A-,Cii-> ψ for all Kripke models <K, Ç,lh > of P R O P T T 
2 4 32 P R O P O S I T I O N (Soundness) For Г о sei of formulas of P R O P n r and φ a 
formula of PROPn T , 
Γ hpROPn^ ψ => Γ |= ψ 
P R O O F Let <Κ, С, Ih > be a Kripke model for P R O P T T By induction on the 
derivation of Γ hpR OPn
T
 Ψ we prove 
Γ hpRoPnT- φ => Γ lh<i f iç ii(.> φ 
If the last rule is (conv), or if φ 6 Γ, we are immediately done 
( D - I ) Say φ Ξ χ Э ф Then by IH Γ, χ II· ф, ι e for all substitutions * we have 
V/c e K[k Ih Γ*, χ* =ί> k Ih ψ·\ Now let * be a substitution and let / G К 
with / Ih Г" and m Ώ I with m Ih χ' Then m Ih Γ', χ* and hence by IH 
τη Ih φ', so we are done 
(Э-Е) Say φ has been derived from ф D φ and ф, so we have as IH Γ Ih ф D φ 
and Γ Ih ф Now let " be a substitution and let k 6 К with fc Ih Г* Then 
by IH k Ih ф' and V/ Ώ k[l \l· φ* =ϊ l Ih ρ'] Because k 3 fc we find that 
fc Ih (¿>* and we are done 
(V-I) Say φ = VxeD ф, so we have as IH Γ Ih φ That is, for all substitutions * 
we have V/c 6 K[k It- Γ" => A; Ih φ*] Now xD does not occur free in Γ, so 
we know that for all substitutions * and all t e D, V/c 6 K[k Ih Γ* => k Ih 
( # / * ] ) * ] Hence Γ Ih VieD V 
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(V-Ε) Say ψ = φ[Ρ/χ], which has been derived from WxeD φ Then by IH Γ Ib 
VieD φ Now let * be a substitution and к Ε К such that A; Ih Г* Then 
for all t 6 b к Ih {φ[ί/χ})' and hence к Ih (φ[Ρ'/χ])', ι e A: Ih (^[Ρ/ι])* 
2 4 33 PROPOSITION (Completeness) For Г a set of sentences of PROPnT and 
φ a sentence of PROPnT, 
Γ \=φ=> Γ hpnop^ ν? 
PROOF The proof is by contraposition, so we suppose Γ I/PROP^ Ψ and construct 
a Kripke model <K, C,lh > of PROPrT in which Γ Ι/ φ (Our construction of 
the counter-model is a direct generalisation of the standard construction of a 
counter-model for showing completeness of Kripke models with respect to first 
order intuitionistic predicate logic, as it is given for example in [van Dalen 1983]) 
Before giving the model we introduce one extra notion for Δ a set of sentences, 
we write Δ for the closure of Δ under denvabihty in PROPrT Now the model 
is defined as follows 
• Κ = Ν*, the set of finite sequences of natural numbers, 
• ptlfh = 33\p*a = m], where • is the concatenation operation, 
• For every m € Ν* we define a set of sentences of PROPnT, Σ(τη), by 
induction on the length of m, as follows 
- Σ ( ο ) = Γ, 
- For E(m) defined, consider an enumeration of sentences ψο, ψ\, such 
that Σ(πι) U {tpt} is consistent for all г Now define 
Е(т*г) =Σ{τη)υ{φ
ι
) 
The relation Ih is now defined by 
m Ih ф =фе Σ{πι)(& Σ(τη) h ф) 
We now only have to verify the following two facts 
1 <N*, Ç, Ih > is a Kripke model of PROPrT, 
2 In the model we have <> Ih Г, О Ι/ φ and hence Γ ψ ψ 
The second follows immediately from the construction of the model The first is 
slightly more work we have to check the four cases of Definition 2 4 29 The first 
two cases are trivial, we give detailed proofs of the third and fourth case 
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• m l h i p D i / i o V p D m\p Ih <£ =>· plh V] for (=*·), let ρ Ώ m, ρ Ih φ 
Then Σ(ρ) h- <¿> and Σ (ρ) h ν? D V, so Σ(ρ) h V, so ρ Ih ψ For («=), 
let m be a finite sequence From the assumption we know that Vp 3 
то Σ(ρ) l· з^ => Σ(ρ) h -0 We distinguish two cases according to whether 
Σ(τη) U {φ} is consistent or not If Σ(τη) Ο {ψ} is inconsistent, then trivially 
Σ(πι)ΐ){φ} h ψ and so Σ{τη) \- φ Э ψ and hence m Ih ψ D ψ If Σ(τη)υ{<^} 
is consistent, then Σ(τπ) U {(^ } = Σ(τη*ζ) for some г, and hence Σ(τη*ι) h ip 
by the assumption But then Σ (τη * г) U {φ} h ψ, so Σ(τη) h p D t f and 
hence m\l· φ Э ψ 
• m Ih VXEZV <=> Vi 6 £>[m Ih <p[i/:r]] for =>, let ί 6 І) Now Σ(τπ) Η VieD^ 
and hence Σ(τπ) h >p[t/x} For ·<=, from the assumption we know that 
m Ih <¿>[c/x] for all constants c, ι e Σ(τπ) h < [^c/i] for all constants and so 
Σ(πι) h Vieö ρ И 
Technically, the reason that we can not get conservativity from this model 
notion is that a model of PROPnT is in general not a model of PROP(n + 1)T 
In less technical terms the reason seems to be that the model notion is too 
syntactical, especially in the clause for the universal quantifier, where the ordering 
Ç doesn't play any role at all 
Chapter 3 
The formulas-as-types 
embedding 
3.1. Introduction 
The so called formulas-as-types embedding provides a formalization of the Brou-
wer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of proofs as constructions. The first de-
tailed description is in [Howard 1980], where also the terminology 'formulas-as-
types' is first used. There it is shown how, in first order logic, types can be 
associated with formulas and lambda terms with proofs in such a way that there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between types and formulas and terms and proofs 
and further that cut-elimination in the logic corresponds to reduction in the term 
calculus. In view of the last point it would be correct also to associate Tait with 
the formulas-as-types notion, as his [Tait 1965] 'discovery of the close correspon-
dence between cut-elimination and reduction of lambda terms provided half of the 
motivation' for [Howard 1980]. Also de Bruijn is often associated to the formulas-
as-types notion, because the Automath project which was founded by de Bruijn, 
was the first to rigorously interpret mathematical structures and propositions as 
types and objects and proofs as lambda terms. So, from a wider perspective it 
is certainly justifiable to speak of the Curry-Howard-de Bruijn embedding (also 
because the earliest developments in Automath took place independent of the 
work of Howard). Having said this we want to point out that there are essential 
differences between the two approaches. For example, in the Automath systems 
the logic is coded into the system, so there is in general no reduction relation 
in the term calculus that corresponds to cut-elimination. Automath systems are 
intended to serve as a logical framework in which the user can work with any for-
mal systems he or she desires. Application, A-abstraction and conversion serve 
as tools for handling the basic mathematical manipulations like function applica-
tion, function definition and substitution. It is appropriate to remark here that 
some later systems of the Automath family do use the abstraction-application 
features of the system to interpret logical connectives directly (and hence reduc-
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tion corresponds to cut-elimination) Later in this section we shall give some 
examples of Automath systems to clarify these remarks 
We do not go into great detail about the Brouwer Heyting Kolmogorov (BHK) 
interpretation of proofs [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988] is a good reference and 
gives a thorough explanation of the idea Let's just discuss the connectives D 
and V according to the BHK interpretation 
1 A proof of φ D φ is a method for constructing a proof of ψ from a proof of 
Ψ 
2 A proof of Vi 6 Α φ{χ) is a method for constructing a proof of ψ{α) from 
a proof of о 6 A 
It is obvious (in retrospect) that the lambda calculus provides the necessary 
mechanisms for turning the informal interpretations into a formal system For 
minimal propositional logic this was already noticed by [Curry and Feys 1958] 
For first order predicate logic, [Howard 1980] was the first to give a formalisation 
of the BHK interpretation using typed lambda calculus Due to the work of 
[Church 1940] it was already known that also the language of predicate logic can 
be presented as a typed lambda calculus Over the years this has led to the 
definition of various typed lambda calculi that incorporate the logical language 
and proofs (in the form of lambda terms) in one system In this thesis we shall 
see a variety of those systems 
We do not claim to give an overview of all the possible approaches to the 
formulas as-types embedding In fact we do not even attempt to do this For 
example one of the main contributions to the field, the work in Martin-Lof's type 
theory, will not be treated at all One of the reasons is that a PhD thesis is not the 
place to give a detailed technical overview of such a broad field as Type Theory, 
but another important reason is that the approach of Martin Lof does not really 
fit with the framework of logics as we have set it up in the previous chapter 
One of the main problems is that, due to the understanding of the existential 
quantifier in terms of a strong Σ type, the logic of Martin-Lof is strictly first 
order (in order to remain consistent) We do not feel that the forced lack of 
Σ-types in our higher order logics is a big gap, but that is because we feel that 
the strong Σ-type is not the right way to formalise the intuitionistic existential 
quantifier (To be precise we do not mean to say that Σ types are not a valid 
mathematical concept, but only that Σ should not be understood as 3) 
Of course there is also a lot to say about systems that we do treat and we 
shall do so at the appropriate places in the text 
3.2. The formulas-as-types notion à la Howard 
In this paragraph we look at an interpretation of formulas as types and proofs as 
terms m the flavour of [Howard 1980], where the interpretation is given for full 
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first order predicate logic. Although in flavour the same, our treatment is quite 
a bit different from Howard's, as has already been pointed out in the previous 
chapter. As we are mainly concerned with logics that only use Э and V we shall 
not treat the full first order predicate logic here but restrict to the system PRED. 
First order logic based on just Э and V is quite minimal, but it is sufficient to make 
the general idea sufficiently clear. In our formalisation the logical language will 
also be presented in a typed lambda calculus manner. This idea of an 'all-in-one 
presentation' is probably due to de Bruijn and his Automath project, although 
we are not absolutely sure. 
3.2.1. DEFINITION. 1. The set of functional types of APRED, Type', is de­
scribed by the following abstract syntax. 
Type' ::= \Іггіу | Type'—>Type', 
with Var'" a countable set of type-variables. The set of predicate types of 
APRED, Typep, consists of the expressions 
σι-»σ2-» ^„-»Prop, 
with η > 0 and all ot functional types. 
2. The object-terms of the language of APRED form a subset of the set of 
pseudoterms, T, which is generated by the following abstract syntax 
Τ ::= Varob | TT | λ τ Type'Τ | Τ Э Τ | War^Type'.T, 
with Var"6 a countable set of object-variables. An object-term is of a certain 
type only under assumption of specific types (functional or predicative) for 
the free variables that occur in the term. That the object-term t is of type 
A if xt is of type Ax for 1 < г < n, is denoted by 
xl:A1,x2:A2,... ,xn:An\- t : A. 
Here i i , . . . , i
n
 are different object-variables and A\,...,A
n
 are types. The 
part Χχ.Αι,Χϊ.Αϊι... ,!„:/!„ is called an object-context. The rules for deriv-
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ing these typing judgements are the following 
(var) 
(λ abs) 
(app) 
O) 
(V) 
„ . . if χ A in Γ 
Γ I- χ A 
T,xA\-t В 
Г h λχ Α ί Α^Β 
Γl·q Α^Β Γ h i Α 
Thqt Β 
Γ h φ Prop Γ h ф Prop 
Γ h ψ D ф Prop 
Γ, ι Л г-ν? Prop 
if Л a function 
Г h Vx Α φ Prop 
3 The set of proof-terms is a subset of the set of pseudoproofs, P, generated 
by the following abstract syntax 
Ρ = аг
рт
 I PP I PT Ι λχ Type' Ρ | λχ Τ Ρ, 
where Var*"" is the set of proof variables The rules for generating statements 
of the form 
χι A
u
 ,x
n
A
n
,pi<p
u
 ,Pfc¥>*r-M A, 
where the χ A is as in 2, p\, pk are different proof-variables and 
X\ A\, , x
n
 A
n
 r- φ
χ
 Prop for 1 < ι < к, 
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are the following (The part pi φι, ,pk φ^ is called the proof context as 
opposed to the object-context ) 
(axiom)
 Γ ι Δ ( _ ρ φ ιΐρφιηΑ, 
Τ,Δ,ρφ\-Μ ф 
(D -in) 
(Э -el) 
(V-in) ^ —» ' „ , # — if i $ FV(A), A a functional type, 
(V-el) 
(conv) ή ψ =3 ф 
Γ, Δ h Μ φ 
The intention of the system should be clear natural deduction proofs of 
PRED are interpreted as typed lambda terms in APRED The language of PRED 
is also a typed lambda calculus and also that part is formalised in APRED in a 
typing judgement that is obtained via derivations Note that the functional types 
correspond to domains of order 1 (the ones over which quantification is allowed) 
and the predicative types correspond to domains of order 2 Before describing a 
formal correspondence between derivations in PRED and proof-terms in APRED, 
we give two examples 
3 2 2 EXAMPLES 1 From the deduction 
Vx A {Px DQ) VI A Px 
PxDQ PX 
Γ, Al· Χρφ Μ φΟ ф 
Τ, Al· Μ φ Эф Γ, Δ h Ν φ 
Γ, Al· Μ Ν φ 
Γ, χ A, A h Μ φ 
Γ,Al·\xAM 4χΑφ 
Γ, Al· Μ Vi Αφ Yl·t Α 
Γ, Δ h Mt φ[1/χ] 
Τ, Al· Μ φ Tl· φ Prop 
Q 
we obtain the judgement 
Ρ Л->Ргор,С> Prop, χ A, 
Pi Vi A{PX D <5),p2Vx A Px l· pii(p 2 i) Q 
Notice that the declaration of ι is essential here for the construction of 
the proof (APRED explicitly takes care of the so called free logic, where 
domains are allowed to be empty ) 
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2 From the deduction 
Vx A {Px Э (?) Vx Л Px 
PXDQ PX 
Q 
хЛ Qx 
we obtain the judgement 
Ρ Л—Ргор,С Prop, 
Pi Vx Л (Px D Q),p2 Vx Л Px l· XxApix{p2x) Vx Л Q 
Now it is not needed for the construction of the proof to declare χ 
We list some of the meta theoretical properties of APRED that we shall be 
using later They are given without proof later we shall encounter other (more 
complicated) typed lambda calculi for which these properties also hold and we 
prefer to prove them once for all systems together 
3 2 3 FACT Let Γ, Δ Ι- Μ φ be derivable in APRED We have the following 
properties 
1 Permutation if Γ' is a permutation of Γ and Δ' a permutation of Δ, then 
Γ', Δ' l· Μ φ \ also derivable 
2 Substitution if Γ contains χ A and Γ\ [χ A) l· ί Л then Г\(х Л), A[t/x] l· 
M[t/x] tp[t/x] is also derivable 
3 Thinning if Г' Э Г, Г' an object context and Δ' D A, A' a proof-context, 
then Γ', Δ' l· Μ φ is also derivable 
4 Closure or Subject-Reduction îlf M -»0 M', then Γ, Δ h Μ' φ is also 
derivable 
5 Stripping or Generation 
Γ,ΔΙ-ρ ψ 
(ρ a proof variable) 
Τ,Α^ΧχΑΜ φ 
(Л a type) 
Γ, Δ r- λρ χ Μ φ 
(χ a proposition) 
Γ,Ah MN φ 
(Ν a proof) 
Γ, Δ h Mí ψ 
(t an object) 
=> 
= > • 
=s> 
=> 
=> 
φ = ip with ρ ψ Ç A 
for some ψ, 
Γ, χ Л, Δ h M ip with ψ = Vx Л ф 
for some ф, 
Г, Δ, ρ χ Í- M ф with ψ = χ D ф 
for some ф, 
Γ, Al· Μ ν ο χ , Γ , Δ Ι - Λ Γ φ with ψ = χ 
for some φ, χ, 
Γ, Al· M Vx Л φ, Γ h t A with φ = f[t/x] 
for some ф, A 
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To a deduction of 
V i . ,ψπ^Φ 
in PRED, we are going to associate an object context Γ and a proof-term M such 
that 
Г,Рі і. ,ρ
η
ψ
η
\-Μ φ 
in APRED We want M to be a faithful representaton of the deduction in PRED 
such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between deductions (in PRED) 
and proof-terms (in APRED) To achieve this, Γ should assign types to all the 
free term-variables in the deduction that are not bound by a V at any later stage 
(What it means for variables to be 'bound by a V' will be explained later) From 
the examples it will be clear that sometimes we have to declare a variable x, 
even though this variable does not occur free in the conclusion or in any of the 
premises of the derivation Before giving the translation we have to define two 
operations on contexts that will be used 
3 2 4 D E F I N I T I O N For Γι and Γ 2 object-context, the union ofT\ and Γ 2 , Γ ι υ Γ 2 ) 
is Γι followed by Γ2, with the restriction that if χ is declared in both contexts, 
say χ Л € Γι and χ В € Г2, then 
Α Ξ В => χ В is left out, (so we leave only χ A 
Α φ. В => both χ A and χ В are left out 
For Δι and Δ 2 proof-context, the disjoint union of Δι and Δ 2 , Δι kí Δ 2 , is 
Δι followed by Δ 2 , with the restriction that if ρ is declared in both contexts, 
say ρ ψ 6 Δι and ρ ψ e Δ 2 , then the second ρ is renamed with a fresh 
proof variable q So, for example 
(P ψ)&(ρ ψ)=Ρ Ψ, Я Ψ 
Note that Γι U Γ2 is always a correct object-context and that, if Δι and Δ 2 
are corrects proof-contexts w r t Γ, then Δ
χ
 1+) Δ 2 is a correct proof-context w г t 
Г 
3 2 5 D E F I N I T I O N For every term t of the language of PRED we define a context 
Г, such that r , h ( D (in APRED) if t e D (in PRED), as follows 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
XD 
XxeD M 
MN 
φ D φ 
^ΧίΌψ 
г( 
Γ, 
Γ, 
Γ« 
Γ« 
= ΧΌ D, 
= r M \ ( i D ) , 
= Гм U Tjv, 
= Γ,,υΓψ, 
= Γ , \ ( ι ΰ ) 
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We now define, by induction, for every deduction in PRED an object context 
Γ, a proof context Δ and a term M such that 
Γ , Δ Κ Μ </> (in APRED), 
if φ is the conclusion of the deduction In fact this establishes a mapping from 
deductions to λ terms In the following we shall denote deductions by the capital 
Greek characters Σ and Θ To denote explicitly that φ is a conclusion of the 
deduction ψ we shall often use the format 
Σ 
Ψ 
(So when we write this down we mean that ψ is part of the deduction Σ ) For 
reasons of hygiene we shall assume that in a deduction all bound variables are 
chosen distinct and different from the free ones 
3 2 6 D E F I N I T I O N We inductively define the mapping ([-]) from deductions of 
PRED to proof terms of APRED Together with the proof term we define an 
object-context and a proof context in which the proof term is typable The double 
horizontal lines on the right mean that the judgement below is being defined in 
terms of the judgement above 
Φ ι—• Г^,рфЬр φ, 
Γ, Δ h ([Σ]) ф 
Ы 
Σ 
Φ 
<рЭф' 
Σ Θ 
φ Э φ φ 
Φ 
Σ 
Φ 
V x e D V 
Σ 
Vx e D φ 
φ[ί/χ] 
Σ 
Φ if φ = φ 
Ψ 
ΓΌΓ
φ
,Α\(ρφ)\-Χρφ([Σ^ ψ D ф 
η , Δ , Η Σ β φρψ Г
а
,Д
а
І-Д Р φ 
r i u r j . ^ w A j i - í E D í e í φ 
Γ,ΔΚ([ΣΡ φ 
Γ\(χ£»),ΔΙ-λι£)([Σ]) Vi Ώφ 
Γι,ΔΙ-([Σ5 VxD ψ Γ2 h ί D 
ι\ υ Γ2, Δ h flq)t Φ[ί/χ] 
Γ, Δ h ([Σ]) φ Υ
φ
\-ψ Prop 
Γ U IV Δ h ( И φ 
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The cases in the definition for the last rule being (Э-І) and (Э-Е) need some 
extra clarification 
(D-I) The [φ]1 on top of the deduction signifies a specific set of occurrences of the 
formula ψ as leaves of the deduction tree As this set may also be empty 
we have to take the union of Γ with Г^ What happens at an (Э-І) rule is 
the following 
1 Add a fresh declaration ρ φ to Δ 
2 Remove the declarations ρ' φ that correspond to an occurrence of φ 
that is being discharged 
3 Substitute ρ for p' in ([Σ]) 
4 Abstract from the last declaration in Δ (which is ρ φ) 
(Э-Е) In fact the ([ ]) is not exactly the ([ Ц that is found by induction Possi­
bly some of the free variables in ([ ]) are renamed What happens is the 
following 
1 Consider the proof-context Δι 1+) Δ 2 and especially the renaming of 
the declared variables in Δ2 that has been caused by the operation 1+) 
2 Rename the free proof-variables m ([Θ]) accordingly, obtaining say, 
(I©'D 
3 Apply Щ to j e ' j 
(There will in practice be no confusion if we just write <[Q]¡ instead ) 
Of course the intended meaning is that the judgement below the double lines 
is derivable if the judgement above the lines is This will be proved later in 
Theorem 3 2 8 It should be clear at this point however that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the occurrences of φ as a (non-discharged) premise in 
the deduction and declarations ρ φ m Δ 
NOTATION If for Σ a deduction in PRED, Γ, Δ h ([ΣΙ) φ is the judgement that 
we obtain from Σ by Definition 3 2 6 above, we write Γ E for Γ and Δ^ for Δ 
Let us state the following trivial facts about the definition 
3 2 7 FACT 1 For Σ a deduction in PRED there is a one-to-one correspon­
dence between occurrences of non-discharged formulas of Σ and declarations 
of variables to the same formula in ΑΣ 
2 In the case for the (V-I) rule the variable χ does not occur free in the 
proof-context Δ 
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3.2.8. T H E O R E M . 
Σ
 in PRED => Γ
Σ
; Δ
Σ
 h ([Σ]) : ψ is derivable m APRED 
P R O O F . By induction on the deduction Σ. The proof follows easily by using the 
meta-theoretical facts of APRED that were stated in 3.2.3. Kl 
The proof-context Δ^ represents precisely the non-discharged assumptions of 
Σ. The object-context Γ Σ declares precisely those object-variables that occur in 
Σ and are not bound later by a V 
Due to the conversion rule, the context Γ
Ε
 is not minimal with respect to the 
judgement 
in the sense that there may be a smaller object-context Γ for which 
Γ; Δ
Ε
 h (И) : ψ 
is derivable. (A proof of the statement 'all declared variables in Γ
Σ
 occur free in 
Δ Ε or ([Σ])' breaks down on the conversion rule.) A counterexample to minimality 
of Γ Σ is given by the derivation 
Ы 
(\χ:Α.φ D ip)y 
φΖ)ψ 
We have Γ
Σ
 = φ-Ρτορ,υ.:Α, Δ
Ε
 = 0, ([Σ]) = Χρ·ψ ρ, whereas 
<¿?:Prop; h \ρ:φ.ρ : φ D ψ. 
The conversion rule is also the reason that the embedding ([]) is not really one-
to-one. The λ-term ([Σ]) that we obtain ignores all applications of (conv) in the 
deduction Σ and, as is easily seen, applications of (conv) can be moved through 
the tree Σ more or less freely. There is however a one-to-one correspondence 
between equivalence classes of deductions and λ-terms if we let two deductions 
be equivalent if one obtains the same tree after removing all applications of (conv). 
We shall define this equivalence relation more precisely later. 
3.2.1. Completeness of the embedding 
We now define a mapping back from the proof-terms of APRED to deductions of 
PRED. 
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3.2.9. DEFINITION. For any proof-terms M with Γ; Δ h M : φ we define by 
induction on the structure of M a deduction Σ(Μ) as follows. 
Γ ; Δ Κ ρ : 
Δ Ι- \ρ:ψ N : 
\ h Xx:A N 
Γ;ΔΚ MN 
Γ; Δ l· JVÍ 
: V? ι — » 
: </5 ι — > 
: (ρ ι — » 
: y > ι — • 
: φ ι — • 
Φ 
- if ρ : φ € Δ 
[ΦΥ 
Σ(Ν) 
χ 
V» 3 χ * 
ν 
Σ(ΛΓ) 
Vx:D.ip 
Ψ 
Σ(Μ) Σ{Ν) 
Χ Э V" Χ 
V 
Σ(Ν) 
Vx e Ό.φ 
φ[ί/χ] 
For every case, the final rule is always an application of (conv). This can be 
vacuous if the conclusion that was obtained is already ψ. 
The Definition is justified by Stripping, which says that the proposition ψ is 
always equal to a proposition of the form we require. 
3.2.10. PROPOSITION. If Γ;Δ h M : ψ m ÀPRED, then 
1. the conclusion of Σ{Μ) is φ and all non-discharged assumptions of'Σ(Μ) 
are declared in Δ, 
2. (p(M)D = M and Г
Е ( М ) С Γ, ΑΣ(Μ) Ç Δ. 
PROOF. By induction on the structure of М.Й 
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To be more precise as to what extent there is a bijective correspondence be­
tween deductions in PRED and proof-terms in APRED, we define an equivalence 
relation on deductions of PRED 
3 2 11 DEFINITION We define a stripping operation (-) from deduction trees 
to labelled finite trees as follows 
Ψ ι — • Ψ, 
Ы 
Σ 
Φ _ 
φ^φ
1 
Σ Θ 
φ D Φ φ 
Φ 
Σ 
Φ 
Ухе Όφ 
Σ 
Ухе Όφ 
φ[ί/χ) 
Σ 
Φ if φ = φ 
Ψ 
~ 
— 
— 
-— 
(Σ) 
ι 
<Σ) (Θ) 
MP 
<Σ) 
χε D 
{R 
t 
(Σ) 
Remember that, when writing φ below Σ, we mean that φ is a part of the 
deduction Σ So, the mapping () removes all formulas from the tree Σ, except for 
the leaves In doing so it leaves just enough information behind to reconstruct 
which rule has been applied and in which form (like which occurrences of a formula 
have been discharged, which variable has been abstracted from and which term 
has been substituted) 
3 2 12 EXAMPLE 
ірЭ^Эф [φ]1 φΟψΟφ [φ]1 
φ Эф Μ ' MP [φ]' 
Φ MP 
φΌφ
1 
г 
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3.2.13. DEFINITION. The equivalence relation ~ с я o n deductions of PRED is 
defined by 
Σ ~ c * Θ := (Σ) = (Θ). 
The ~ с я equivalence classes will be denoted by [—]сн-
3.2.14. EXAMPLE. Let φ —>$ ф. The following deductions are equivalent under 
~сн-
[ψ]1 
— M 
ы 
<pD<p' 
and are different from 
ψ 
ψΏφ
1 
φ D φ 
φ3φ' 
ф D φ 
Φ Эф' 
Also in APRED there is a trivial variation on a proof-term that we want 
to abstract from. The situation occurs already in the definition of ([]), which is 
not fully fixed, due to the choices of renamings of proof-variables that we have 
to make. So, what we want to do is consider pairs (Δ, M), where Δ is a proof-
context and M a proof-term, and an equivalence relation on these pairs such that 
(Δι, Mi) and (Δ 2, M2) are equivalent if there is a substitution of proof-variables 
for proof-variables α such that σ(Δι) = Δ 2 and σ(Μι) = M2. If this is the case 
we call (A\,M\) and (Δ 2,Μ 2) equivalent modulo renaming of proof-variables. 
3.2.15. PROPOSITION. Let θ and Θ' be deductions m PRED. 
1. If Θ ~ся Θ', then (Δ©, ([Θ])) and (Δθ',ίΘ'Ι)) are equivalent modulo re­
naming of proof-variables. 
2 S(([0D) ~
c
„ Θ. 
PROOF. The first by induction on the structure of (Θ)(= (Θ')). The second by 
induction on the structure of Θ. S 
The following is now an obvious consequence of Proposition 3.2.15 and Propo­
sition 3.2.10. 
3.2 16. COROLLARY. The mappings Σ(—) and ([—]) constitute a bisection between 
~cи -equivalence classes of deductions m PRED and pairs (Δ, M) modulo renam­
ing of proof-variables. 
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3.2.2. Comparison with other embeddings 
In [Barendregt 1992] a different embedding of logic-in-natural-deduction-style 
into typed lambda calculus is given For this system we have no completeness 
on the level of derivations (and hence the embedding is not an isomorphism 
on the level of derivations) In Chapter 2 1, paragraph 2 2, we have already 
pointed out what the problem is the formalization of the logic is not good, it is 
somewhere in between a sequent-formulation of natural deduction (as it is used 
in [Howard 1980]) and a 'real' natural deduction formulation, (like the one in 
[Prawitz 1965]) As a consequence the proof-terms λρ φ \q φ ρ and λρ φ Xq φ q 
will always be mapped to the same derivation-tree of the original logic 
The embedding that was described in [Barendregt 1992] has been studied 
extensively in [Tonino anf Fujita 1992] for the case of higher order logic In this 
paper a completeness result is stated which can not be right, namely Theorem 
6 2, saying that the composition of, first the mapping from type system to logic 
and then the mapping from logic to type system, constitutes the identity on the 
level of proof terms The two proof terms of the formula φ D φ D ψ as given 
above present a counter-example 
It will be clear from these remarks that we feel a strong preference for the 
embedding as described above there is a clear correspondence between derivation 
trees and proof-terms Note also that in [Barendregt 1992] the embedding is 
done in two steps first linearize the derivation trees and then embed these as 
typed lambda terms m a calculus This calculus (APRED) is different from 
our APRED, because it does not distinguish proof contexts and object-contexts 
Our embedding is also done in two steps Above we have given the interpretation 
of derivation trees as typed lambda terms in APRED In Chapter 6 1 it will 
be shown that our system APRED is the same as the calculus APRED used 
in [Barendregt 1992] We think that the way in which we have split up the 
embedding is more natural and gives a better insight 
3.2.3. Reduction of derivations and extensions to higher orders 
It is well-known that cut-elimination in PRED corresponds to normalization of β-
reduction Let's make this precise by defining a reduction relation on deductions 
of PRED 
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3 2 17 DEFINITION The reduction relation —>B on deductions of PRED is de-
fined as follows 
Ы 
Σ 
Φ 
φθφ
χ 
Φ' 
Σ 
t Σ[ί/ι] 
Vi e D φ — > B φ^/χ] 
Vi e D φ' φ'^/χ) 
<p'[t/x] 
The definition of Σ[ί/ι] will be clear and it is easy to check that Σ[ί/ι] is indeed 
a deduction of φ[ί/χ] 
The reduction relation —>д eliminates what is generally known as a 'cut' 
a redundancy in a proof by first introducing a connective and then immediately 
eliminating it 
3 2 18 PROPOSITION There is α one-to-one correspondence between reduction 
steps —*в l n а deduction Θ of PRED and β-reductions in the corresponding 
proof-term <[&]) of APRED Hence we have 
—>в г* (strongly) normalizing on deductions of PRED 
Ό- β reduction is (strongly) normalizing on proof-terms of APRED 
PROOF Immediate from the one-to-one correspondence between equivalence clas­
ses of deductions and proof-terms modulo renaming of proof-variables, as it was 
stated in Corollary 3 2 16 Η 
In [Howard 1980] the formulas-as-types embedding is discussed for the full 
intuitionistic first order predicate logic In APRED this amounts to the addition 
of the connectives V,&,-i and 3 and the corresponding operators for the intro­
duction and elimination rules Also these operators come together with reduction 
rules that correspond to the rules for cut-elimination for the connectives in the full 
first order predicate logic [Howard 1980] also discusses the extension to Heyting 
Arithmetic which amounts to the addition of an induction operator We do not 
give details of these extensions Our exposition for the case of PRED covers all 
the basic difficulties that one encounters, so the extension is a straightforward 
Θ 
φ 
Σ 
Φ 
Φ' 
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one Moreover we are more interested in giving some details of the extension to 
second and higher order systems, in which all the extra connectives and induction 
can be defined 
3 2 19 D E F I N I T I O N The systems APRED2 and APREDw are defined by extend­
ing APRED in the following way 
1 For APRED2, allow quantification over all types, ι e add the possibility 
of quantification over predicate types (The distinction between functional 
and predicate types is still meaningful, because we do not allow the forma­
tion of object-terms by λ abstraction over predicate types ) 
2 For APREDtj, extend the types to 
Type = Vari!/1 Prop | Type—»Type, 
and allow quantification and A abstraction over all types (Then there is no 
need to distinguish between functional and predicate types, but we may still 
do so, a type being a functional type if it is of the form A\ —• —>A
n
 with 
A
n
 a type-variable and a predicate type if it is of the form Αχ—> —»Prop ) 
The connectives V,&,-i and 3 can now be defined in terms of D and V in 
both APRED2 and APREDu; The definitions have already been given in Re­
mark 2 2 7 This means that there are closed proof terms that correspond to the 
introduction and elimination rules for the connectives The correspondence is 
even stronger in the sense that these closed terms satisfy part of the reduction 
rules that correspond to cut-elimination It is not difficult to verify this and we 
therefore just treat the cases for V and 3 as an example (The terms correspond­
ing to introduction and elimination only satisfy part of the cut-elimination rules, 
because m the full predicate logic there are also rules that combine an elimination 
rule for one connective with a rule of another connective These are not satisfied 
See e g [Girard et al 1989] for these type of rules ) 
3 2 20 E X A M P L E S We work in APRED2 
1 The connective V is defined by φ\/φ = Va Prop(</? D a) D (ψ D a ) D a and 
we have the following combinators for V introduction and V elimination 
(For reasons of readability we have omitted some type information ) 
V li φΌφνψ, 
= Αι φ Xagh gx, 
V-I2 -φ^φνψ, 
= Αι ф Xagh hx, 
V-Ε Va Prop φ V ф Э [φ D α) Э {Φ D α) Э α, 
= λα \χ φ У φ \gh xagh 
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These combinators satisfy the following reductions 
ν-Εχ(ν-ΐ!ί)$/ι -*
β
 gt, 
\Z-Ex(V-l2t)gh ~»β ht 
These reductions correspond in the obvious way to the rewriting of a part 
of a deduction where we have done an V-introduction and then immediately 
a V-ehmination 
2 The connective 3 is defined by 3 ι Α φ = Va Prop (Vi Α φ D α) D α and 
we have the following combinators for 3-mtroduction and 3-ehmination 
(Again we have omitted some type information ) 
3-1 Vi Α (φ D 3x Α φ), 
= Xx A Xh φ Xag gxh, 
3-Е Va Prop (3x Α φ) Э (Vx Α φ D a) D a, 
= Xahg hag 
These combinators satisfy the following reduction 
3-EX(3-lth)g -*p gth, 
which corresponds to the rewriting of a part of a deduction where we have 
done an 3-introduction and then immediately a 3-ehmination 
In a similar way one can also interpret Heyting Arithmetic in APR.ED2 start­
ing from a fixed type A and two objects 0 A and S A—>A (declared as variables 
in the object-context, but in fact treated as constants), one would like to con­
struct a proof-term of type 
Ind = VP Л-*Ргор PO Э (V¡/ АРуЭ P{Sy)) Э (Vx A P i ) 
As it is stated now this is of course impossible nothing tells us that the objects 
of type A are just the ones built up from 0 and S We can handle this by 
relativization Let N A—»Prop be defined by 
N = Ai A VP Л-Prop PO Э (Vi/ A Py D P(Sy)) D Px 
So Nt is true if t is built up from 0 and S only, ι e 
Nt is true if t is a numeral We have the following proof-terms 
zero ./VO 
= XP Л—»Prop Xhohi h0, 
succ Vx A Nx Э N(Sx) 
= Xx A Xq Nx XP Л—»Prop λ/ι0/ΐι hix(qPh0hi) 
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We can now define induction as follows 
Ind = VP Λ—Prop PO D (Vy A (Py & Ny) D P(Sy)) D (Vx A Nx D Px) 
So Ind states induction for numerals We can now find a closed term 
md Ind 
that also satisfies the required equality rules (Compare for example with the 
scheme for induction in [Howard 1980] ) 
índPíoíiOzerò -»β í0 PO, 
indPíoíi(5n)(succng) =β ¿in(indP<0iing) P(Sn) 
3.3. The formulas-as-types notion à la de Bruijn 
We now want to say something about the work of de Bruijn in the Automath 
project in relation to the notion of formulas as types Presenting things in this 
way suggests that there are two totally different approaches, which is not true 
(For example in the Automath project many different systems have been intro 
duced and some of them are quite close to systems that we have seen in the 
previous section ) The reason for separating the two is that both have their own 
basic underlying ideas that we want to single out This is also the reason that 
in this section we restrict our attention mainly to the system AUT 68, which 
probably covers best those basic ideas of Automath that we want to talk about 
We do not want to introduce AUT 68 in the original format, but in a format 
close to the typed lambda calculus APRED that we have encountered in the 
previous section The reason is twofold first it would take a lot of space to 
explain AUT-68 in its original format (Something which has been done quite 
succesfully in [van Daalen 1973] ) Second we want to present it in a format which 
is close to one that will be used later for describing typed lambda calculi This 
means that we ignore some of the features that are inevitable for making the 
system feasible for man-machine interaction but are inessential for our discussion 
of formulas-as-types (Like the definition-mechanism of Automath ) 
Our definition of AUT-68 owes a lot to discussions with van Benthem Jutting 
In fact it is a derivative of he description he has given of AUT-68 as a Pure Type 
System 
3 3 1 D E F I N I T I O N AUT-68 is a system for deriving judgements of the form 
Γ\- M В 
Here Г is a context, ι e a sequence of declarations, which are statements of the 
form χ A, where χ is a variable and A a term The M and В are terms, which 
are taken from the set of pseudoterms 
Τ = Var I type | TT | λχ Τ Τ | Πχ Τ Τ, 
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on which we have the usual notions of substitution, β- and 77-reduction etcetera. 
The terms are singled out from the set Τ by the derivation rules that determine 
which judgements Γ h M : В are derivable. The derivation rules are the following. 
(base) 0 h 
Г h A{: type) 
(ctxt) if χ not in Г 
Γ, χ:A h 
rh 
ax 
Γ h type 
ΓΗ 
(proj) 'пх-.АеГ 
Τ\-χ:Α 
(ΠΙ) 
(Π2) 
(Π) 
(λ) 
(app) 
r,x:type l· B(: type) 
Г h ni:type.ß 
Г,х:А\- В Tl· А : type 
Г 1- Пх-.А.В 
Г,х:А h В : type Г h А : type 
Г h Пх-.А.В : type 
Г,х:АЬМ:В Г h Пх:А.В(: type) 
Г h λζ:ΑΜ : Пх:АВ 
П - М : П : г : А В Г \- N : А 
Г h MN : B[N/x] 
Г h M : В Г h Л(: type) 
(conv) .— A =я В 
Tl· M: A 
We use the convention of writing A—>B for Πχ-.Α.Β if ι ^ FV(S). 
As people familiar with Automath may notice, we have not only changed the 
presentation of the system, but also the system itself. For example the original 
system does not contain Π-expressions: λ is used everywhere at places where we 
have put а Π. We feel that the systems with us is more natural and it is certainly 
more readily understood by people who are familiar with the actual developments 
in typed lambda calculi. Moreover there is no real difference between the two 
versions of the system: if we use the formalisation without Π we can always 
'recognise' the Xs that should be 'read as' us. (This is not true for extensions 
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of AUT 68 like AUT-QE, where the identification of Π and λ really extends the 
system ) 
Those not familiar with this kind of calculus may wonder what the use of this 
system is We therefore give an example The general purpose of the system is 
to provide a logical framework in which a user can work with a formal system of 
his or her choice The situation is then that the language of the formal system is 
declared in a context, which is then fixed (This part of the context is then used 
as a kind of 'signature' and the variables declared in it act as constants ) 
3 3 2 EXAMPLE First Order Predicate Logic The idea is to interpret the do­
mains of the logic as well as the formulas as types, a domain being understood as 
the type of its elements and a formula being understood as the type of its proofs 
Consider the following context 
Γ = ± type, V type—>type-*type, 
abs Πχ type J_—*x, 
in! Πι, j/ typex->(x Vj/),in2 Ux,y type y->{x V y), 
out Пх, y, ζ type (χ V ¡/)-»(x-»z)-»(y-»z)-».2:, 
cl Πχ type χ V (χ—»J.) 
Then, we have for example (abbreviating A—»± to ->A), 
Γ h λχ type \y -i-ix outxi/2(clx)(Ap χ p){\q ->x ahsx(yq)) 
Πχ t y p e ((x—•-!-)—*!•)—>x 
The universal quantifier is interpreted by the Π 
Vx Α φ =Ux Α φ 
and we can define the existential quantifier in terms of the universal one (classi­
cally) by 
Эх Α φ = -iVx A -up 
The theory of natural numbers can now be developed by adding to Γ 
TV type, 0 N,S N^N,+ N^>N->N,= N^>N->N, 
comm Π χ , y N x + y = y + x, etc 
One of the drawbacks of this kind of interpretation of first order predicate logic 
is that domains of the logic and formulas are not only treated in the same manner 
(as types), but even as if they were the same kind of things the system itself 
can not distinguish between formulas and domains This was also recognised 
by de Bruijn who especially emphasized this drawback m relation to so called 
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'proof-irrelevance' This becomes very apparent if we look at situations where 
proof-terms are subexpressions of the object-terms, for example if we have 
R type, pos R—»type.sqrt Πι R pos(x)—»R, 
where R represents the real numbers, pos the predicate that decides whether a 
number is non-negative and sqrt constructs the square root of a number if that 
number is non-negative Although in general we may want to distinguish different 
proofs of a formula, we obviously want sqrtrp only to depend on τ and on the 
fact that τ is non-negative (not on the particular proof sqrtrp and sqrtrp' should 
represent the same real number) Clearly there is no way to state proof-irelevance 
in its most general form like 'for all formulas φ all terms of type φ are equal' 
One of the extensions of AUT-68 that has been considered (and is also known 
under the name AUT-68) is the one which splits type into type and prop So 
for prop we have the same rules as type (but we can now easily make variants of 
the system that handles type and prop differently), but we can specify different 
axioms for prop in the context 
There are some other drawbacks to the direct interpretation of formulas as 
types Note that the system is essentially first order we can not quantify over 
the collection of subsets of a domain To do this we would have to be able to 
write down (ΠΡ A—»type φ) type, which is not allowed As a consequence we 
also can not formalise induction in its most general form It would have to be 
something like 
TIP JV-»type Ρ0-»(Πχ N Px-»P(Sx))-»(ny N Py) 
(Note that the fact that we have Πι type В (for В type) in the system does 
not mean that the system is impredicative Ώχ type В itself is not of type type ) 
For the same reason we can not represent the (first order) intuitiomstic existential 
quantifier Knowing that it can't be defined in terms of V, the only option is to 
declare it in the context with its introduction and elimination rules 
Ξ Πχ type (χ—»type)—»type, 
but this is not allowed 
To overcome the drawbacks that we just mentioned, yet another option has 
been developed by the Automath community, which does not require a change of 
the system but only a different use of it The idea is to not let formulas be types 
themselves but to introduce a fixed type constant prop, representing the names 
of the formulas, and a kind of lifting operator Τ prop—»type, which maps a 
name of a formula to the type of its proofs Although the difference with the first 
interpretation may seem small at first sight, this is a major improvement. First 
the system is now really used as a framework in the previous interpretation some 
features of the type system were used directly for the logic (like the Π which is 
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used as V and D), whereas now all the quantifiers have to be represented in a 
context Further this interpretation gives much more flexibility, allowing one to 
interpret for example second order and higher order logic in a similar way, but 
also more exotic formal systems like typed lambda calculus itself Let's give an 
example of a formalisation done according to this new point of view 
3 3 3 E X A M P L E First Order Predicate Logic We adapt the example that we 
gave before to the new interpretation 
Γ = prop type, Τ prop—»type, 
J. prop, V prop—»prop—»prop, 
Э prop—»prop—»prop, V Π ι t y p e (x—»prop)—»prop, 
abs Π ι prop T(_L)—»T(i), 
Ш] Ux,y prop T ( i ) - » T ( i Vj/),in2 Ux,y prop T{y)->T(x V y), 
out Π ι , y, Ζ prop T(x V ¡ , ) _ ( Т ( і ) - » Г ( г ) ) - ( Т ( у ) - . Г ( г ) ) - » Т ( г ) , 
V Ι Π ι type UP ι—prop (Пг ι T{Pz))-*T(VxP), 
V-E Π ι type UP i-»prop Т( і Р ) - > П г ι T{Pz), 
cl Π ι prop T(x) V T(x Э 1 ) , 
etcetera 
(We have not stated the rules for Э ) Again we have an M such that 
Γ l· Μ Π ι prop T ( ( ( i З І ) З І ) Э і ) 
The intuitiomstic existential quantifier can now also be defined by letting 
3 Π ι type (x—»prop)—»prop 
and adding declarations for the intuitiomstic introduction and elimination rule 
We can also add induction for the natural numbers by declaring 
ind UP W - p r o p T{P0)^T(yN{\x N Px D P{Sx)))^T{VN(\y N Py)) 
The flexibility is really an enormous advantage of the system This was 
also noticed by researchers in Edinburgh, who defined their system LF ('Log 
ical Framework', [Harper et al 1987]) based on ideas from Automath We have 
again been inspired by LF in the choice for our representation of AUT-68, which 
is quite close to LF We shall say something more about LF later Now we want 
to treat as an example higher order predicate logic (PREDu;) in AUT-68 As one 
may have noticed in the previous example, the domains of the logic are still types, 
which may be undesirable if one wants to allow operations on domains that are 
not allowed on types in AUT-68 (For example cartesian products of domains ) 
In that case one would like to push the language of the logic one level lower by 
introducing a type of names of domains 'dom' and an operator D dom—»type 
that maps a name of a domain to the type of its elements Higher order predicate 
logic is one example of a system where such an approach is appropriate 
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334 EXAMPLE We interpret the system PREDw in AUT-68 by introducing the 
following context 
Γ = dom type, Û dom—»type, 
=> dom—»dom—»dom, prop dom 
= Tld dom Dd—*Dd—> type, 
Ap Ud, e dom D(d=>e)-»£)ci-»De, 
Abs Tld, e dom (Dd^>De)-»D(d=>e), 
β Tld, e dom Π/ Dd-^De Tlx Dd Apde{Absdef)x=fx, 
ξ Ud, e dom Π/, g Dd—>De (Tlx Dd fx=gx)-*(Absdef=Absdeg), 
comp Πα!, e dom Π/, g D(d^-e) Ux, у Dd x=y^>f=g-+(Apfx=Apgy), 
Τ Dprop-»type, 
Э Dprop—»Dprop—»Dprop, V Tld dom (Dd—»Dprop)—»Dprop, 
Э-І Πι, Ï/ Dprop T(i Э y)—>Tx—»Ту, 
O-E Πι, j/ Dprop (Γι—»Ту)—»Т(і Э ¡/), 
-І Па dom TIP Dd-»Dprop (Пг Dd T(P¿))-»T(VdP), 
V-E Па dom ПР Dd-»Dprop T(VdP)-»n2 Dd T{Pz) 
By pushing the domains one level lower, all of the higher order language is 
now coded, but still the substitution and conversion mechanisms of the system 
take care of substitution and α-conversion in the defined higher order language 
Note that this is not the only possibility an alternative is to let the domains 
still be types in which case one would have for example 
Г = prop type, Г prop-»type, 
Э prop—»prop—»prop, V Па type (d—»prop)—»prop, 
Э-І Пі, у prop T(x О у)—»Γι—>Ty, 
Э-Е Пі, у prop (Tx^Ty)^T(x D y), 
V-I nd type TIP d^prop (Пг d T(Pz))->T(WP), 
V-Ε nd type TIP d-»prop T(VdP)->Tlz d T(Pz), 
etcetera 
But this is exactly the same context as we had in Example 3 3 3' 
3 3 5 REMARK The context of Example 3 3 3 represents higher order predicate 
logic in AUT-68 The V quantifier that is declared in the context applies to all 
types, so it applies to A, A—»prop, (A—»prop)—»prop etcetera 
Obviously, less coding makes things easier to read and write However, there 
is also an important advantage of the approach of Example 3 3 4, which is that 
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adequacy of the interpretation is easier to prove This issue has not received a 
lot of attention in the Automath project, but which is of course very relevant 
To which extent is the interpretation of the logic in AUT-68 adequate7 (Are 
there sentences that are provable in the interpretation in AUT-68 that were not 
provable in the original logic7) In the interpretation of higher order predicate 
logic of Example 3 3 3, the V quantifier can range over any type, including types 
of the form Τφ, with ψ prop Clearly this is not available in the logic so we 
really have to do some work to show that this extra feature doesn't provide us 
any ingenious proof of an unwanted theorem (like _L for example) 
The problem of adequacy of encodings of formal systems has been taken very 
seriously by those who defined the system LF See for example [Gardner 1992] 
Let's introduce this system and sketch how adequacy proofs are given for the 
system (There is no general theorem saying that a specific way of encoding 
formal systems will always yield an adequate interpretation, but there is a general 
proof procedure that will usually do the job of proving adequacy ) 
3 3 6 DEFINITION LF [Harper et al 1987]is a system for deriving judgements 
of the form 
Fl· Μ В 
where Г is a context and M and В are terms, which are taken from the set of 
pseudoterms 
Τ = Var |type|kind|TT|AxTT|nxTT, 
like in the definition of AUT-68 (Definition 3 3 1) The derivation rules are the 
following (s ranges over {type, kind} ) 
(base) 
(ax) 
(Π) 
W 
(conv) 
0 b 
ГЬ 
Г 1- type kind 
Γ,χ Ah β s Tl· A type 
Г h Пх А В s 
Γ,χ Al· Μ В Γl·UxAB s 
Г h Xx A M YlxAB 
Tl· M В Tl· A s 
Α=
βη
Β 
Tl· M A 
(ctxt) 
(proj) 
(app) 
Tl·A s 
if χ not in Γ 
Γ,χ Al· 
Tl· 
if χ A e Γ 
Tl·! A 
Tl· M UxA В Tl· N A 
Τ l· MN B[N/x] 
Again we use the convention of writing A—*B for Пх A В if χ $ FV(ß) 
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In the definition we have ignored one feature of LF, which is the use of so 
called 'signatures' These are special contexts in which constants are declared In 
our definition a signature is part of the context, to be precise that part in which 
the language of the formal system is fixed (like the Γ in 3 3 4) 
Looking again at the example of higher order predicate logic, we see that 
only the interpretation of Example 3 3 4 is possible in LF The second requires 
a Π-abstraction over type, which is not allowed in LF Apart from conversion, 
this is in fact the only difference between LF and AUT-68 (in the way it was 
defined in Definition 3 3 1) If one reads the judgements of AUT-68 that are of 
the form Γ h S as Γ Ι- β kind, the the systems have the same rules, except for 
the гиІе(Пі), which is extra in AUT-68 
The way to prove adequacy of the interpretation is by using so called 'long-
/îrç-normal forms' We already encountered this notion in the previous chapter 
Recall that a long-/37?-normal form is obtained by first taking the /3-normal form 
and then doing η expansion, where a term C[M] in 0 normal form η expands 
to C[\x A Mx] only if χ £ FV(M), M Ux A В and C[\x A Mx] is again in 
/3-normal form We write long-/?7?-nf(M) for the long /Jrç-normal form of the 
term M The usefulness of this definition depends on the normalization and 
confluence of βη reduction in LF The first property is relatively easy (shown 
in [Harper et al 1987]), but the second is surprisingly complicated and was first 
proved by [Salvesen 1989] 
Now one can define an isomorphism between /Зту-equivalence classes of terms 
of a specific type in Γ and terms of the corresponding domain in the higher order 
predicate logic (It is of course allowed to extend Γ a little bit, but only with 
variable declarations χ dom or χ D(d) ) This is done by defining the isomorphism 
on the long-/37?-normal forms, which form a complete set of représentants for the 
/3r?-equivalence classes For example all the terms of type Dd correspond to terms 
of the higher order predicate logic by first taking long-/Î7?-normal forms and then 
defining the inductive mapping [—] by 
И = xProp, 
[φ Эф) = M Э [VI, 
\Щ\х Dd M)] = Vi e И [M], 
[ΑρΜΝ] = M A T ] , 
[Abs(Az Dd M))] = \x e [d] [M], 
where the correspondence [—] between terms of type dom and domains is obvious 
In a similar way one defines a correspondence between terms of type Τφ in LF 
and deductions of φ in PREDa;, establishing in this way the adequacy of the 
interpretation 
As pointed out already, LF can be seen as a subsystem of AUT-68, modulo 
some small changes And, although the number of rules is limited, LF is very pow­
erful in interpreting a wide variety of formal systems (See [Harper et al 1987], 
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[Avron et al 1987] or [Gardner 1992] for examples ) It is however not minimal 
yet We can do without a rule without weakening the power of the system This 
is partly due to the way in which the system is being used (See the example 
of higher order predicate logic, 3 3 4 ) Once the context Γ that represents the 
formal system has been established, one is only interested in judgements of the 
form 
Γ h M A, with A a type 
On the other hand there is no reason to let the context Γ not be in normal form 
From these two principles we can show that half of the rule (λ) is superfluous 
there is no need to be able to form \x Α Μ Π ι Л ß in case Π ι A В kind 
3 3 7 D E F I N I T I O N In LF we split the rule (λ) in two, a (λ 0) and a (XP) rule 
For convenience we attach a label to the abstraction that we introduce with the 
rule, so 
Y,x Al· Μ В Tl·XìxAB type 
Tl·\0xAM UxAB 
T,xAl· Μ В TbYix AB kind 
(λρ) 
Tl· XpxAM UxAB 
The system LF without the rule (λρ) we call LF~, and we write h - for judgements 
in LF~ On the terms of LF we now distinguish /^-reduction from /3p-reduction 
in the obvious way 
(XoxAM)N —-A M[N/x], 
(XpxAM)N — > 0 P M[N/x] 
Similarly we can now talk about βρ normal forms etcetera 
We can show that a /?p-normal form of a relevant judgement contains no λρ 
and that if a judgement contains no λρ, it can be derived without the rule (λρ) 
3 3 8 P R O P O S I T I O N 1 If M t y p e or M A t y p e in LF, then ßP-nf{M) 
contains no \p 
2 IfTl· M Л, Γ, M and A contain no \ P l then Γ h " M A 
P R O O F Both by induction on the derivation of Γ H M A Details can be found 
in [Geuvers 1990] H 
3 3 9 COROLLARY IfTl· M A( type) , all m βP -normal form, then Γ h " M 
A{ type) 
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If Γ is an LF context representing some system of logic and Л is a type that 
represents some formula of this logic, then we can assume Г and A to be in 0p-
normal form Now, when looking for a proof of A in LF, one only has to look at 
terms that do not contain a λρ the (λρ) rule can totally be ignored 
The previous Proposition says that the only real need for Πι A В kind 
is to be able to declare a variable in it Even this use is usually of the most 
simple form where χ £ FV(ß) The standard application of it in both AUT-
68 and LF (certainly for logical systems) is the declaration of Τ prop—»type, 
where prop type is another declaration In practice, this going hence and forth 
between φ prop (the name of the formula) and Τφ type (the type of its proofs) 
can be very inconvenient, as was already noticed by de Bruijn in [de Bruijn 1974] 
This was one of the reasons for him to introduce the system AUT-4 In fact it 
is a family of systems which are obtained by adding to an Automath system the 
'fourth level' In terms of the system AUT-68, as we defined it in Definition 3 3 1, 
this means that we add prop as a new constant of the language with the axiom 
prop type 
and all the rules for prop to make it into a logic For the set of rules one allows, 
[de Bruijn 1974] suggests different possibilities We give here an extension of 
AUT-68 to an AUT-4 like system where the set of rules for prop is rather minimal 
but still interesting 
3 3 10 DEFINITION We define the system AUT 68+ as an AUT-4 like extension 
to AUT-68, by adding to AUT-68 (Definition 3 3 1) the constant prop with the 
following rules (s stands for type or prop ) 
ΓΗ Γ h A prop 
(ax') (ctxt') if χ not in Γ 
Γ l· prop type Τ,χ AV-
Γ,χΑ^Β prop Γ I-Л s Τ,χΑ'τΜ В Γ Ι- Πι Α Β prop 
ThTlxAB prop Г h λχ Α Μ Пх A В 
The example of higher order predicate logic can now be done without any 
coding at all, by taking type for the class of domains, prop for the class of 
propositions and defining 
φ Э ф = φ—*ψ for φ,φ e Prop, 
Va; £ Α φ = ïlx Α φ for A a domain and φ e Prop 
Then all introduction and elimination rules are obviously satisfied 
We see that the formulas-as-types interpretation of PREDo; in the system 
AUT-68+ is very 'Howard-like' in the sense that there is no coding and that 
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introduction rules correspond directly to λ-abstractions, elimination rules to ap­
plications. We can make this correspondence formal by restricting the rules of 
AUT-68+ and showing that the system obtained in this way is equivalent to 
APREDo; as discussed in the previous section. The restriction of AUT-68+ is 
easily defined; we just remove all rules that have no meaning in higher order 
predicate logic. 
3.3.11. DEFINITION. The system AUT-HOL (Automath for higher order predi­
cate logic) is defined by removing from AUT-68+ the rules (Π1) and (Π2). So we 
have the following rules, (s stands for type or prop.) 
(base) 0 h (ctxt) 
(ax) (ax') 
Γ h type 
ΓΗ 
(proj) if x:A e Γ 
T\-x.A 
Γ, χ: A Η В : type Г H A : type 
(Π) — — ^ — — (Π') 
Γ Η Α(: s) 
Γ,χ-.Al· 
ΓΗ 
Γ Η prop : 
if χ not in Γ 
type 
г, 
Г h Пх-.А.В : type 
x:Ah M .В Г1-Пх:Л.В 
ГНЛх:Л.М: 
Г\- M : В Tl· А: 
Пх-.А.В 
prop 
: s 
-β В 
(λ) -!— : — — — (арр) 
г, x:A H В : prop Г H A 
Г 1- Ux-.A.B : 
Г г-Λ/ :Ux:A.B 
: prop 
ΓΗ Ν : 
: s 
: A 
Γ h MN : B[N/x] 
Fl· M : A 
In the definition we have already anticipated towards its properties by re­
stricting the (conv) rule to propositions. We can prove that, if Γ h M : A and A 
contains a redex, then Γ h A : prop. 
Due to the fact that we have removed the rules (Π1) and (Π2), the system 
has a nice property that is sometimes called context separation. Notice first that 
there are three ways of adding a variable to the context, namely by declaring 
it as a variable of A where A : prop or A : type or neither of the two, in 
which case A = type as is easily seen. So we can speak of proof-vanables (if 
A : prop), object-variables (if A : type) and set-variables. The system has some 
nice properties. 
3.3.12. LEMMA. In the system AUT-HOL we have the following. 
1. Strengthening: Г
ь
 χ:В, Г2 H M : A with χ $ FV(T2, M, A), then 
Г
и
Г2\-М:А. 
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2. Permutation: Γι,x:B,y:C, Γ2 h M : A with χ $ FV(C), then 
Гі,у:С,х:В,Г2г- M : Α. 
3. If Γ l· A : type, </ien A = Ai—> >Л
п
_і—>A
n
 with A
n
 = prop or A
n
 = χ 
with i : type 6 Γ and all А
г
 of the same form as A (n > 0). 
4 IfVrM: A{: type), then M contains no proof-variables (variables χ with 
χ : φ(: prop) € Γ/ 
P R O O F . The proof is by induction on derivations. Η 
3.3.13. COROLLARY. In AUT-HOL we can split up every context Γ into three dis­
joint parts Гі, Г2, Гз, the first containing the set-variables, the second the object-
variables and the third the proof-variables such that 
Γ\-Μ:Α =i> Г
и
Г2,Г3\- M : A with 
Α Ξ type => Γι h M : type, 
A : type => Γ ι , Γ 2 Η Μ : Α 
As a consequence of the Lemma and the Corollary we find that AUT-HOL is 
isomorphic to the system APREDai of Definition 3.2.19. The isomorphism from 
AUT-HOL to APREDu; consists of a rearrangement of the context as suggested in 
the Corollary and replacing set-variables by names for basic domains. Further we 
have to write Vi e Α.φ for ΐΙχ:Α.φ if A:type and <^:prop and φ D ψ for φ—>ψ(= 
Πζ:ψ.φ) if φ,ψ-.-ρτορ In the reverse direction we have similar replacements and 
rewritings. 
3.3.14. P R O P O S I T I O N . Let \-A denote denvabihty in AUT-HOL and h¿ denote 
derwabihty m APREDo*. If В is a domain, then 
Г l·A M : В О Г Ь Г 2 \-А M : В О Г2 r-L M : В. 
If В a proposition, then 
Г \-
А
 M • В о Г
Ь
Г 2 , Г 3 \-АМ :В& Г 2 ,Г 3 \-L M : В. 
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Chapter 4 
Pure Type Systems 
4.1. Introduction 
The framework of Pure Type Systems (PTSs) provides a general discnption of a 
large class of typed lambda calculi and makes it possible to derive a lot of meta 
theoretic properties in a generic way We give a list of examples of systems in 
the form of a PTS and then give a detailed study of the meta theory The notion 
of a PTS first appears explicitly in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] under the name 
GTS (Generalised Type System), where it is used to describe the so called 'cube 
of typed lambda calculi' of Barendregt and its meta theory The typed lambda 
calculi that belong to the class of Generalised Type Systems have only one type 
constructor (the Π and hence the definable —>) and equality rule (just β), and 
therefore the name 'Pure Type System' was suggested by Thierry Coquand and 
has been widely adopted since The situation is that (almost) every typed lambda 
calculus contains a core PTS, which does of course not mean that the core PTS 
is in any respect the most essential part, but it gives a good starting point for 
research 
A notion very similar to that of PTS occurs already in the work of Ter-
louw ([Terlouw 1989a] and [Terlouw 1989b]), who describes (in Dutch) what he 
calls a 'Generalised System for Terms and Types' It is also implicit in the 
work of Berardi ([Berardi 1988]), who describes various examples of Pure Type 
Systems without insisting on a general definition Both have been inspired 
by the notion of the 'cube of typed lambda calculi', (see [Barendregt 1992]), 
a first important step towards the notion of PTS The first coherent study of 
the meta theory is [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991], which has strongly benefit­
ted from suggestions in [Terlouw 1989a] The main meta-theoretic results of 
[Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] can also be found in [Barendregt 1992] 
In what follows we give a slight extension of the notion of PTS, with 77-equahty, 
to be able to use it also for our study of the Church-Rosser property (CR) for 
/?r?-reduction for the Calculus of Constructions with ^-conversion rule We also 
do the meta theory for these extended PTSs 
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It is well-known that the inclusion of η complicates things quite a bit, because 
CR for βη on the set of pseudoterms is false We therefore describe a very weak 
form of the Church-Rosser property for βη, which turns out to be provable for the 
set of pseudoterms. This 'Key Lemma' will do the job in almost all cases where 
we used CR in the study of the meta theory of PTSs with only /3-conversion in 
[Geuvers and Nederhof 1991]. One important case is missing, which is Subject 
Reduction for η (SR for η), saying that if Γ h M : A and Μ -»
η
 Ν, then 
Γ h Ν : Α. It seems that the proof can't be done without having first established 
a proof of Strengthening. 
T
x
,x:A,T2\- M : В 
хІ? {Т2,М,В) 1 =»Гі,Г 2г-М:Я. 
In [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] there is a proof of this rule for a certain subclass 
of PTSs. The general proof for all PTSs is given in [van Benthem Jutting 199+]). 
Both proofs use CR in an essential way, i.e. where the Key Lemma doesn't seem 
to suffice. 
The Calculus of Constructions is a relatively 'simple' system for which we 
can prove Strengthening without having to rely on CR. This situation turns 
out to occur more generally: We can describe a subclass of PTSs for which 
Strengthening, and hence SR for η can be proved without having to rely on CR. 
This will be discussed in Chapter 5.1, in Definition 5.2.7 and Lemma 5.2.10. It 
will turn out that the Calculus of Constructions belongs to this class of systems, 
so it satisfies SR for η. 
Often the situation is more complicated and it is not clear how to show that 
SR for η holds in general. This is even more worrying because a proof of the 
Church-Rosser property on well-typed terms will certainly require SR. So we 
have no proof of CR for βη and it seems we are in a deadlock situation. The way 
out is suggested in the work of Salvesen ([Salvesenl991]) on proving CR for βη-
reduction for LF. The trick is to first add Strengthening as a rule to the system. 
(This was also suggested in [Geuvers 1992] as an alternative; as things stand it 
is not an alternative method but the only possible one.) Many problems then 
vanish: The addition of a rule (strengthening) does not complicate the known 
meta theory and allows to prove SR for η for the extended PTS notion. We can 
use this, because the system without (strengthening) rule is a subsystem. This 
does not yet mean that we can prove SR for η and CR for βη in general for 
the system without the rule (strengthening). We only have a proof of these two 
properties for normalizing systems. The general problem remains open. 
We see that, for our study of PTSs with /3r?-conversion rule, it is useful to also 
study the extension of the system with a rule (strengthening). We therefore define 
three notions of Pure Type System: The original one with only /3-conversion, to 
be denoted by PTS^, the one with /^-conversion, to be denoted by PTS^, and 
the one with /3r/-conversion and strengthening rule, to be denoted by PTS^. 
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4.2. Definitions 
The Pure Type Systems are formal systems for deriving judgements of the form 
Γ I-M Л, 
where both M and A are in the set of so called pseudoterms, a set of expressions 
from which the derivation rules select the ones that are typable The Γ is a finite 
sequence of so called declarations, statements of the form χ В, where u s a 
variable and β is a pseudoterm The idea is of course that a term M can only 
be of type A (M A) relative to a typing of the free variables that occur in M 
and A Before giving the precise definition of Pure Type Systems we define the 
set of pseudoterms Τ over a base set S (The dependency of Τ on 5 is usually 
ignored ) 
4 2 1 DEFINITION For S some set, the set of pseudoterms over 5, T, is defined 
by 
Τ = S I Var I (П аг Τ Τ) | (AVar Τ Τ) | TT, 
where Var is a countable set of expressions, called variables Both Π and λ bind 
variables and hence we have the usual notions of free variable and bound variable 
We adopt the λ-calculus notation of writing FV(M) for the set of free variables 
in the pseudoterm M 
On Τ we have the usual notions of β and η reduction, generated from 
(\x A M)P —>0 M[P/x], 
where M[P/x] denotes the substitution of Ρ for χ in M (done with the usual 
care to avoid capturing of free variables) and 
Xx A Mx —•, M, if χ І FV(M) 
and both compatible with application, A-abstraction and Π-abstraction We also 
adopt from the untyped lambda calculus the conventions of denoting the transi­
tive reflexive closure of —*¡¡ by -*β and the transitive symmetric closure of -»β 
by =β (and similar for —•, and —*β
η
 =—*p U —», ) 
The typing of terms is done under the assumption of specific types for the 
free variables that occur in the term 
4 2 2 DEFINITION 1 A declaration is a statement of the form χ A, where 
ж is a variable and A a pseudoterm, 
2 A pseudocontext is a finite sequence of declarations such that, if χ A and 
у В are different declarations of the same pseudocontext, then χ ^ y, 
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3 If Г = i i A¡, ,xn An is a pseudocontext, the domain ο/Γ, dom(r) is the 
set {ii, , x„}, for i , 6 dom(r), the image of x, гп Γ, notation imr(z,), IS 
the pseudoterm At 
4 For Γ a pseudocontext, a variable y is T-fresh (or just fresh if it is clear 
which Γ we are talking about) if y ^ dom(r) 
5 For Γ and Γ' pseudocontexts, Γ' \ Γ is the pseudocontext which is obtained 
by removing from Γ' all declarations χ A for which χ 6 dom(r) 
4 2 3 DEFINITION A Pure Type System with β conversion (PTS^) is given by a 
set 5, a set А С S χ S and a set TZ С S χ S χ S The PTS that is given by S, 
A and TZ is denoted by \ß(S, A, TV) and is the typed lambda calculus with the 
following deduction rules 
(sort) h si s2 if (51.52) € A 
(var) 
(weak) 
(Π) ^ "" "' " ' " " ' if ( í b í 2 , a 3 ) e f c 
(λ) 
(app) 
(conv^) A =0 В 
Г h M 5 
In the rules (var) and (weak) it is always assumed that the newly declared variable 
is fresh, that is, it has not yet been declared in Γ If 52 = 53 in a triple (si, «2,53) € 
TZ, we write (si,S2) € TZ The equality in the conversion rule (conv^) is the β-
equality on the set of pseudoterms Τ 
The elements of S are called sorts, the elements of A (usually written as Si 52) 
are called axioms and the elements of TZ are called rules 
A Pure Type System with βη conversion (PTS^,,) is also given by a set S, a set 
А С S χ S and zsetTZcSxSxS and now denoted by \β
η
(δ,Α,7Ζ) The 
Tl· A s 
Γ, χ A h i A 
Fl · A s Fl· M 
Υ,χΑΥ-Μ С 
С 
Τ\-Α si Τ,χΑ\-Β s2 
Г\-ПхАВ 53 
Г, χ Al·- M В Г І - П х Л В s 
Г h λχ A M 
Γ h M UxAB 
UxA В 
r h J V л 
Γ h MN B[N/x] 
Tl·- M A Th В s 
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only difference with a PTS^ is that a PTS^, has a /^-conversion rule: 
ч
 Fl· M : А Г Ь B:s 
(conv^) Α =0η В 
ΓΗ M : В 
Again the /Jrç-equality m the side condition is an equality on the set of pseu-
doterms T. 
A Pure Type System with βη-conversion and strengthening (PTS^) is also given 
by a set S, a set А С S χ S and Ά set llcSxSxS and now denoted by 
A^(5, A,11). The difference with a PTS^ is that a PTS^ has a strengthening 
rule: 
Гі,х-С,Г 2 І-М: A (streng) ^ ,_ „
 A I fx£FV(r 2 ,M,A) 
Г
Ь
Г 2 h M • A 
In the following, when we use the notion 'PTS' (without subscript), we arbi­
trarily refer to one of the three notions above. 
We see that there is no distinction between types and terms in the sense 
that the types are formed first and then the terms are formed using the types. 
The derivation rules above select the typable terms from the pseudoterms, a 
pseudoterm A being typable if there is a context Γ and a pseudoterm В such that 
Г l· A : В or Г h В . A is derivable. For practical reasons we make the following 
definitions. 
4.2.4. DEFINITION. Let \{S,A,Tl) be a PTS. 
1. A pseudoterm A is typable in \{S,A,7l) if there is a pseudocontext Г and 
a pseudoterm В such that Г h A : В от Г \- В : A is derivable. The set of 
typable terms of \(S, A, TZ) is denoted by Jerm(X(S,A,TZ)) (or just Term 
if the PTS is clear from the context.) 
2. A pseudocontext Г is a context of \{S,A,TV) (Г e Context(A(iS, ,4,72,) or 
just Г e Context if there is no ambiguity), if there are pseudoterms A and 
В such that Г I- A : В is derivable, 
3. For Г a context of X(S,A,TZ) and A a term, A is typable in Г (notation 
A e Теггп(Г)) if Г I- A : В or Г h В : A for some B, 
4. For Г a context, s a sort and A a term, A is an s-term in Г (notation 
A e s-Term(r)) if Г I- A : s, 
5. For Г a context, s a sort and A a term, A is an s-element m Г (notation 
A e s-Elt(r)) if Г h A : В : s for some term B, 
6. For s a sort, the set of s-terms (of λ(5, A,1t)) is defined by s-Term := 
Ureçontexts-Term(r) and the set of s -elements/ (of \(S,A, TZ)) is defined 
by e-Elt := UreContextS-Elt(r). 
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A practical purpose for the use of the PTS framework is that many properties 
can be proved once and for all for the whole class of PTSs In paragraph 4 4 we 
list and prove the most important ones for the three versions of the Pure Type 
Systems, PTS^, PTS/j, and PTS^ In order to do the meta theory for the latter 
two versions, we first study the collection of pseudoterms Τ in a bit more detail 
and prove a very weak form of Church-Rosser property for /^-reduction on T, 
just enough to handle most of the cases where we used CR of /^-reduction in the 
meta theory of PTS^ (as it was given in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] ) We now 
want to give some examples of type systems that fit in the PTS framework and 
also say something about mappings between PTSs 
The framework yields a nice tool for describing a specific class of mappings 
between type systems that we call PTS-morphisms These PTS-morphisms will 
be described as a subset of a general set of mappings between Pure Type Systems 
4 2 5 DEFINITION Let X{S, А, 72) and λ(5', А', 72') be PTSs 
A mapping from X(S, A, 72) to X(S', .4', 72') is a function that assigns pseudojudge-
ments of X{S', A', 72.') to derivable judgements of X(S, A, 72), a pseudojudgement 
being a sequent Γ h Μ В with Г a pseudocontext and M, В pseudoterms 
A morphism from X(S, A, 72) to X(S'', A', 72') is a mapping ƒ from S to S' that 
preserves axioms and rules, that is 
s i s ¡ e 5 =» / ( s i ) / ( a 2 ) € S ' , 
(sus2,s3)en => (/(si) , / (s2) , / (s3))€72' 
A PTS-morphism ƒ from X(S, A, 72) to X(S', A', 72') immediately extends to a 
mapping from the pseudoterms of X(S, A, 72) to the pseudoterms of X(S', A', 72') 
and hence to a mapping between the PTSs by induction on the structure of terms 
This mapping preserves substitution and /3(i;)-equality and also denvabihty 
4 2 6 LEMMA If ƒ is α PTS-morphism from ζ to ζ', then 
Г Ь
С
М /1=>ЛГ)(- (-/(М) f (A) 
There are certainly many other interesting mappings between Pure Type Sys­
tems and we don't want to give the PTS-morphisms any priority However they 
have some practical interest because they are easy to describe and share a lot of 
desirable properties And of course the Pure Type Systems with the PTS mor­
phisms form a category with products, coproducts and as terminal object the 
system with Type Type, often referred to as λ* 
S = Type, 
A = Type Type, 
72 = (Type, Type) 
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There are two subclasses of PTSs that have some special interest because 
the systems belonging to those subclasses share some additional nice properties. 
Also, most of the known examples of Pure Type Systems belong to both classes. 
4.2.7. DEFINITION. A PTS X(S, A, TZ) is functional if the relation Л is a partial 
function from S to S and the relation TZ is a partial function from S χ 5 to S. 
That is, 
s : s', s : s" e A => s' = s", 
(suS2,s3),(sus2,s'3) € TZ => s3 = s'3. 
A PTS X(S, A, TZ) is mjective if it is functional and the functions A and TZ are 
also injective. That is, 
s' : s,s" :s Ç A => s' = s", 
(s-i,S2,s3),{s'1,s'2,s3) 6 TZ =*· Si = si к s2 = s 2 . 
In [Barendregt 1992], the notion of functional is called 'singly-sorted' and the 
notion of injective is called 'singly-occupied'. 
In [van Benthem Jutting et. al. 1992] there are more definitions of subclasses 
of Pure Type Systems that are of interest. One of the purposes of that article is to 
find different sets of rules that generate the same set of derivable judgements, but 
have easier operational properties. This is especially important for proving the 
completeness of type checking algorithms. We shall say something more about 
this in Chapter 6.1. For now we want to describe two of the subclasses of Pure 
Type Systems that are defined in [van Benthem Jutting et. al. 1992], because 
they have some importance later in the text. 
4.2.8. DEFINITION. 1. A PTS X{S,A,TZ) is full if 
Vsbs2 6 S3s3 e 5[(si,52,s3) € тг]. 
2. A PTS X(S,A,TZ) is semi-full if 
Vsi,s2,s2.
s3 € <5[(si,s2,S3) e 7г => 3s3[(si,s2,s'3) € TZ]}. 
The importance of the notion of 'full' PTS lies in the fact that the second 
premise of the (A) rule can be replaced by Vs 6 S[B ^ s] V 3s e S[B:s € A], 
which is much easier to handle. The importance of the notion of 'semi-full' will 
become clear when we study the Church-Rosser property for βη in PTS^. 
To end this section we want to mention some subtle variant of the syntax 
that has some practical use because it allows to prove a very nice meta property. 
The idea is to devide up the variables in several disjoint countable subsets, one 
subset for every sort s, which subset will be denoted by Vs. There are some small 
alterations in the derivation rules given in the following definition. 
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(var) 
(weak) 
ΓΗ A 
Γ, χ A h χ 
Tl· A s 
s 
A 
Γ, χ A h M 
M 
с 
с 
4 2 9 DEFINITION The syntax of Pure Type Systems with sorted variables has 
the set of variables Var devided up into countable subsets Vars for every s ζ S 
and the following (var) and (weak) rule 
χ € Var" 
χ € Vars 
It will turn out that, if we use the syntax with sorted variables in an injective 
PTS/3, the sets s-Term and s'-Term are disjoint for s ~ψ. s' (and similarly for 
s-Elt and s'-Elt ) The importance of this fact lies in the possibility of defining a 
mapping on the well-typed terms of the PTS^ by induction on the structure of 
terms, without having to mention a specific context in which the term is typed 
One only has to distinguish cases according to the sorts that specific subterms 
are terms or elements of 
4.3. Examples of P u r e Type Systems and morphisms 
4.3.1. The cube of typed lambda calculi 
We first treat the so called 'cube of typed lambda calculi', as presented by Baren-
dregt in [Barendregt 1992] The cube includes well-known systems like the simply 
typed and polymorphically typed lambda calculus To show that the two repre­
sentations of these systems are in fact the same requires some technical but not 
difficult work 
4 3 1 DEFINITION (Barendregt) The cube of typed lambda calculi consists of the 
eight PTS^s, all of them having as sorts the set 5 = {*, •} and as axiom A = 
{* •} the rules for each system are as follows 
λ -
A2 
λΡ 
Χω 
Χω 
λΡ2 
ΧΡω 
ΧΡω 
(*.*) (*,*) 
(*,*) 
(*.*) 
(*.*) 
(*,*) 
(*.*) 
(*>*) 
(α,*) 
(α,*) (°.*) 
(°.*) 
(*.°) 
(*.°) (*.°) (*.°) 
(°,α) 
(°,D) 
(D.°) (°.°) 
Note that all systems of the cube are injective and hence functional, so they 
enjoy all the nice properties that hold for these subclasses of PTSs It is convenient 
to think of the set of variables Var as being split up into a set Var* and a set VarG, 
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as was suggested in Definition 4.2.9. Te first type of variables will be referred to 
as object-variables, the second as constructor-variables. 
The systems λ—» and Λ2 are also known as the simply typed lambda calculus 
and the polymorphically typed lambda calculus (due to Girard as system F and 
Reynolds.) The system Χω is a higher order version of Λ2, also known as Girard's 
system Έω. The presentation of these systems as a PTS is quite different from the 
original one. If one is just interested in those systems alone it is in general more 
convenient to study them in their original presentation. The PTS framework is 
more convenient for systems with type dependency, that is the feature that a type 
A:* may itself contain a term M with M:B;*. This situation only occurs in the 
presence of the rule (*, O). In that case there is no other syntax for the systems 
which is essentially more convenient then the PTS format. The system AP is 
very close to LF, due to [Harper et al. 1987] (see Definition 3.3.6), in fact LF is 
the PTS^ variant of AP. The system ΧΡω is the Calculus of Constructions, due 
to [Coquand 1985]. (See also [Coquand and Huet 1988].) The system ΛΡ2 was 
defined under the same name by [Longo and Moggi 1988]. 
Usually the eight systems of the cube are presented in a picture as follows 
ΧΡω 
-ΧΡω 
where an arrow denotes inclusion of one system in another. 
The use of the cube is to give a fine structure for the Calculus of Constructions 
(ΧΡω), which is the largest system in the cube. It is now possible to understand 
ΧΡω as built up from the basic constants * and Π by allowing three kinds of 
dependencies, where dependency should be understood as the possibility to ab­
stract over specific terms to form a term of another specific kind. For example if 
we call the terms of type • types and the terms of type D kinds, then (•, *) means 
that we can abstract over a type to define a term of a type (e.g. Χχ.σ.χ : σ—*σ) 
and (О, •) means that we can abstract over a kind to define a term of a type (e.g. 
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Xa * Xx α χ Πα • α—»α ) An extensive explanation of these dependencies is 
given in [Barendregt 1992] 
As we have already pointed out, the PTS format is not always the most 
practical if one wants to study a specific system by itself It is however very 
convenient if one wants to compare different systems Applications of this will be 
given later when studying for example the Strong Normalization for the Calculus 
of Constructions One of the features that can come in handy are the PTS 
morphisms as defined in Definition 4 2 5 Obviously, all the inclusions inside the 
cube are PTS-morphisms 
Without a proof we now state the correspondence between the systems A—>, 
A2 and Χω in their original presentation and the PTS-format Let's therefore 
define these systems here again in a different format 
4 3 2 DEFINITION The system Fw is defined as follows The set of kinds, К is 
given in abstract syntax by 
к = *\K->K 
The constructors of Fu> are given by 
1 There are countably many variables а* к for every к ζ K, 
2 UM k!-*k2, N kuthen MN къ 
3 If M k2, then Aaf
1
 M fci—Jfc2, 
4 If σ * then Ilaf σ •, 
5 If σ, r *, then σ—>r * 
we have the usual notions of bound and free variables, substitution and β-
reduction on the set of constructors An object-context is a sequence of dec­
larations i i σι, ,x
n
 σ
η
 with all x, distinct Let Γ be an object-context The 
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derivation rules of Έω are the following 
(axiom) 
(—in) 
(—el) 
Ш-іп1 V 1 1 l i l ) 
(Π-el) 
(conv) 
Г h χ : σ 
Τ,χ:σ\- Μ :τ 
Γ h Χχ-.σ.Μ : σ—>τ 
Tl· Μ : σ - τ Γ h W : 
Tl· MN : τ 
Tl· Μ :σ 
Tl·λαk.M :Пак.а 
Tl· M: ΠοΛσ 
Tl· Mt: a[t/a] 
Tl· Μ :σ 
Tl· Μ :τ 
if χ:σ in Γ, 
: a 
if α JÉ FV(r), 
if ¿Ж 
if σ =β т. 
We can define the order of a kind, ord(A:), just as we defined the order of domains 
for predicate logic in Definition 2.2.6, as follows. 
ord(*) = 2, 
ord(fci—•... —>kp—»•) = max{orá(ki)\l <i <p} + 1. 
Now define for η € N, Fn by restricting the set of kinds of Fn (and hence the 
formation of constructors) to those of order < n. The system F2 will be called 
F and the systems FO and Fl, which are the same, are just the simply typed 
lambda calculus and will also be referred to as STA. 
Just as we have defined the systems Fn for 3 < η as subsystems of Fw that 
contain the system F, we can also define PTSs An for all 3 < η such that 
Λ2 С A3 С · · · С Χω. 
We shall not do it, because on the one hand it is quite clear what such systems 
should look like (restrict the formation of kinds to a certain depth) while on 
the other hand the definition is very involved and doesn't give any real insight. 
To state the equivalence of Fw and Χω and of F and Λ2, we introduce some 
notation. For Γ a context in Χω or Λ2, let Γπ be the subcontext that contains 
only the declarations of constructor-variables, and let Г* be the subcontext that 
contains only the declarations of object-variables.We have the following Lemma. 
(Something similar would hold for the other systems An, if we would have defined 
them.) 
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4 3 3 L E M M A In \ω and \2 we have 
Γ l· Α α =>· Α ξ. К, and in λ2, A = *, 
ΓΗ M /1(D) => r ° h M Л, 
Г h M А{ *) => Г п , Г * г - М /1 
P R O O F Immediately by induction on derivations H 
Now, if M A with /1 a kind in Fa;, we have to introduce a context in \ω to 
type M in We denote this context by YM For every free constructor variable in 
M, Тм contains a declaration of this variable to the kind it has in M Similarly 
for Μ Α * , Τ M A contains a declaration of each constructor variable that is 
free in M or A 
The other way around, if Γ h M A in \JJ, we denote by M + the term M 
where each constructor variable is replaced by a variable of the kind that is given 
for it in Γ 
We now have the following proposition 
4 3 4 P R O P O S I T I O N 
Γ Η
λ ω
 M /1(D) => M+ A{e К) m Fw, 
Г Κ
λω
 M A{*) =>· Γ' \-Fu, M A, 
and the other way around 
M Л(е К) m Fw => Г
м
 Η
λα
, M А, 
T\-FuM А{*) => TMAJ^XUM А 
P R O O F By induction on derivations or the structure of terms, using the Lemma H 
We shall go into more details about the Calculus of Constructions and other 
systems of the cube later, in Chapter 6 1 
4.3.2. Logics as Pure Type Systems 
Other interesting example of PTSs were given by [Berardi 1988], who defined 
logical systems as PTSs In Chapter 3 1 we encountered the typed lambda cal­
culi APRED (Definition 3 2 1), APRED2 and APREDu; (Definition 3 2 19) that 
correspond directly to the logical systems PRED, PRED2 and PREDw, as de­
fined in 2 2 6 The correspondence was only verified in full detail for the case 
of APRED and PRED (see Theorem 3 2 8 and Proposition 3 2 10), but it is not 
very difficult to extend it to the other cases We also saw that the correspon­
dence is very strong in the sense that there is a correspondence between proofs 
and proof terms (See Proposition 3 2 15) The next step is now to define PTSs 
that correspond to the systems APRED, APRED2 and APREDo; The systems 
that we are looking for are precisely the systems that were defined by Berardi 
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4 3 5 DEFINITION (Berardi) The cube of logical typed lambda calculi, also re-
ferred to as the logic cube, consists of the following eight PTS^s Each of them 
has 
5 = {Prop, Set, Type", Type'}, 
A = Prop Type'', Set Type" 
The rules of each of the systems is given by the following table 
APROP 
APROP2 
APROPw 
APROPw 
(Prop, Prop) 
(Prop, Prop) 
(Prop, Prop) 
(Prop, Prop) 
(Type?, Prop) 
(Type", Type") 
(Type^.Type") 
(Type", Prop) 
APRED (Set, Set) (Set, Type") 
(Prop, Prop) (Set, Prop) 
APRED2 (Set, Set) (Set, Type") 
(Prop, Prop) (Set, Prop) (Type", Prop) 
APREDw (Set, Set) (Set, Type") (Type", Set) (Type", Type*) 
(Prop, Prop) (Set, Prop) 
APREDw (Set, Set) (Set, Type") (Type", Set) (Type", Type") 
(Prop, Prop) (Set, Prop) (Type^Prop) 
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The systems are presented in a picture as follows 
APROPu; APREDu; 
APROP2 APRED2 
APROPu; APREDu; 
APROP APRED 
where an arrow denotes inclusion of one system in another 
Some intuition is required here, it is probably best to keep APRED and its 
extensions in mind The sort Prop is to be understood as the class of propositions 
The sorts Set and Type' together form the universe of domains Domains of the 
form A\—> -^A
n
—>a with α a variable are of type Set, the functional types, 
while domains of the form Αχ—* —*A
n
—»Prop are of type Typep(n > 0) the 
predicate types The sort Type5 allows the introduction of variables of type Set, 
and that is its only purpose This should be sufficient to understand the first 
four rules of TZ in APREDu; The other three correspond to the logical rules in 
the following sense 
(Prop, Prop) ~» implication (φ D ψ), 
(Set, Prop) ~» quantification over functional types (Vi Α φ, A Set) 
(Type7", Prop) ~> quantification over predicate types (Vi Α ψ, A Typep) 
The systems of first, second and higher order proposition logic are defined by 
just removing the sorts Set and Type* Note that the systems APROP, APROP2 
and APROPu; that we get in this way are just λ—», A2 and Χω The two systems 
APREDu; and APROPu; have just been added to make the whole thing into a 
cube analoguous to the cube of Defintion 4 3 1 They are in formulas-as-types 
correspondence with two logical systems that we encountered in Definition 2 2 11, 
namely APROPu; corresponds to PROP1" and APREDu; corresponds to PREDT 
These are logics in which there is no order-restriction on the A-abstraction, but 
only on the V-quantification, so the whole higher order language is available but 
not the possibility to do higher order quantification 
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It is not immediately obvious that we can still see the systems of 4.3.5 as 
being built up in three stages. (First the domains, then the terms and finally 
the proofs.) It could well be the case that an object expression contains a proof 
expression or that a domain expression depends on a term. This is however not 
the case: The systems APRED, APRED2 and APREDo; correspond to APRED, 
APRED2 respectively APREDu; in the similar way as A2 and Χω correspond to F 
and FU;. We are not going to state this correspondence explicitly, let alone prove 
it. It is very similar to the work for A2 and Χω that we did before. Let's only 
state the basic property that makes the whole correspondence work. (Compare 
this Proposition with Lemma 4.3.3.) 
4.3.6 PROPOSITION. In APREDu; we have the following. If Γ Ь M : A then 
Гд,Г
т
,Г
я
г- M : A with 
• Γβ, ΓΥ,Γρ is a sound permutation o}T, 
• Го only contains declarations of the form χ : Set, 
• Γτ only contains declarations of the form χ : A with YD I" A : Set/Typep, 
• Γρ only contains declarations of the form χ : φ with Гд, Γχ h ψ : Prop, 
• if A = Set/TypeP , then TD\- M : A, 
• if Γ h A • Set/TypeP, then Γ
Ω
, Г
т
 h M : Α. 
PROOF. By induction on the derivation.ІЯ 
Similar Propositions hold for APRED and APRED2. They demistify these 
PTSs enough to be able to verify the stated correspondences. 
As was noticed by [Barendregt 1992], it is also possible to describe a PTS that 
corresponds to the subsystem PRED -^ of PRED (Definition 2.3.7). 
4.3.7. DEFINITION APRED_/ is the PTS with 
5 Prop, Set, Fun, Typep,Typei, 
A Prop : TypeP,, Set : Type", 
П (Set, Set, Fun), (Set, Fun, Fun), (Set, TypeP), 
(Prop, Prop), (Set, Prop) 
The idea is that Set contains only basic domains (B of PRED - ' ) and Fun 
contains the functional domains ((F of PRED - ' ) . Quantification is only possible 
over types in Set. The system APRED - ' is not really a subsystem of APRED, 
but only via the morphism that maps Set and Fun to Set. We have a Proposition 
like 4.3.6 to prove in detail that the formulas-as-types embedding from PRED"' 
to APRED - ' is an isomorphism. 
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We have seen that many of the logical systems of Chapter 2 1 are in one-to-one 
correspondence with a PTS^ To show such a correspondence one has to make 
two steps First define a typed λ calculus 'as close as possible' to the original 
logic and formalize the formulas-as-types embedding à la Howard (This has been 
done in detail for the system PRED in Chapter 3 1, where we defined APRED 
and the formulas-as-types embedding from PRED to APRED ) Then show that 
the intermediate typed λ calculus is the same as the PTS/э that we want the logic 
to correspond with (This has been done in detail for the intermediate systems F 
and Ρω, that correspond to A2 (= APROP2), respectively Χω (= APROPw)) For 
the systems PRED2, P R E D O J and PRED" ¡ , we have only given the corresponding 
PTS/3 without detailed proof, which is very similar to the proof for the other cases 
We can depict the correspondences in a picture as follows, where ~ denotes a 
correspondence and f~] denotes a correspondence that we have verified in great 
detail 
PRED 
PRED2 
PREDu» 
PROP 
PROP2 
PROPw 
PRED_ / 
\Ш1 
л * 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
<^-> 
A P R E D 
A P R E D 2 
A P R E D w 
STA 
F 
Fuj 
l*V 
<-^  
·*** 
'*<·' 
\E\ 
1 ^ 
APRED"·' 
APRED, 
APRED2, 
APREDu;, 
A^(=APROP), 
A2(=APROP2), 
Χω (= APROPw) 
For most of the other logical systems of Chapter 2 1 one can also define cor­
responding PTS^s We have not done this here Most of the times the definition 
becomes a hack without any intuitive meaning, so we don't see this as a very 
useful operation 
4.3.3. Morphisms between Pure Type Systems 
The reason for introducing the cube of logical Pure Type Systems (Definition 
4 3 5) is to formalise the embedding of logics into the typed lambda calculi of 
the cube, and especially the Calculus of Constructions (ΧΡω ) This was also the 
original motive for Berardi to define these systems To formalise the practical 
use of ΧΡω as a system of higher order predicate logic and to better understand 
the use of ΑΡω as a higher order predicate logic We come to speak about ΧΡω 
and its relation to PREDu; in more detail later At this point we just want 
to treat the interpretation of logics in the systems of the Barendregt's cube by 
defining a mapping of the cube of logical systems into the Barendregt's cube. This 
mapping is sometimes referred to as the formulas-as-types embedding (or even 
isomorphism), but we feel that it is more appropriate to use that terminology for 
the transition from 'real' logical systems to typed lambda calculi 
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4 3 8 DEFINITION The collapsing mapping from the logic cube to the Baren-
dregt's cube is the PTS-morphism Я given by 
Я(Ргор) = *, 
H {Set) = *, 
Я(Туре") = D, 
Я(Туре') = D 
It is easy to verify that for each corner of the cube, Я is a PTS-morphism 
from the system in the logic cube to the system in the Barendregt's cube The 
question arises whether the mapping is complete, especially with respect to the 
inhabitation of propositions One of the nice things of doing logic in for example 
λΡω, is that domains of the logic and propositions are treated in exactly the 
same way This opens up a wide range of new possibilities (like the possibility 
to define domains that represent inductive data types ) On the other hand it is 
not so obvious that all this is still sound We shall see that in the broadest sense 
this operation is not sound, ι e the collapsing mapping is not complete, while in 
a more narrow sense, things are not that bad More about this in Chapter 6 1 
To end this section we want to give a different Pure Type System that cor­
responds to PREDOJ that is more intuitive then ÀPREDw It can be seen as a 
direct formulas-as-types formalisation of PREDw, using the fact that in PREDw 
there is no reason to distinguish between functional types and predicate types, 
as was done in APREDui (See also Definition 3 2 19 ) On the other hand this 
alternative version can also be obtained by defining the system AUT-HOL in a 
PTS format (AUT-HOL was defined in 3 3 11 by applying ideas from the Au-
tomath systems AUT-4 to the system AUT-68 ) We already pointed out the 
correspondence between AUT-HOL and APREDu; in Proposition 3 3 14 
4 3 9 DEFINITION The typed lambda calculus ÀHOPL is the PTS with 
S = {Prop, Type, Type'}, 
A = Prop Type, Type Type', 
П = (Type, Type), 
(Prop, Prop), (Type, Prop) 
The meaning of the components of the system should be clear from the in­
tended correspondence with PREDu; Prop is the sort of formulas, Type is the 
sort of domains and the sort Type' is just there to be able to introduce variables of 
type Type (These variables are to be the basic domains of the logic ) There is a 
heavy overloading of symbols Ylx А В stands for logical implication (э) if A and 
В are both propositions (of type Prop), for universal quantification (V¿) if Л is a 
type and В a proposition {A Type, В Prop) and it stands for the domain A—*B 
if both A and В are types (of type Type ) Again it is not immediately obvious 
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that AHOPL can be seen as being built up in three stages. (First the domains, 
then the objects and finally the proofs.) That this is still the case is stated in 
the following proposition, which is the AHOPL equivalent of Proposition 4.3.6 
4.3.10. P R O P O S I T I O N . We work in AHOPL. If Γ h- M : A then Τ0,ΤΤιΓΡ l· M • 
A with 
• Γϋ,ΓΥ, Γρ is a sound permutation ofT, 
• Гд only contains declarations of the form χ : Type, 
• Γ7· only contains declarations of the form χ : A with TD h A : Type, 
• Γρ only contains declarations of the form χ : φ with Γ^,Γ-τ l· ψ : Prop, 
• if A = Type , then TD h M • A, 
• if Tl· A: Type, then TD, TT l· M : A. 
The Proposition states (among other things) that the domains (terms of type 
Type) are just built up from domain-variables using Π, so no object- or proof-
variables occur as subterms, so the domains are as in AHOPL. Further it states 
that the terms of the object-language are formed from the object-variables by 
A-abstraction and application and (for terms of type Prop) by Π, so they don't 
contain proof-variables: ίΙχ:φ.φ {φ, ψ : Prop) denotes ψ Э ψ, the logical implica­
tion. 
As an application of the notion of PTS-morphism and also to fully justify 
the two systems AHOPL and A P R E D U J in terms of each other, we prove that 
APREDüj and AHOPL are in a sense the same system. 
4 3.11. P R O P O S I T I O N . There is a PTS-morphism G from APREDo; to AHOPL 
and a denvability-preservmg map F from AHOPL to APREDw such that F о 
G = Id and G o F = Id. 
P R O O F . Take for G : APREDw -> AHOPL the PTSmorphism 
G(Prop) = Prop, 
G(Set) = Type, 
С(Туре") = Type, 
G(TypO = Type'. 
and for F : AHOPL -» APREDo; first define the mapping F from Term(AHOPL)\ 
{Type'} to Term(APREDw) by 
F(x) = 1,(1 a variable), 
F(Prop) = Prop, 
F(Type) = Set, 
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and further by induction on the structure of the terms G, being a PTS morphism, 
preserves derivations F preserves substitution and /3-equality and F extends to 
contexts straightforwardly by defining 
F(i i A
u
 ,x
n
 A
n
) =x
x
 F(A{), ,x
n
F{A
n
) 
(The sort Type' does not appear in a context of AHOPL ) Now we extend F to 
derivable judgements of AHOPL by defining 
F ( r i - M A) = F{Γ)l·F(M) F(A), if A /Type, Type', 
F ( r Ι- M Type) = F(T) h F {M) Set, if Μ Ξ ->α, (α a variable), 
F(T h M Type) = F(T) h F(M) Typ^, if M = -»Prop, 
F(rhType Type') = F(T) h Set Type" 
Now F is a PTS mapping in the sense of Definition 4 2 5 By easy induction one 
proves that F preserves derivations Also F(G(T r- Μ A)) = Γ h M A and 
G ( F ( r h M A)) = T\- M A И 
We feel that the correspondence between PREDw and AHOPL is more intu­
itive then the one between APREDw and PREDL; A disadvantage of presenting 
higher order predicate logic as AHOPL is that we can not find e g second order 
predicate logic as a subsystem by an easy restriction on the rules For the rules 
there is no distinction between the basic domains and the domain Prop Further 
AHOPL doesn't allow a straightforward syntactical description of the formulas-
as types embedding of higher order predicate logic into CC (APREDw does, as 
we saw in Definition 4 3 8) In the following we therefore also look at the system 
APREDCJ 
4.3.4. Inconsistent Pure Type Systems 
Inconsistency is not really a property of a PTS as such, but it depends on a 
interpretation that has been given to the different parts of it One could say 
that a PTS is inconsistent if all closed types of a specific sort that is intended 
to be the sort of all formulas, are inhabited by a closed term, but that is not 
always satisfying In [Coquand and Herbelm 1992], a restriction is made to so 
called logical PTSs systems that have two specific sorts Prop and Type with the 
oproperties that Prop Type is an axiom, (Type, Prop) is a rule, the system is 
functional and there are no sorts of type Prop Usually it is obvious which sort is 
to be understood as the sort of formulas, so we just speak of 'inconsistent PTSs' 
One of the inconsistent PTSs we have seen is A* (which is not a logical PTS) 
Other ones are the following 
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4 3 12 DEFINITION The system XU is defined as follows 
S = Prop, Type, Type', 
A = Prop Type, Type Type', 
11 = (Type, Type), (Type', Type) 
(Prop, Prop), (Type, Prop) 
The system XU is defined by extending XU~ with the rule (Type', Prop) 
In [Girard 1971] these systems are discussed as logics They are obtained 
by extending PREDu with polymorphic domains (system U~) and with quan­
tification over all domains (together with the polymorphic domains, this forms 
the system U) As typed lambda calculi they are extensions of AHOPL AU" is 
AHOPL with the rule (Type', Type) (polymorphic domains) and AU is AU" with 
(Type, Prop) (quantification over all domains) For example in AU- one has do­
mains like ПЛ Type A—>(A-+A)—>A (numerals) and UA Type (A—»Prop)—»Prop 
In AU one can write down formulas like UA Type UP A—»Prop Пх A Px—*Px 
It is not so difficult to see that the extension of higher order predicate logic 
with just quantification over all domains is consistent and conservative over 
PREDu 
4 3 13 THEOREM Both \U~ and XU are inconsistent, ι e m both systems there 
is a term M with 
h M _L(= Πα Prop α) 
PROOF For XU the proof is in [Girard 1972] A good explanation of it and a 
discussion of applications of the proof to other type systems can be found in 
[Coquand 1986] This fact has become known as Girard's paradox, especially 
in its application to the system A* The proof for \U~ is in [Coquand 199+] 
It internalises Reynold's argument that there are no set theoretic models of the 
polymorphic lambda calculus И 
Using the meta theory for Pure Type Systems, it is easy to see that in an in­
consistent system there are terms that have no normal form So the normalization 
property does not hold for At/, \U~ and A* 
That XU is not such a strange system is shown by the fact that we can separate 
contexts in the system, just like in AHOPL and other systems That is, we have 
the following 
4 3 14 PROPOSITION We work m XU If TV- M A then YDJT,YP h M A 
with 
• Γβ,Γχ,Γρ is a sound permutation ofT, 
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• YD only contains declarations of the form χ : Type, 
• Γ7- only contains declarations of the form χ : A with Гд h A : Type, 
• Гр only contains declarations of the form χ : φ with Гд, Г h φ : Prop, 
• if A = Type , then TDl· M : A, 
• if Γ h Л : Type, ¿Zien Γ
σ
, Γ
τ
 Y- M : Α. 
In Chapter 6.1 we shall see that, if we are a little bit more careful, it is possible 
to extend higher order logic with polymorphic domains and still have a consistent 
system. 
4.4. Meta theory of Pure Type Systems 
In this section we want to treat the meta theory for our different notions of 
Pure Type System. For the PTS^s, most of the results that are listed here have 
already been treated in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991]. A lot of the proofs in that 
paper can immediately be extended to the cases for PTS/j, and PTS^, but not 
all. The essential problem is that the Church-Rosser property for /ÏTj-reduction 
does not hold for Τ (the set of pseudoterms). This is very problematic, not only 
because CR on Τ is the tool for proving Subject Reduction and Church-Rosser 
for the typable terms, but also because it makes the whole system PTS^ quite 
suspect: Think of the possibility that A and В are types with Α =ρ
η
 В, but 
only by means of an expansion-reduction path which passes through the set of 
non-typable terms. The conversion rule says that the types A and В still have 
the same inhabitants, but that is of course not what we want. 
Having realised ourselves how problematic the absence of the Church-Rosser 
property for βη-reduction on Τ is, we are of course going to look for solutions. 
It should be remarked here that the solutions given in this thesis have some 
generality, but can not be the final answer The fact is that we did manage 
to prove a general property of /?r/-equality on Τ that can in practical situations 
replace CR. However, using this we only managed to prove CR for βη on well-
typed terms for a restricted class of PTS^s: The ones that are functional and 
normalizing. So we have no proof of CR for βη for a system like λ*, although we 
very strongly believe that it holds, even more so because there are other PTS^s 
that are not normalizing, for which CR for βη can easily be proved. (So the lack 
of normalization doesn't seem to be very essential.) It should be possible to find 
a general proof which works for all PTS^s. Further, the dependency of CR for 
βη on normalization implies that CR becomes essentially a higher order property 
(for example for the Calculus of Constructions, for which a normalization proof 
can not be done in higher order arithmetic.) We feel that this can not be the 
case (also because for some non-normalizing PTS^s the proof of CR for βη can 
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be done in first order arithmetic ) Having made all these negative comments on 
the work, we want to stress that there is still enough generality in the proof, 
especially the part that analyses βη equality on pseudoterms, that we think it 
can be an important contribution to a general proof of CR for ^-reduction for 
arbitrary Pure Type Systems 
4.4.1. Specifying the notions to be studied 
We now want to fix some notions and notations that will be studied in the rest 
of this thesis 
4 4 1 D E F I N I T I O N Let Λ' be a set of pseudoterms closed under /3(7/)-reduction 
We say that X satisfies the Church-Rosser property for 0{η)-reduction, notation 
X \= CR^(,), or just X satisfies CR^
n
), if 
VM,N,P e Χ[Ν
β{η)^ м -~0M p=>3Qe Χ[Ν ^0(η) QßM^P]] 
We say that X satisfies Confluence for β(η)-reduction, notation X \= CON^,,), 
or just X satisfies CONß^), if 
VM, N e X[M =«„> N => 3Q e Χ [M -»«
ч ) Q m «- N\] 
Obviously, for /9-reduction 
X\=CR0<*X\= CON0, 
But for /^-reduction this is not the case 
4 4 2 D E F I N I T I O N Let X be a set of pseudoterms closed under /3(^-reduction 
We say that X satisfies Strong Normalization for β (η) reduction, notation X (= 
SN^(,), or just X satisfies SNg^), if there are no infinite /3(?y)-reduction sequences 
in X 
We could have formulated this property more positively, for example by saying 
that for all M in X there is an η € N such that η is an upperbound to the length 
of /3(?7)-reduction sequences starting from M We have not done so because the 
first is a bit easier to work with Most of the proofs of Strong Normalization in 
this thesis can be redone with the alternative definition 
4.4.2. Analyzing /Зту-equality on the pseudoterms 
In the proof of Church-Rosser we shall relate the /îrç-reduction on typed terms to 
the reductions on untyped lambda terms Properties of reduction and equality on 
the untyped terms will be used to obtain results about reduction and equality in 
Τ We therefore define an erasure mapping from Τ to Λ and give some properties 
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for it With this we can prove the so called Key Lemma about /3r/-equality in T, 
which will enable us to prove the important meta theoretical properties like UT 
(Uniqueness of Types) and SR/j for PTS^ and SR, for PTSJ, But first of all 
we give a proof of postponement of 77-reduction in T, a well-known property of 
/^-reduction in Л 
Postponement of η-reduction 
We prove the postponement of η-reduction for a set of pseudoterms Τ by an argu­
ment similar to the one used in [Barendregt 1984] (Chapter 15) for the untyped 
lambda calculus The idea is to mark 77-redexes as superscripts inside the terms 
(as superscript we take the type of the abstracted variablem the r?-redex ) In case 
one is convinced of the fact that postponement of 77-reduction holds for T, this 
paragraph may be skipped 
4 4 3 DEFINITION The set of pseudoterms with markers, T + is defined by ab­
stract syntax as 
T + = 5 I Var I (П аг T + T+) | (Л аг T + T + ) | T+T+ | T + T + 
The reduction relation on T + is ß+, defined by the basic steps 
(XxAP)Q ^ 0 + P[Q/x], 
PAQ — * • PQ, 
and further by induction on the structure of terms, such that it is compatible 
with application, λ- and Π-abstraction and the superscript operation 
The intended meaning of PAQ is (Ax A Px)Q, a /3-redex, so this should ïn-
deedreduce to PQ in T+ We define the two mappings | | л and φ from T + to 
T, the first erasing the superscripts and the second inserting an η redex for a 
superscript 
4 4 4 DEFINITION 1 The mapping \\h T + —• Τ is defined by erasing all 
superscripts, 
2 The mapping φ T + —• Τ is defined by 
φ{ΡΑ) = \x φ(Α) φ(Ρ)χ (for a fresh x) 
and further by induction on the structure of the term 
The following are now easily proved (by induction on the structure of terms ) 
44 5 LEMMA For M, NeJ+, 
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1. φ(Μ[Ν/χ}) = φ{Μ)[φ{Ν)Ιχ), 
2. φ{Μ) -», \M\h. 
The following lemma is a formal justification for the definition of/3+-reduction: 
It shows that ψ preserves (/?+-)reductions and | \h reflects (/5+-) reductions. 
4.4.6 LEMMA For P,QeT+, M,M' € Τ, 
1. Ρ -^0+ Q =» φ(Ρ) —>„ φ{<ί), 
2. p^\\h M —*
β
 M' => 3P' € T[P -*0+ P' i-JI" M']. 
PROOF. The proof of the first splits into two cases, depending on the type of 
redex: Ρ = C[{Xx-A.B)C] or Ρ Ξ C[BAC). For both of them the required 
property is easily proved, using for the first case Lemma 4.4.5(1). The proof 
of the second is by imitating the reduction from M to M' in T+. Let M = 
C[(Xx:A.Q)S], M' = C[Q[S/x]\. Then Ρ = C°[{{\x:B.R)°T)°], where ° denotes 
a possible superscript and \B\h = A, \R\h = Q and \T\h = S. Now Ρ -*0+ 
C°[{{\x:A.R)T)0} —> 0 + C[R[T/x]]. So we are done by taking P' = C°[R[T/x}}. 
И 
4.4.7. LEMMA. For Q, Μ, M' e Τ, 
Q —», Μ -»„ M' => 3Q' € T[<? -»/, Q' ->„ M'} 
PROOF. Let's say that Q = C[Xx:A.Nx], M = C[N]. Now define Ρ := C[NA]. 
Then ψ{Ρ) = Q and \P\h = M, so, by Lemma 4.4.6(2) we find P' € T+ such 
that Ρ -*
β+ Ρ' κ-»
11
" M'. By Lemma 4.4.5(2) we find that also φ{Ρ') -», M'. By 
Lemma 4.4.6(1) we find that (Q =)φ{Ρ) -»/з ψ{Ρ')-
We are now done by taking Q' = φ(Ρ') И 
4.4.8. COROLLARY (Postponement of 77-reduction). For Μ, N e Τ, 
M-*frN=*3Qe T[M -.„ Q -», TV]. 
PROOF. It suffices to prove the following property, which is a slight variation of 
the Lemma: If Q -», M -*0 M', then 3Q' 6 J[Q -*0 Q' -»,, M']. This property 
follows immediately from the Lemma itself. Kl 
4.4.9. THEOREM. For X с Τ, X closed under β-reduction, if X \= SN0, then 
J, X \= SN0n, where J. X denotes the closure of X under -*η. 
PROOF. First remark that I AT is the same as 1 X by the postponement of 
77. Now, an infinite /^-reduction in J. X yields an infinite /3-reduction in X by 
postponement of η and the fact that there are no infinite ^-reductions. So we 
are done by X \= SN0. (Note that, if we have an effective bound to the number 
of/^-reduction steps to normal form in X, then we can also compute an effective 
bound to the number of ^-reduction steps in | X.) IS 
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The Key Lemma for βη-reduction on Τ 
The counterexample of [Nederpelt 1973] shows that, if one tries to prove C R ^ , 
there is a problem in the types of the λ-abstracted variables. We call these types 
domains. 
4.4.10. D E F I N I T I O N . Let M e T. A subterm A of M is a domain if it occurs as 
\x:A in M. (So we are not concerned with Π-abstractions.) 
The erasure map removes all domains. 
4.4.11. D E F I N I T I O N . The erasure map \\ : Τ —• Λ π is defined by induction on 
the structure of pseudoterms as follows. 
| λ χ : Α Μ | := λ ι . | Μ | , 
\Ux:A.B\ := Π χ : | Α | . | β | , 
\MN\ := \M\\N\. 
Неге, Λ
π
 is Л extended with the extra variable binder Π and constants s for each 
s e S. 
4.4.12. R E M A R K All the well-known facts (like C R ^ ) about /^/-reduction in Λ 
continue to hold for ^-reduct ion in Λπ. This can easily be seen by viewing 
Π ι : | Α | . | β | as G|A|(Ax.|B|), with G some fixed constant. 
If, for M,M' e Τ, \М\ = \M'\, then M and M' have the same 'structure', 
apart from the domains that may be very different. We therefore give the follow­
ing definition. 
4.4.13. D E F I N I T I O N . Let M,M' e T. If \M\ = \M'\ and the respective domains 
in M and M' are all /^η-equal, we say that M and M' are domain-equal, notation 
M=dM' 
We have the following proposition, relating reduction in Τ to reduction in Λπ. 
4.4 14. P R O P O S I T I O N . For M and M' m Τ, 
(1) M—>
β
Μ' =• \Μ\—^|М'| | М | = | М ' | , 
and similar for — *
η
 and so for =β
η
. For M € Τ, Q € Λπ, 
(2) \M\^ßQ =• 3N[M—>ßNk\N\ = \Q]. 
The latter doesn't hold m general for —•,,, but we do have (for с a variable or 
sort) 
(3) | M | - » , c => Μ^
η
σ. 
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P R O O F The first is trivial If the redex is erased by 11, then \M\ Ξ \M'\ and 
otherwise the same redex can still be done in Λπ, so \M\ —• \M'\ The second 
is almost trivial, as 11 only erases domains, a β redex in \M\ is also a β redex in 
M, and by evaluating it we find N e Τ with M —*β N and |TV| = Q 
That the second is not valid for η is shown by the taking M = Αχ σ y(Xz Px z)x 
(This term can even be well-typed in e g the Calculus of Constructions Take 
Ρ = \x σ τ, y (τ—»τ)-+σ—>σ In Lemma 5 2 3 we see that nevertheless, if M is 
well-typed in a functional normalizing P T S ^ , and M is in βη nf, then \M\ is in 
βη-ni ) 
The third is a corollary of the following more general lemma Η 
4 4 15 L E M M A Let M and M' be in Τ 
\M\ -»,, Q, Q contains no Xs ^ 3N[M -»
η
 N к \N\ = Q] 
P R O O F By induction on the number of As in \M\ First remark that, as Q 
contains no As, all the As in \M\ become the A of an 7/-redex at some point in the 
reduction \M\ -»
v
 Q Further note that the only way in which an η-iedex can be 
created m Л п is by Ax M(\y xy) —•,, \x Mx, which implies that the innermost 
A in \M\ is always an 77-redex in \M\ If \M\ contains only one A we are easily 
done Now suppose that \M\ contains n + 1 As and that we are already done 
for terms containing n As Take the innermost η redex of \M\, say it is Ax \P\x, 
coming from Ax A Px m M Then \P\ does not contain any A, for if it would this 
A would have to be the A of a redex, which would make Ax \P\x not innermost 
This implies that Ax A Px is also an 77-redex in M So we can apply IH to the 
term obtained by contracting the 77-redex Ax A Px in M and we are done H 
The following is an immediate corollary of the counterexample to C R ^ on Τ 
4 4 16 L E M M A (Domain Lemma) If C[\x A M\ and В are m Τ (ι e С is a 
pseudoterm with subterm Αχ A M), then 
C[\x A M] =g
v
 C[\x Β M] 
P R O O F 
C[Xy В (Ax A M)y] 
where у is some variable not occurring free in A or M IS 
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First some notation For D € Τ and M € Τ, MD € Τ is the pseudoterm 
obtained by replacing all domains in M by D For D € Τ and t 6 Λπ, t+D € Τ 
is the pseudoterm obtained by adding D as domain to every λ abstraction in t 
(So for example (λι x)+D is Xx D χ ) 
4 4 17 COROLLARY For A and В pseudoterms, 
\Α\=
βη
\Β\=>Α=
βη
Β 
PROOF Let \A\ =
βη
 \B\, so by Church-Rosser |A| I |S | , say \A\ -*
βη
 tßn «-
\B\ Take for D some closed pseudoterm (or fresh variable), then we have the 
following diagram (The =
βη
 are an immediate consequence of Lemma 4 4 16 ) 
Α =0η Α Β =βη В 
So Α=
βη
 Β Η 
4 4 18 LEMMA (Key Lemma) Let с be a variable or a sort 
1 cP, _ P
n
 =0η Q =» Q ^ß XyÂcQl QnR, with Qx =βη Pt (1 < ι < η) 
and R and у are of the same length with R ->•,, у 
2 ПхР
:
 P2 =βη Q =Φ Q -*β Xy Α (Πχ Qx Q2)R, with Рг =Sn Q, (г = 1,2) 
and R and y are of the same length with R -», y 
PROOF We only prove the first, since the proof of the second is totally similar 
For reasons of readability we adapt here the convention to use capitals for pseu­
doterms and small characters for elements of Лп 
Let cP\ P
n
 and Q be as in the first case of the lemma By CR^ on Лп we find 
<i, ,t
n
 £ Лп withc|Pi| | P
n
| -»
β
„ ct
x
 i„and |Q| -»^ cti t„ Usingpost-
ponement of ^-reduction, we find that |Q| -*
β
 Ay cçi qnf'-», ct\ tn (Doing 
as many /3-reductions as possible, ι e we /3-reduce all the 7/-redexes that overlap 
with a /3-redexe More precisely, if (Xx Mx)N —*„ MN or Xx (Xz N)x —•,, 
Xz N is one of the ^-reductions from Xy cq\ q
n
f to ct\ t
nt then we do it al­
ready as a /3-reduction step ) So y and fare of the same length By 4 4 14 we find 
a term Ay AcQ^ Qnñwith Q -*0 Xy A cQ-i QnR and \Xy A cQx QnR\ = 
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Xy cq\ q
n
r The situation is as follows 
с Л P
n
r — > C | P , | \Pn\ \Q\< \Q 
ß 
XyAcQx QnR 
Now R —>,, у follows from f -»
η
 у and Proposition 4 4 14(3) We also have 
|<?,| =β
η
 \P,\ (for 1 < ι < n), so, by Corollary 4 4 17 we have Q, =
βη
 Ρ, (1 < г < 
η) and we are done Ή 
There is a generalisation of the Key Lemma to include terms that begin with 
a A abstraction We give it for technical completeness 
4 4 19 L E M M A (General Key Lemma) Let с be a variable or a sort 
1 \zi Ai Xzp Ap cPi P„ =enQ => Q -»/э Xz\ ΒΛ Xz„ B„ cQx Qm, 
with η + q = m + ρ and Pi, ,P
n
,zq, ,Z\andQi, ,Qm,zp, zi are 
pazrwise βη-convertible 
2 XzARxPiPi =β
η
 Q => Q -*
β
 Xz В Xy С {UuQlQ2)R, with Ρ, =0η 
Qt {ι = 1,2) and R -», у 
P R O O F The proof is quite similar to the proof of the Key Lemma Again we 
only treat the first case because it is the most difficult one of the two Using 
the properties of the untyped labda calculus we now get the following picture 
(Notation z1 denotes z\, ,zp, z" denotes z\, ,zq) 
X?A'cP1 Pn\ > A / c | P 1 | \Pn\ \Q\< i Q 
ß 
Xz" B" cQ 
where ζ is z\, z
s
 for some s < p,q First, we can conclude from this that 
q — s = m — τ and ρ — s = n — r and hence n + q = m + ρ Further, this means 
that for r < г < η, \Pt\ -*η 2 s + ,_ r and for τ < ι < m, \QZ\ -»»ч 2 í + 1_ r Just as in 
the Key Lemma, we use Corollary 4 4 17 to conclude that Pi, , P„, zq, , Z\ 
and Qi, ,Qm,zP, Z\ are pairwise βη-eqaai and we are done S 
'The Lemma can also be proved by induction on the length of the reduction-expansion path 
from cP\ P
n
 to Q, as was suggested to us by В Werner This does not change the proof in 
an essential way, we think that the proof above explains the idea better 
CÍi í „ 
λ$ cqi q
n
f 
βη 
Xz ct\ í r - Xz" cq 
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4.4.3. A list of properties for Pure Type Systems 
At those points in the text where essential use of specific meta theory is being 
made, we refer to the relevant lemmas and propositions, so this paragraph may 
be skipped for now 
In the following we let ζ = \(S, A, TZ) be an arbitrary PTS If we do not make 
explicit reference to the PTS, we always refer to this generic system ζ If the 
lemma or proposition only holds for a specific notion of PTSs or for a specific 
subset of the class of all PTSs, this will be explicitly mentioned So, the generic 
case is that a lemma or proposition holds for all three notions of PTS and also 
that the given (sketched) proof works for all three cases 
As remarked, we treat terms modulo α-equivalence, so, for example Xx Ay 
and \z Ay are the same terms (for different x, y and z ) This makes that, for 
χ i FV(S), 
χ А, у В h \x A y Ux А В 
is derivable, whereas it is not without Q-conversion Also variables that are free 
in a typable term are in a sense bound by a declaration in the context For those 
variables we also have a notion of α-conversion that we call 'replacement' and 
that is provable, as is shown by the following lemma 
4 4 20 REPLACEMENT LEMMA For Г
ь
і А,Тг a context, M and В terms and 
у a fresh variable that is not bound m M or fi, 
Г і , і Д Г 2 Н М В =• ТъУА,Т2[уІх}УМ[уІх] В[у/х] 
by a derivation with the same underlying tree, 
where the underlying tree of a derivation is the labelled tree that is found by 
removing from the derivation everything but the names of the applied rules (at 
every node ) 
The lemma says that the names of the declared variables in the context really 
don't matter and we may assume them to be different from any of the bound 
variables The importance of this lemma is illustrated by the fact that now, if we 
do some proof by induction on the derivation and we want to handle the case that 
the last rule was (streng), we may take for the variable that has been removed 
just any fresh variable (So the lemma implies that the name of the removed 
variable doesn't matter ) 
PROOF By induction on the derivation of ΓΊ,χ Λ,Γ2 h Μ В The only in­
teresting case is when the last rule is (streng) and the variable that has been 
removed is y, say 
r
u
xA,r2,yC,r3l· Μ В 
— l^iL^J
 y φ FV(r3, Μ, В) 
Г
ь
;г Α,Γ 2 ,Γ 3 Ι-Μ В 
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Then by IH Гі,х:Л,Г 2 ,г :С,Гз h M : В is derivable with a derivation with 
the same underlying tree (for г an arbitrary fresh variable.) So, again by IH, 
Гі,у:А,Г2[у/х],г:С[у/х\,Г3[у/х] h M[y/x] : В[у/х] is derivable with a deriva­
tion with the same underlying tree. Now we are done by one application of the 
rule (streng) to remove the declaration z:C[y/x]. El 
Another basic property, that is especially important and handy when it comes 
to proving meta theory and which was first remarked by Randy Pollack is the 
following. 
4.4.21. L E M M A (Restricted Weakening). If Τ \- M : A is derivable, we may as­
sume the derivation ofΤ h M : A to contain only applications of the rule (weak) 
that are of the following form. 
Tl· A:s T h e : ß 
(weak) с a variable or a sort, χ fresh 
r,x:Ahc:B 
i.e. the weakening rule is only applied to typings of variables and sorts. 
The proof of the property for PTS^ and PTS^,, is quite straightforward. We 
give it below. For P T S ^ , the proof is more complicated. For that case the 
property will be proved later, as a corollary to the more general Sublemma 4.4.25 
(that also implies the Thinning Lemma 4.4.24.) 
P R O O F . (For PTS^ and P T S ^ ) The proof is by induction on the derivation. All 
cases except for the last rule being (weak) are easy. In case the last rule is (weak), 
say 
ΓΙ- A :s Tl· M :B 
(weak) χ fresh 
T,x:A\-M:B 
we find by IH that Γ Ь A : s and Γ h M : В are provable with the restricted form 
of weakening rule as described in the lemma. Now we are going to make some 
small alterations in the derivation tree of Г h M . В to turn it into a derivation 
tree of Г, x:A h M : В with restricted weakening rule. The alterations are as 
follows: Go up in the tree to the place where the context Г is created. So, if 
Γ Ξ Γ', y.C we go to the places where Γ' is extended to Γ. This is done by a (var) 
rule or a restricted (weak) rule, so we have either 
Γ' h С : s' 
(var) 
Г', y.Cl· y.C 
or 
Г' h С : s' Г h с : E 
(weak) 
Г.у.СЬс-.Е 
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In the first case we change the derivation by inserting 
Γ' h С : s' 
Г',y:C У-у : С ГУ-A: s 
Г,х:АУ-у:С 
and replacing Г by Г, x:A downwards. In the second case we change the derivation 
by inserting 
r'y-C-.s' ГУ-с-.Е 
Г',у:С\-с:Е rhA-.s 
Г,х:А\-с:Е 
and replacing Г by Г, x:A downwards. It is easy to see that these alterations 
satisfy the requirements. El 
It is convenient to have some special notation for derivability in a system with 
a restricted (weak) rule as in the lemma. We therefore introduce the following. 
NOTATION. Г \-w M : A denotes the fact that Г h M : A is derivable with 
a derivation tree with the weakening rule restricted to typings of variables and 
sorts: 
Г Н / 1 : І T h e i ß 
(weak) с a variable or a sort, χ fresh 
T,x:A\-c:B 
Consequently, if we talk about a derivation of Γ \-w M : A, we refer to a derivation 
tree with the restricted weakening rule. 
4.4.22. LEMMA (Free variables). For Γ = Χχ.Αι,..., x
n
:A
n
 and Γ h M : В, then 
1. FV(M,B)c{x
u
...,x
n
}, 
2- Vi,.j < η[χ
τ
 = χj =>• г = j]. 
PROOF. By easy induction on the length of the derivation of Г l· M : В. SI 
4.4.23. LEMMA. For Г = x^.Ai,.. .,х
п
:А
п
 e Context, 
1. Г h s : s' for all s:s' € S, 
2. Г У- χ
τ
 : A, for all г < η, 
3. Χι.Αχ,... ,і,_і:Л
г
_і h Л, : s for some s (Ξ S. 
PROOF. All three by an easy induction on the length of the derivation that shows 
that Γ is a context (i.e. a derivation of a sequent Г У- A : В for some A and B.) 
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4 4 24 THINNING LEMMA For Г and Г' contexts and M and В pseudoterms, 
Г Э Г 
гьм в ^
r
'
h M B 
The proof for PTS/э and PTS^,, is straightforward Due to the strengthening 
rule, the proof is quite difficult for PTS^ It comes as an easy corollary of the 
Sublemma 4 4 25, which is an induction loading to prove both Thinning and the 
Lemma on the restricted use of the weakening rule (4 4 21 )l 
PROOF (For PTS^ and PTS^) The proof is by induction on the derivation We 
treat the case of the last rule being the (П) rule, because it has some interest 
(just as the case of the (λ) rule, which is similar ) 
Say 
Γ I- Л ί Γ , ι ^ δ s' 
ГЬПхАВ s" 
and let Г ' ] Г We may assume that χ £ dom(r') (by Lemma 4 4 20 ) By IH 
Γ' h A s and hence Γ', ι Л is a context By applying IH to the second premise 
we find Γ', χ A h В s', so by the (П) rule Г' l· Ux A В s" and we are done H 
4 4 25 SUBLEMMA For Г, Г' and A contexts and M and В terms we have the 
following 
г э г ] 
i e d o m ( r ' ) n d o m ( A ) = > i m
r
( x ) = imA(i) \ => Δ , Γ \ Δ Ρ" Μ В 
Tl· M В J 
The Sublemma is only interesting for the system PTS^ because it has as 
consequences that Thinning and Restricted Weakening hold for PTS^ Moreover, 
the Sublemma for PTS^ and PTS^, is a very easy consequence of Thinning and 
'As was pointed out to us by J McKinna, it is also possible to prove Thinning and Substi­
tution (Proposition 4 4 26) at once by proving the following Lemma 
Г
І м г ) Ь Д к р ( м ) '(fl)' 
where ρ is an arbitrary substitution of pseudoterms for variables, which is straightforwardly 
extended to a mapping from Τ to T, and Δ I- p{T) means that Δ h p(x) p(A) for every 
ι A S Γ This Lemma can easily be proved if one adapts the rule (streng) as follows 
Г ь і С , Г 2 Ь М AVll·C s (streng') — If ι І F V ( r 2 l M, A) 
Г
Ь
Г 2 І - М A 
This rule is equivalent to (streng), as is easily shown by using Lemma 4 4 22 
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Restricted Weakening themselves (which have already been proved): The only 
thing to do is to show that Δ, Γ' \ Δ in the statement of the Sublemma is indeed 
a context. 
PROOF. (For PTS^) By induction on the derivation of Γ l· M : В. We treat the 
cases for the last rule being (var), (weak), (П) and (streng). (The case for (Л) is 
similar to (П) and the cases for (sort), (app) and (conv) are easy, like the case 
for (weak).) 
(var) Say 
T h A :s 
T,x:A\-x:A 
and Г' Э T,x:A and Δ are contexts satisfying the requirements of the 
lemma. Now, Г' Э Γ, so we can apply IH to Γ h A : s to obtain 
Δ, Γ' \ Δ \-w A : s. By an argument similar to the proof of the second 
case of Lemma 4.4.23 one can show that in general, if Γ hw Ρ : С and 
χ:A € Γ, then Γ h*° χ : A. Now, in the present situation we have 
that x:A € Δ,Γ' \ Δ and Δ,Γ' \ Δ г-ш A : s, so we may conclude 
Δ, Γ' \ Δ l·™ χ : A and we are done. 
(weak) Say 
ГЬ A :s Г\- M :B 
Γ,χ:Α\- M : В 
and Г' D Г, x:A and Δ are contexts satisfying the requirements of the 
lemma. Now, because of Г' Э Γ we can apply IH to Γ h M : В to obtain 
Δ, Γ' \ Δ Ρ" Μ : Β and we are done. 
(Π) Say 
Γ l· В : si Γ, ι : Bl· С : з2 
Г h Пх:В.С : s3 
and Г ' Э Г and Δ are contexts satisfying the requirements of the lemma. 
Then by IH Δ,Γ' \ Δ г-ш В : slt so Δ,Γ' \ Δ,ι :Β is a context. Also 
Δ,Γ' \ Δ,χ.Β Э Τ,χ.Β, so we can apply IH to Γ,χ:Β h С : s2 to obtain 
Δ, Г' \ A,x:B Ьш С : S2 and we can conclude (by an application of (П)) 
that Δ , Γ ' \ Δ Η " Ux-.B.C :s3. 
(streng) Say 
Г
ь
і : Л , Г 2 Н М : В 
Г
Ь
Г 2 | - M :B 
and Г' Э Γι, Гг and Δ are contexts satisfying the requirements of the 
lemma. Then by IH (using the fact that Γι,χ:Λ,Γ2 2 Гь^^іГг) we 
get that П Д Г ь і Л Г з ) \T' \-w M : В and hence that T\x:A is a 
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context Also Γ', χ A D Г
ь
 χ А, Γ2, so we can apply IH again to obtain 
A,(r,xA)\A\-w Μ В Now, x £ F V ( M , ß ) , so Δ, Γ'\ Δ Ρ " Μ В, 
by one application of (streng) IS 
As corollaries we find proofs of Restricted Weakening (Lemma 4 4 21) and 
Thinning (Lemma 4 4 24) for P T S | 4 For the first take Δ = 0, Γ' = Γ and for 
the second take Δ = 0 
4 4 26 P R O P O S I T I O N (Substitution) For Г1гх А, Γ2 a. context, Μ, В and Ν 
¿erms 
Г , , х Д Г 2 Н М ß 
P R O O F By induction on the length of the derivation of Г
и
х Α,Γ2 Η Μ В, 
assuming that Γι l· N A is derivable The only case that is really interesting 
is, when the last rule is (streng), ι e when we are in the system P T S ^ We also 
treat the case when the last rule is (app), because some attention has to be given 
to the substitutions 
(streng) Say 
( Г , , і Д Г 2 ) » с Ь М В 
(streng) — — y¿FV{A,M,B) 
Г
и
хА,Г2Ь-М В 
where we use the notation {Г)уС to denote a context from which one 
obtains the context Г by removing the declaration у С, and Δ is the tail 
of the context (Γι,χ A, Гг) С , relative to the position oí у С Now, if 
у С is a declaration to the right of χ A in (Гі,a; A, Гг) С , the required 
consequence follows easily by applying IH to ( Г
ь
х Л , Г 2 ) у С h Μ В 
and Vil· Ν A, and then (streng) If the declaration у С is to the left 
of χ A, then 
( Γ Ί ) * 0 ' , ! A , r 2 h M В (streng) У-^-^ — yiFV(A,M,B) 
Г ь і Л . Г г г - М В 
The IH does not immediately apply, but by Thinning (Lemma 4 4 24), 
w e m a y c o n d u d e t h a t ( r 1 ) » c r - A T Л and hence by IH (r1)yC,T2[N/x]l· 
M[N/x] B[N/x] Note that у f FW (Ν), so we can apply (streng) to 
get Г
ь
 Γ 2[Λ7ι] h M[N/x] B[N/x] and we are done 
(app) Say 
Г
и
хА,Т2\-М Пу В С Γι, ι Л,Г 2 г- Ρ В (app) 
Гі,хА,Г
а
\-МР С[Р/у) 
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Now by IH and (app), Γ,, Γ2[Ν/χ] h M[N/x]P[N/x\ C[N/x}[P[N/x}/y] 
We may assume that y $ FV(ri, χ А, Γ2) (a precise justification of this 
assumption may be found in the Replacement Lemma, 4 4 20 ) Hence 
y i FV(7V) and so we can conclude C[N/x][P[N/x]/y] = {C[P/y])[N/x] 
and we are done И 
4 4 27 STRIPPING LEMMA For Г a context, Μ, N and R terms, we have the 
following 
(г) Г h s R, s e S => R = s' with s s' ζ A for some s' e S, 
(ιι) Γ h ζ R, χ e Var =>· R = A with χ Л g Γ for some term A, 
(m) ThüxMN R =>· Γ h M ί, ,Γ,ιΜΙ-JV s2 and R = s3 
with (si, S2, «a) 6 TZ for some si, s2, «з € 5, 
For PTS^,) 
{ιυ) Γ\-ΧχΜΝ R =• Γ,χΜΙ-JV Α , Γ Κ Π ι Μ Β 5 and 
Д = Πι Μ В for some term В and s 6 5, 
{υ) Γ h MW Л =• Т\- M Пх AB,Tl· N A with R = B[N/x] 
for some terms A and S, 
For PTSJ,, 
(ги') Г h λ ι M У Л ^ Γ', χ M h ΛΓ S, Γ'Ι- Πι M В s and 
R = Ux M В іот some S, s € S and Г' Э Г, 
(г/) Г h M/V Д => Γ'Ι- M Π ι / Ι β , Γ Ί - J V Л with R = В[У /і] 
for some terms A and S and context Г ' Э Г 
In fact the case (iv') can be strengthened to (îv) for PTS^, so (îv) holds 
generally for all three notions of PTS But we are only in the position to prove 
this fact after we have proved the Subject Reduction property for /^-reduction 
(Lemma 4 4 30), which in turn uses Stripping (in the weaker version given in the 
Lemma above ) 
PROOF For PTS^ and PTS/э, the proof is easy If Г h Ρ Л, we may assume the 
derivation tree of this judgement to have the restricted form of the weakening 
rule We can go up in this derivation tree until we reach the point where the 
term Ρ has been formed In doing this we only pass through applications of the 
conversion rule (so the context Γ remains the same, only the type R is replaced 
by a convertible one ) At the point where the term Ρ has been formed we dis­
tinguish the five different cases above, according to the form of P, and we easily 
check that the conclusions are satisfied 
For PTS£ the proof is more complicated because, in going up through the deriva­
tion tree of a judgement Γ hw Ρ R, we also pass through applications of (streng), 
which will extend the context Γ to a context Γ' So the proofs of (iv'), (v') and 
(ι) are easy The method described above, going up in the derivation tree until 
we reach at the point where the term is formed, works for each of the three cases 
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For the proof of (n) we can apply the same method to arrive at a context Г' Э Г 
whose last declaration is χ A with A = R The context Г is obtained from 
Г' by removing declarations, but χ A can of course not be one of them, so 
χ Л € Γ and we are done For the proof of (in) we apply the method to arrive 
at a context Γ' D Γ for which Γ' h M s
u
T',xMl· N s2 and Γ'l· Ux Μ N s3 
with 33 = R Now the domain of Γ' may be larger than that of Γ, but none of 
the extra variables occurs free in Πι Μ N (and we may assume all of them to be 
different from x), so we can conclude that Γ (- M si and Γ, χ M h N s2 and 
we are done E3 
4 4 28 CORRECTNESS OF TYPES LEMMA For Г a context, M and A terms, 
Г h M A => 3s e S[A = s V Г h A s] 
PROOF The proof can be given by analysing the derivation tree of Г \-w M A, 
like in the proof of 4 4 27, but also by induction on the derivation of Г l· M A 
We follow the second option, which gives the shortest proof The only two cases 
that have some interest are when the last rule is (app) or (streng) 
(app) 
Г Ь Р Пх AB Fl· N А 
ГІ-РЛГ B[N/x] 
Then Г h Πι A В s by IH and hence by Stripping (Lemma 4 4 27), 
T,x A l· В s' for some s' e S Now by Substitution (Proposition 
4 4 26), we conclude that Г h B[N/x] s' 
(streng) 
Г і , х Д Г 2 К М В 
Г
ь
Г 2 г - М В 
Then by IH Β Ξ s or Γι, χ Л,Гг Ь В s for some s 6 S, so by one 
application of (streng), В = s or Г
ь
 Г2 H В s for some s € »S H 
4 4 29 UNIQUENESS OF TYPES LEMMA For functional PTSs, if Г is a context, 
M, С and C' are terms we have 
ThM с ƒ ^ c - c 
PROOF By induction on the structure of the term M, using Stripping In case 
M is a sort or a Π-term, we use the functionality The only interesting cases 
are when M is an application term or when we are in a PTS^ and M is a λ-
abstraction or an application We do the latter case, because it covers all the 
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interesting cases So let M = PN Then we find by Stripping terms A, A', В 
and B' and contexts Г' Э Г and Г" Э Г such that 
Г' h Ρ ПхАВ, 
Г" h Ρ UxA'B', 
with С =β
η
 Β[Ν/χ], С' =β
η
 Β'[Ν/χ] By the Replacement Lemma we may 
assume that dom(r' \ Γ) Π dom(r" \ Γ) = 0 So we can take Δ to be the union of 
Γ' and Γ" and we have 
Δ h Ρ ПхАВ, 
Δ h Ρ ПхА'В' 
Now we can apply IH to conclude that Πι Α Β =β
η
 Ux А' В' By the Key Lemma 
we may conclude from this that Β =β
η
 В' and hence B[N/x] =β
η
 B'[N/x] and 
we are done S 
4 4 30 SUBJECT REDUCTION LEMMA FOR BETA (SR^) For Γ, Γ' contexts, Ρ, P' 
and D terms, 
Γ h Ρ DL· Ρ —>ß Ρ' =• Γ l· Ρ' D, 
Tl· Ρ DkT —>0 Γ' =• Γ' l· Ρ D 
PROOF We do the proof for PTSJ , for PTS^ and РТБ/з the proof is slightly 
easier because of the stronger version of the Stripping Lemma 4 4 27 The proof 
of the two statements is done simultaneously, by induction on the derivation of 
Г h Ρ D, distinguishing cases according to the last rule 
Proof of (ι) All cases except for the last rule being (app) are immediate, some­
times by using IH (For (Π) and (λ), use IH on (n) ) If the last rule is (app), we 
distinguish subcases according to where the reduction takes place 
Subcase 1 
Γ h M nxACΓl·N A 
Γ h MN C[N/x] 
with Ρ = MN and the reduction is inside Μ от N Then we are 
immediately done by IH 
Subcase 2 
Г І - Л х Л М Пх BC Tl· Ν В 
Г h {\х A M)N C[N/x] 
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with Ρ = (λχ A Μ)Ν and Ρ' = Μ[Ν/χ] Then by applying Stripping 
(4 4 27) to the first premise, we find 
Г,хАУ-М С (1) 
Г'h Πι Л С" s{&S) 
ПхАС' = ПхВС 
with Г' D Г 
So, again by Stripping 
T'l· A Si (2) 
Γ',ζΛΙ-C" s2 
for some Si, S2 6 «5 
By applying Thinning (4 4 24) to the second premise we find 
T'l· Ν В (3) 
By the Key Lemma (4 4 18), we conclude from Пт AC' = Пі В С 
that 
A = В (4) 
С' = C (5) 
So, applying (conv) to (2) and (3), using (4), we get 
ГУ- N A (6) 
Applying Substitution (Proposition 4 4 26) to (6) and (1) we get 
Г' h M[N/x] C'[N/x] (7) 
By applying Correctness of Types (Lemma 4 4 28) to the first premise, 
we find Г У- Пх ВС s' for some s' e S, hence Г' h ïlx ВС s' and 
hence by Stripping 
Г,хВУ-С s'2(eS) (8) 
Now apply Substitution to (3) and (8) to get 
T'y-C[N/x] s'2 (9) 
Apply (conv) to (7) and (9) (using (5)) to conclude 
Γ\-Μ[Ν/χ] C[N/x] 
The variables that are in the set аот(Г') \ аот(Г) are not free in 
M[N/x], C[N/x] or Г, so they can be removed by consecutive appli­
cations of (streng) to obtain 
T\-M[N/x] C[N/x] 
and we are done 
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Proof of (и) All cases can be handled easily by applying IH In case the last rule 
is (var) or (weak), also use IH on (ι) В 
4 4 31 COROLLARY 
Г I- M С, С -*ß С' =» Г h M С' 
P R O O F Immediate, using Correctness of Types (4 4 28) 13 
4 4 32 S U B J E C T R E D U C T I O N L E M M A FOR ETA (SR, for PTS^ and P T S ^ ) For 
Г, Г' contexts, P, P' and D terms, 
Г h Ρ DkP —•,, Ρ' =>· Tl· P' D 
Tl· P DkT —>„ Γ' => Γ' h Ρ D 
P R O O F We do the prove for PTS^, The proof for PTS^ is slightly simpler and 
follows the same lines (It uses the fact that (streng) is a derived rule, which 
will only be shown in 4 4 35 ) Simultaneously by induction on the derivation of 
Γ h Ρ D We treat the proof for P T S ^ , because it is the most complicated 
The only interesting case is when the last rule is the (lambda) rule and we are in 
the following situation 
Y,x A\- Mx В Гг-Пх A В s 
Г h Αι Л M i Пх A В 
with χ $ FW (M) Then by Stripping (4 4 27) we find 
( Г , і Л ) ' h M YlyCE 
[Τ, χ А)' г- ι С 
E[x/y] = В 
with (Г, χ A)1 D Г, χ A We may conclude that A = С and hence that Π ι А В = 
UyCE So 
(Г,хА)'\-М ПхАВ, 
and by some applications of (streng) we find 
Г h M Xìx AB 
and we are done 
For all other cases the proof follows exactly the proof of SR^ SI 
4 4 33 COROLLARY FOT PTS^ and PTS^ we have 
Г h M С, С - н , С' =>• Г h M С' 
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PROOF Immediate, using Correctness of Types (4 4 28) В 
4 4 34 SUBLEMMA (for proving that (streng) is a derived rule for PTS^j For 
PTS^, if Γι, χ Α,Γ2 is a context and M and В are terms, then 
Although the property seems to be obviously correct, the proof for the general 
case is remarkably complicated and requires the introduction of many new notions 
and definitions For that reason and because the proof is not ours, we omit it 
here and refer to [van Benthem Jutting 199+] for details (which is the original 
source ) The idea of using the above Sublemma to prove that (streng) is a derived 
rule, first appeared in [Luo 1989], who used it for the system ECC The author 
and Nederhof used it (in the joint paper [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991]) to give 
the proof for functional PTS^s (For this case the situation is easier because we 
have Uniqueness of Types ) We shortly repeat that proof here 
PROOF of the Sublemma for functional PTS/js 
The proof is by induction on the derivation of Γι, χ A, Γ2 \~ Μ В, distinguishing 
cases according to the last rule The only interesting cases are when the last rule 
is (λ), (app) or (conv), so we treat those 
(λ) Say M = Xy С Ν, В = Пу С D and 
Т
и
хА,Гг,уС\- N D Г h Пу С D s 
r
u
xA,r2\-XyCN ÎlyCD 
Then by IH Г
ь
 Г2,у С h N D' for some D' with D -*0 D' 
Also, Γ!, χ А, Гг Ь С s-¡ is a conclusion of a subdenvation of the deriva-
tion with conclusion Г
ь
і А,Г2, у С l· N D, so by IH Г Ь Г 2 г- С s¡ 
By Correctness of Types we find that Гі,Г2,у С h D' s2 or D' = s € S 
In the second case too there is an s2 such that D'(= s) s2, because for 
D there is such s2 and we have SR^ 
Now, by functionality, the Si and s2 are such that {s\, s2, s) GlZ ((si, s2, s) 
is the rule that justified the formation of Uy С D), so we can apply (П) 
to conclude Гі, Г2Г-П3/CD' s and hence Γ
:
, Г2 h Xy С N Пу С D' 
(app) Say M = NP, В = D[P/y] and 
r
u
xA,r2r-N UyCD Г h Ρ С 
Г
ь
*Л,Г 2 г-Л/Р D[P/y] 
Then by IH, Γι,Γ2 h N Uy С' D' and Г Ь Г 2 h N С" with С -*β 
С', С" and D -»β D' By Church-Rosser we find a term C " such that 
C',C" -»0 C " and hence (by Corollary 4 4 31) Γ,,Γ2 h N îlyC" D' 
a n d r b r 2 r - P C" We may now conclude that Г
Ь
Г 2 h NP D'[P/y] 
and we are done 
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(conv) Say 
Г
и
хА,Г2\-М С r\-D s 
С = D 
Г , , і Л , Г 2 Н М D 
Then by IH Г
Ь
Г 2 V- M С' for some С' with С -*ß С' By Church-
Rosser there is a C" such that C', D -*ß С" Now Г
ь
 Г2 h M С" and 
we are done H 
The statement of the Sublemma can be weakened a bit by requiring the B' to 
be convertible with В (and not necessarily a reduct ) This trivializes the case for 
the last ruel being (conv), but doesn't make the whole proof really easier We still 
need Church-Rosser, functionality and the case for the last rule being (λ) becomes 
a bit more involved Moreover it is slightly more work to get Strengthening from 
the Sublemma 
4 4 35 STRENGTHENING LEMMA FOR PTS^ For Г
ь
а; A,T2 a context and M 
and В terms, 
Г і , і Д Г 2 Ь М В 
x ¿ F V ( r 2 , M , B ) f -Γ, ,Γ ϊΓ-Λί В 
PROOF By the Sublemma we find a B' such that Β -»β В' and 
Г
Ь
Г 2 Ь М В' 
By Correctness of Types there are two possibilities, Г
ь
і A,Y2 \~ В s or В = 
s 6 S In the second case we are immediately done, because В = В' In the first 
case we can once again apply the Sublemma to 
Г
ь
 ι A,r2l· В s 
to find that 
Г
ь
Г 2 г - В s 
Now we are done by one application of (conv) И 
4 4 36 STRONG PERMUTATION LEMMA FOR PTSfl AND PTS^ 
For Γι,χ А,у B,T2 a context, M and С terms, with χ £ FV(B), 
rltxA,y Β,Γ2*- M С =>Гиу Β,χ А,Г2\- M С 
PROOF The only thing to do is to show that Гі,у Β, χ Α,Γ2 is a legal context 
ιΐ Γι,χ A,y ß ,Γ 2 is (Then we are done by Thinning, 4 4 24 ) By Lemma 4 4 23 
we know that 
Г
и
хАг-В s 
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for some s G S By Strengthening for PTS^ (Lemma 4 4 35) or by the rule 
(streng) for PTS^, we conclude that 
r , h S s 
and hence that T¡,y В is a legal context So, by one again using Lemma 4 4 23 
and Thinning we derive that Гі, у Β, χ A is a legal context We can repeat this 
operation of applying Lemma 4 4 23 and Thinning for all declarations in Г2 and 
finally conclude that Гі, у Β,χ Α,Γ2 is a legal context Η 
A weak form of the Permutation Lemma, which holds for all notions of Pure 
Type System is the following 
T
u
xA,yB,r2l· M С \ 
Г \-В s I иУ ' ' 2 
The proof is the same as for the proof of the Strong Permutation Lemma, except 
for the fact that one doesn't need Strengthening because of the second assumption 
in the statement 
Finally we want to prove two properties that use the syntax with sorted vari­
ables as it was described in Definition 4 2 9 We prove the Lemmas for injective 
PTS^s, which is an unpractical restriction, not so much because of the restriction 
to mjectivity but especially because we don't have the Lemma for PTS^ There­
fore we shall look into this matter again in detail when we study the Calculus of 
Constructions with /îrç-conversion Let us remark here that the following Lemmas 
are not true if we drop the restriction to injective systems, a counterexample can 
be found in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] 
4 4 37 CLASSIFICATION LEMMA FOR INJECTIVE SYSTEMS For s,s' sorts, s ^ 
s', 
s Term Π б'-Term = 0, 
s-Eltns'-Elt = 0 
PROOF For the first it suffices to prove the following 
Γ r- M s, Γ' h M s' => s Ξ s' 
For the second it suffices to prove the following 
Γ h M В s, Fl· M В' s' => s Ξ s' 
We prove these two statements simultaneously by induction on the structure of 
terms, using the Church-Rosser property, SR^ and Uniqueness of Types The 
proof is not really difficult but still a bit tricky and we therefore give it in quite 
some detail 
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var If Γ l· χ s, Γ' I- χ s' and χ 6 Var*0 then χ Л € Γ with Α -»β s and 
χ A' € Γ' with A' -»g s' for some A, A' Furthermore Γ l· A s0 and 
Γ l· A' So and hence s So and s' So are axioms Now by injectivity, 
s = s' For the second statement it suffices to show that, if Γ l· χ В s 
with χ e Vars°, then s = s0 Now, if Г l· χ В, then χ A e Γ with 
Γ h A SQ and A =β В Hence by Church-Rosser, SR^ and Uniqueness 
of Types, s Ξ s 0 
Π-abstr If Γ I- Пх А В s and Г' h Пх А В s', then Tl· A
 Sl and Γ, χ A l· В 
S2 with (ai, S2, s) ζ TZ and at the same time Γ' h A s[ and Γ', χ A l· В 
s 2 with (s'n s2, s') 6 72. Now, by IH s\ Ξ S'J and s2 = ^2 a n c ^ hence s = s' 
because 1Z Ç (5 x <S) χ <S is a function For the second statement we are 
now easily done, because if Γ h Пх А В С s and Г' h Пх A В С' s', 
then С and С" reduce both to the same fixed SQ e S (which is found by 
the argument for the first statement ) Hence s = s' by the fact that A 
is a function 
A-abstr The first statement is trivially satisfied by the fact that a Л-abstraction 
can not be an s-Term For the second statement suppose that Г h 
\x AM В s and Г' h Xx Α Μ В' s' Then В = Пх А С with 
Tl· А sl,Γ,xAl·M С s7 a.nd Τ \-Пх А С s3 ((sus2,s3) S TZ) 
and at the same time B' = Пх A C' with Г' l· A s\, Γ',χ A h M С' s 2 
and Г' h Пх Λ С" s'3 ({s'us2, s'3) e П) Now, by IH si = s\ and s2 = s'2 
and hence s3 = S3 Further, by Church-Rosser, SR^ and Uniqueness of 
Types, s Ξ S3 and s' = s3 and so s = s' 
applic We first prove the second statement, so let Γ h MN D s and Γ' h 
MN D' s' Then Γ h M Пх А В s3¡ Г h N A s,, Г h 
B[N/x] s2 and B[N/x] =g D ({si,s2,s3) € TZ) and at the same time 
s'i, Г' l· B'[N/x] s'2 and 
by IH si Ξ s[ and S3 = s3 
, by Church-Rosser, SR^ and 
Uniqueness of Types, s = s2 and s' Ξ S 2 and so s = s' For the first 
statement, if Γ h MN s and Γ' h MN s', then we find by the 
argument for the second statement a fixed sort so such that s so and 
s' So So, by injectivity, s Ξ S' H 
We can specialize this Lemma a bit further by noticing that in a lot of cases 
the sort s for which A e s-Elt only depends on the 'innermost symbol' of A, 
which is always a sort or a variable Let us first define this notion, we call the 
innermost symbol of A the heart of the term A, notation h(A) 
Γ' 
B' 
an 
h M 
'[Ν/χ] = 
id hence 
Пх 
D1 
s2 
A' В 
((í'l 
I 
s2, 
by 
«3, Г' 
s'3) e 
inject 
h TV 
тг) 
ìvity 
Л' 
Now, 
Also 
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4.4.38. DEFINITION. The heart of a pseusdoterm A, h(A), is defined by induction 
on the structure of terms as follows. 
h(s) 
h(x) 
п(Пх:В.С) 
h{\x:B.M) 
h{MN) 
= s, for s 6 S, 
= x, for χ € Var, 
= h(C), 
= h(M), 
= h(M). 
4.4.39. LEMMA. For an injective PTS^ with all rules of the form (si,S2) (i.e. 
(•si,S2,S3) € TZ => 32 = S3) we have 
M e s-Elt <£> b(M) = χ 6 Vars V 
h(M) = s" шгЙ s" : 5' : s 6 Л /or some s' € 5, 
M e s-Term =• h[M) = χ e Vars' ωιί/ι s:s' € As/ 
h(M) = 5' with s':s £ A. 
PROOF. By induction on the structure of M. For the first part of the Lemma: 
The reverse implication uses the Classification Lemma in case M = x. All other 
cases follow straightforward from IH and the restrictions on the rules and ax-
ioms. For the second part of the Lemma, all cases follow easily from IH and the 
restrictions, except when M is an application term, in which case we need the 
first part of the Lemma. We do this case in detail. 
M = PN, say Γ h PN : s with Γ h Ρ : Yly.B.C : s3 and Г l· Ν : В. Then 
C[N/y] =p s and hence s:s3 € A. Now we can apply the first part of the Lemma 
to the term PN to find that either h(PN) = x G Var*3 or h(PN) = s" with 
s":s':s3 for some s'. By the restrictions on the rules and the fact that s : s3, we 
find that either h{PN) = χ e Var"3 with s.s3 G A or h{PN) = s" with s".s 6 A 
and we are done. H 
Chapter 5 
The Church-Rosser property for 
^-reduct ion 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we want to treat the proof of the Church-Rosser property for 
/37?-reduction in functional normalizing Pure Type Systems By the restriction to 
functional normalizing systems we don't mean that the general property is false 
At this moment this is still an open question, but we strongly believe that CR^, 
holds in general for all Pure Type Systems At the end of this section we shall 
make some comments on this and also on the proof, which we believe has some 
deficits 
In giving the proof we roughly follow [Geuvers 1992] In fact the proof we 
give here is an expanded and updated version of the one that was given in there 
We have changed the order of the lemmas a bit to stress which properties are 
general and which ones are specific properties of functional normalizing PTSs 
5.2. The proof of CR^, for normalizing systems 
Before giving the proof we want to fix some terminology and highlight some 
properties that come in handy for the proofs 
NOTATION Suppose Γ h M Л is a derivable judgement in a functional PTS 
If Ρ is a subterm of M, we can speak of the type of Ρ in the derivation of 
Γ h M A In fact this type is unique up to /^η-equality, due to the uniqueness of 
type property (Lemma 4 4 29) We therefore introduce the notation ty(P), which 
depends on Γ, M and A (but this dependency will usually not be mentioned 
explicitly) and is unique up to =β
η
 We also want to fix the notion of a variable 
χ being free in ty(P) or not As ty(f ) is unique up to =β
η
 we shall usually be 
interested to know whether we can find a type for Ρ in which χ is not free We 
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therefore introduce the notation χ fa ty(P) to denote that there is a type В oí Ρ 
such that χ £ FV(ß) (Note that all this is still relative to Γ, M and A ) 
5 2 1 R E M A R K 1 For terms that have a sort as type, the Key Lemma 4 4 18, 
gives in practice more specific information If Πχ Αι Αι =g
v
 С and С s for 
s e S, then С -»»/з Π ι C I C 2 with С, =βη Аг Similarly if xP\ Pn =gv С 
and С s for s € 5 , then С -»β xQ\ Q
n
 with Р
г
 =ρ
η
 Qt This is true 
because С can not be a λ-abstraction 
2 For well-typed terms (in an arbitrary PTS) that are /îrç-equal to a sort, the 
Key Lemma 4 4 18, also gives some extra information If A € Term(() and 
Α -*β
η
 s(€ S), then A -»^ 5 (This is easily verified by noticing that, 
if Α =ρ
η
 s, then Α -»β Xy A sR -», s (see Proposition 4 4 14) and that 
Xy A sR can only be well typed if y is empty ) 
We first list some lemmas that are valid in all PTS (not just the functional 
normalizing ones ) We have not listed them under the general meta theory for 
Pure Type Systems because all the properties are about terms being (equal to a 
term) in normal form, so for systems that are not normalizing these properties 
loose their interest 
5 2 2 L E M M A 
ThAs • 
A in βη nf , „.., .. 
Α -βη tí 
xïFV(BS) ì 
P R O O F The proof is by induction on the structure of A For A a sort or a variable 
it's trivial For A = Π ι A0 A\, we are done by induction hypothesis Suppose 
now that A is an application term Then χ can only be free in domains of A (Note 
that \B\ =β
η
 \A\ -»,, nf(|/4|), and in untyped lambda calculus 77-reductions do not 
remove any free variables, so χ £ PV( |J4 | ) ) Say С is the leftmost domain of A 
in which χ occurs free, say in the subterm zR\ Rq{\y\ Εχ Xyp Ep Xy С Ρ) 
Then χ fa ty(z), because ζ is declared in the context or ζ is abstracted inside A 
to the left of С This implies that also χ fa iy(zRi Rq) Now ty(zRi R4) = 
П<7 (Пуі Εχ Пу
р
 Ep Uy С D) F and hence С =βη E, for some E with χ $ 
FV(£) Now we can apply IH because С in /?-nf and χ І FV(£) So, χ $ FV(C) 
and there is no leftmost domain in A in which χ occurs free Si 
5 2 3 P R O P O S I T I O N For M e Term, if M in βη-nf, then \M\ m βη-nf 
P R O O F Suppose M in/îrç nf and \M\ not in/?7;-nf Then \M\ is in /3-nf by Propo-
sition 4 4 14 So there is an η-redex in \M\, which is not an 77-redex in M, say 
Xx \N\x is the left most such Then χ e FV(jV) while χ £ FV(|7V|), so χ occurs 
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only free in domains of N. We now follow roughly the same method as in the proof 
of Lemma 5.2.2: Say С is the leftmost domain in which χ is free, say С occurs in 
the subterm zR\ • • • Rq{Xyi\E\. • • • Xyp:Ep.Xy:C.P). Again χ fa ty(z). (If ζ is de­
clared in the context or abstracted left from the abstraction over x, then χ fa ty(¿) 
by the convention that all bound variables are different and different from the 
free ones. If ζ is abstracted right from x, then χ fa ty(z) by the assumption that 
С is the leftmost domain containing x.) This implies that χ fa ty(zRi • • · Rq) and 
by the fact that ty {zRi • • • Rq) = Щ-Щуі.Ех. • •-Y[yp:Ep.I\.y:C.D).F we find that 
С =0η E, for some E with χ І FV(£). Now, by Lemma 5.2.2, χ $. FV(C), so 
there is no leftmost domain in M in which χ occurs free. Hence \M\ is in βη-τιί. 
5.2.4. LEMMA. 
Γ I- M:A 
Γ h M'-.A' 
Α =
βη
 A' 
\M\ = \M'\ 
M, M' in ß-nf 
M =dM' 
(The equality =¿, was defined in Definition 4-4-13: 
all corresponding domains are βη-equal.) 
M =d M' if M =d M' and 
PROOF. M and M' have the same structure (apart from the domains) and we 
have to show that all respective domains in M and M' are pairwise /ΐη-equal. Say 
M = λχι-.Αι.... Xx
n
:A
n
.N and M' = Xxi'.A^ Xx
n
:A'
n
.N', with N and N' not 
abstractions. Then Α =β
η
 Пх^Лі Wx
n
.A
n
.B =β
η
 Пхі:А[... Ux
n
:A'
n
B' =0
η 
A', for some В and B' by Stripping, so А
г
 =ρ
η
 A[. Now compare from left to 
right all domains in N and N'. 
Say С occurs as zR\-• • R4{Xyi.Ei Xyp:Ep.Xx:C.P) in N and C' occurs as 
zR[ • • • К
ч
{Ху1.Е\.... Xyp:E'p.Xx:C'P) in N' and for all domains to the left of С 
(respectively C') we are already done by induction. So Rt =βη R[ for all ι and 
Et =βη E[ for all ι and hence ty(zñi • · · Rq) = ty{zR[ • • • R'q). This implies that 
tyCAî/nÊ!.... Xyp:Ep Xx:C.P) = іу{Х
Уі
 E[. .Xyp:E'p.Xx:C'P') 
and so Β =β
η
 В'. И 
The following Lemma collects the results of the previous Lemmas, establishing 
the confluence of /fry-equality for types in normalizing PTS^. 
5.2.5. LEMMA. Let s,s' e S. 
T l · A:s 
Г h B-.s' 
Α=0ηΒ 
Α, Β in βη-nf 
В. 
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P R O O F By induction on the structure of A, using the Key Lemma, 5 2 4 and 
5 2 3 
If Л Ξ Π ι Αχ Α2, then Β =βη Π ι Βλ Β2 with Αι =ρη Βι and Α2 =βη Β2 By 
induction hypothesis Αι = Βχ and Α2 = Β2 
If Α = χΡι P
n
, then Β Ξ xQi Q
n
 with Pt =βη Qt (by Key Lemma ) Now, 
ty{xPi P
n
) = ty(xQi Q
n
), and so s = s' Further, хР
г
 P
n
 and xQi Q
n 
are in βη-ní, so, by 5 2 3, \xPi Pn\ and \xQi Qn\ are, so \xPi Pn\ = 
\xQ\ Qn\ We can apply 5 2 4 and conclude that all respective domains in 
χΡι P
n
 and xQi Q
n
 are /îrç-equal By induction hypothesis (comparing the 
domains in χΡι P
n
 and xQi Q
n
 from left to right) we conclude that all 
respective domains in χΡι P
n
 and xQi Q
n
 are syntactically equal,that is 
χΡι P
n
 = xQi Q
n
 И 
5 2 6 T H E O R E M ( C O N ^ for normalizing functional P T S ^ ) 
ΓΗ M A 
ΓΗ M' A 
Μ =
βη
 M' 
P R O O F Define У = nf(M), N' = nf(M') We prove N = N' and we are done 
By SR/3 and SR,, we find Γ h N A and Γ h Ν' A By 5 2 3, |TV| and |JV'| are 
in normal form, so |JV| = \N'\ By 5 2 4, all respective domains in N and N' 
are /377-equal We now compare all respective domains in N and N', from left 
to right By Lemma 5 2 5 all respective domains in N and N' are syntactically 
equal (=), so N = Ν' H 
Obviously, the normalization is essential for the proof Note however that 
also the restriction to PTS¿4 is essential, because in PTS^, we don't know how to 
prove SR,, Of course we are still interested in proving CR^, for P T S ^ (functional 
and normalizing) Somewhat surprisingly maybe, that is easy now Using the 
work on PTS¿4 that has been done in this section, we can show that (streng) is 
a derived rule in a functional normalizing PTS/j, and hence that Theorem 5 2 6 
holds for any functional normalizing P T S ^ In fact, everything that is required is 
a simple corollary of Lemma 5 2 5 Then the proof of the denvedness of (streng) 
in functional normalizing PTS^, can be found by redoing the proof of denvedness 
of (streng) in PTS^s (Sublemma 4 4 34 and Lemma 4 4 35 ) 
The property that proves strengthening and hence SR, is interesting enough 
to give it a name and treat it as a specific feature on its own This is because 
in practice it holds quite generally for functional systems, even if they are not 
normalizing (like λ*), or if we do not yet have a proof of normalization (as is the 
case for CC^,, at this point in the text) 
ML· M' 
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5 2 7 DEFINITION We say that a PTS^ or PTS^ satisfies βη-preservation of 
sorts, if 
TV- A s\ 
Tl· В s' \ => s Ξ s' 
л =Sn в J 
Obviously, there are non-functional PTS that do not satisfy /^-preservation 
of sorts (because Uniqueness of Types doesn't hold ) It should also be clear 
that we strongly believe the property to hold for all functional PTS It comes as 
an immediate consequence of Confluence, Subject Reduction and Uniqueness of 
Types The Corollary of Lemma 5 2 5 that we are interested in in the present 
context is that all functional normalizing PTS^ satisfy /3r?-preservation of sorts 
The reason to highlight this property here as a special definition is twofold First, 
this is the specific feature we need to make the proof of strengthening and hence 
SR,, work Second, the ^-preservation of sorts is quite easily proved for other 
systems like CC^, and λ* 
5 2 8 COROLLARY (of Lemma 5 2 5) A functional, normalizing PTS/з,, satisfies 
βη-preservation of sorts 
PROOF Suppose Γ l· A s and Γ h S s' m a functional normalizing system 
without (streng) Then also Γ h Л s and Г h В s' in the extension of the 
system with the rule (streng) Now A and В both normalize, so, by SR^ and SR, 
in the extended system, Г h nf(,A) s and Г h nf(ö) s' (still in the extended 
system) By Lemma 5 2 5, this implies nf(A) Ξ nf(B), so by Uniqueness of Types, 
Trivially, the Corollary also holds for functional normalizing PTS^ 
5 2 9 SUBLEMMA If a PTS^ satisfies βη-preservation of sorts, then 
Г
ь
і Д Г 2 І - М В 
xtFV(r2,M) Г - Э В ' [ В = ^ ' & Г Ь Г 2 Ь М В'] 
PROOF The proof is by induction on the derivation of Γι, χ Α, Γ2 h Μ В, 
distinguishing cases according to the last rule The only interesting cases are 
when the last rule is (λ) or (app), so we treat those (The other cases sometimes 
use the Remark 5 2 1) 
(λ) Say M = \y С Ν, В = Uy С D and 
Г
и
хА,Г2,уСг- N D r1}xA,r2\-UyCD s3 
ri,xA,r2\-\yCN UyCD 
Then by IH Г
ь
 T2,y С h N D' for some D' with D =βη D' 
Also, Γι,χ А, Γ2 l· С Si and Y\,x A,T2,y С \- D s2 are conclusions 
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of subderivations (with (si,s2,S3) £ Tty, so by IH Γι,Γ2 h С : E with 
Ε =β
η
 Si and hence Γ], Γ2 h С : si by 5.2.1 and SR¿j. 
By Correctness of Types we find that Г
ь
 Г2, y.C h D' : s'2 or D' = s € <S. 
In the second case we have D -»β s and s:s2 6 A. So ΓΊ, Гг г- Щ/:С.а : s3 
and hence Г
ь
 Г2 l· Xy.C.N : Uy.C.s with Uy.C D =ßn Uy.C.s. 
In the first case we have by βη-preservation of sorts that 52 = s'2. So 
Γχ,Γ2 r- Uy.C.D' : s3 and hence Г Ь Г 2 H Àt/:C./V : Yly.C.D' with 
Щ/:С.£> = ^ Uy.C.D'. 
(app) Say Μ Ξ NP, Β Ξ D[P/y] and 
ГьХ:Л,Г2 Η Af : Пу:С.£> Гьа::Л,Г2 h Ρ : С 
" Г ь і : Л , Г 2 Ь ; Р:0[Р/2/] 
Then by IH, Гь Г2 h Ν : E and ГиГ2 l· Ν : F with Uy.C.D =3η E and 
F =
βη
 С. By the Key Lemma we find that Ε -*
β
 Uy.C.D' with С =
θη
 С 
and £>' =a, D. So, by Corollary 4.4.31, Г
Ь
Г 2 h Ν : Uy.C.D'. We can 
apply (conv^) to Γι, Γ2 Ь Ρ : F and F =βη С to conclude Г ь Г2 Ь Ρ : С 
and hence Г
Ь
Г 2 l· У Р : ö'[7V/y], where D'[N/x] =0η D[N/x]. В 
5.2.10. LEMMA. If a PTS^ satisfies βη-preservation of sorts, then it satisfies 
strengthening, that is 
Г
и
х:А,Г2\-М:В 1 
x * F V ( r 2 , M , S ) І ^ Г ь Г а г - M . ß . 
PROOF. By the Sublemma we find a B' such that 
Г
Ь
Г 2 Ь М : S'and Β =0ηΒ'. 
By Correctness of Types there are two possibilities, Г
ь
і : Л , Г 2 h В : s or В = 
s ζ S. In the second case we are immediately done by SR¿j, because B' -»β s. In 
the first case we have 
Гі, і :Л,Г 2 г-й : s 
and by once again applying the Sublemma we find that 
Г
Ь
Г 2 h В : Ε =βη s. 
Now we are done by the fact that E -»^ s, SKß and one application of (conv). El 
5.2.11. COROLLARY (^-preservation of sorts implies SR,,). A PTS^ that satis-
fies βη-preservation of sorts, satisfies SR,,. 
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PROOF The proof is exactly the same as for Lemma 4 4 30, so one proves simul­
taneously the following 
Tl· Ρ DhP —>,, Ρ' => Tl· Ρ' D, 
Tl· Ρ DkT —>
η
 Γ' => Γ' Ь Ρ Ό 
The proof uses the fact that we have strengthening, which was stated in the 
Lemma Η 
5 2 12 REMARK In fact we can do with less then /^-preservation of sorts to 
prove strengthening and hence SR,, The specific property that we need in the 
proof of strengthening is the following 
Γ h Л s2 ì 
Г h В s'2 
Α=
βη
Β 
(si,s2,s3) e Tl . 
is'3[(sus2,s'3)çn] 
(This is used in the case of the (λ) rule ) 
If the system satisfies /^-preservation of sorts, the above property is obviously 
satisfied But there are more Pure Type Systems that satisfy the above property, 
for example the semi-full ones Remember that a PTS is semi-full if 
(β!, 52, лз) e П & 4 6 5 => 3a3[(ai, 4 . 'з) e Щ 
It is easy to verify that the above mentioned property holds Consequently, all 
semi-full PTS^,, satisfy strengthening and hence all semi-full PTS^ satisfy SR^ 
5 2 13 THEOREM (CON^ for normalizing functional PTS^) 
Tl· M A ] 
Tl·M'A U M I M' 
Μ =
βη
 M' J 
PROOF The Theorem follows immediately from Theorem 5 2 6 by the fact that 
in any functional normalizing PTS^, the rule (streng) is satisfied, which again 
follows immediately from Corollary 5 2 8 and Lemma 5 2 10 H 
5.3. Discussion 
We have proved CON^ for terms in a fixed context of a fixed type, but only for 
functional normalizing PTS^4 This immediately implies CR/з,, on Term, because 
we have SR^ and SR,, for these systems Confluence for well-typed terms of 
different types doesn't hold Just consider the well-known counterexample The 
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same can be said for well-typed terms in different contexts Take Α ф07) В and 
Г and Г' such that 
Г l· x(Xy Ay) * and Г' I- x(\y By)* 
Then x(Xy A y) =0η x{\y В у), but not x{\y А у) | x(Xy В у) 
We think that, using the work of [van Benthem Jutting 199+], who gives 
an analysis of typing in PTSs, these results can be extended to arbitrary nor­
malizing type systems The most interesting extension, however, is the one to 
non-normalizing type systems like A* First because the proof given here relies 
very heavily on the normalization Second, and maybe even more important, 
because from C O N ^ on Тегт(Г, A) in λ* (with (conv^,)) we hope to get C O N ^ 
on Тегт(Г, A) for an arbitrary PTS^,,, by imitating the reduction steps in λ* in 
the other PTS/э,,, using the terminally of λ* in the category PTS/j,, 
Let's now prove a general statement along these lines, ι e describe a PTS^,, ζ 
such that, if С f= CONg,, then C O N ^ holds for any P T S
a
, Note Remark 5 2 12, 
saying that SR, holds for any semi-full PTS^, 
5 3 1 D E F I N I T I O N The PTSÖ7, AN is the system X(S, A, 11) with 
S = Ν, 
A = Ν χ Ν, 
7г = Ν χ Ν χ Ν 
So AN is full (and hence semi-full), which implies that AN satisfies SR, (See 
Remark 5 2 12) We now have the following Proposition 
5 3 2 P R O P O S I T I O N If AN satisfies CONßl, then all P T S ^ satisfy CON0n 
P R O O F Suppose AN satisfies CONÖJJ and let ζ be an arbitrary PTS/j,, with Γ r-ç 
Μ, Ν A and Μ =
βη
 Ν We have to show that M \ N Now let - be a 
mapping from the sorts of ( to N that is injective on the set of sorts of ( that 
occur in Γ, M or A AN is full, so the map — is a PTS-morphism, so 
ThXNM,Ñ Ä 
Now, M I N and due to the local injectivity of —, the reduction paths from 
M, resp N can be faithfully translated back to reduction paths from M, resp 
N, and s o M I У H 
Because of the restriction to normalizing systems, we need to prove normal­
ization of /?7?-reduction without using the Church-Rosser property This may 
look problematic but in practice it isn't For example for the Calculus of Con­
structions, the strong normalization proof in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] for the 
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system with (conv^) can quite easily be adapted to a proof of strong normaliza­
tion for the system with (conv^) We conjecture here the general theorem that, 
if a PTS/j is (strongly) normalizing, then the PTS^, is 
That the proof of CR^ for non-normalizing systems need not be very com­
plicated is shown by the example of XU This is the system defined in Definition 
4 3 12 for which normalization does not hold If we extend the system by re 
placing the conversion rule with the (conv^) rule, the separation of contexts 
(Proposition 4 3 14) still holds Due to this property, the proof of CR^, is easy 
It works as follows 
1 Note that, if Γ h A Type', then A contains no redexes 
2 Hence, if Γ l· Μ, N A( Type), then the domains in M and N contain no 
redexes 
3 Conclude that CON^, holds for such M and N 
4 Note that, if Γ H M A{ Prop), then the domains of M are terms В with 
Г h В Type or Г h S Prop( Type) 
5 Hence, for these domains CON^ already holds 
6 Hence CON^ holds for M and N with Γ h M, JV Л( Prop) 
If we look at the Church-Rosser property from a point of view as to how 
to compute the common reduct, we see that the situation is really a bit more 
complicated then for untyped lambda calculus In untyped lambda calculus, if 
Μ -*β
η
 Μι and Μ -*β
η
 Μ2, a common reduct of M: and M2 can be found using 
complete developments (See [Barendregt 1984] ) Here one has to do something 
more, namely reduce the domains Consider again M = Xx A (Xy В y)x, M\ = 
Xx Α χ and Мг = Xy В у There are no residuals of the ß-теаех in M2, nor are 
there any residuals of the η redex in M\, so we have a complete development of 
the set of both redexes, but Μ
λ
 φ M2 (They would have been in the untyped 
case ) We still have to unify A and В 
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Chapter 6 
The Calculus of Constructions 
and its fine structure 
6.1. Introduction 
In pragraph 4 3 1 we encountered the Calculus of Constructions (CC) as an ex­
ample of a Pure Type System, where it was also called ХРш In this chapter 
we want to study this system in more detail This will be done in various ways 
First we say something about the practical meaning of the system in terms of 
logic and data types If we want to see the Calculus of Constructions as a logic 
we have to study the formulas as-types embedding from higher order predicate 
logic into CC We have already defined this embedding in Chapter 4 1 (paragraph 
4 3 1) as an embedding from the system ÀPREDu; to CC As we have already 
convinced ourselves of the fact that APREDw and P R E D O J are isomorphic sys-
tems via the formulas-as-types analogy we shall only be studying the embedding 
from APREDu; into CC In paragraph 4 3 1 we also encountered the so called 
cube of typed lambda calculi, which gives a fine structure for CC We shall also 
study the other systems of this cube, especially in relation to the formulas-as-
types embedding The central question for each of these systems will be whether 
the formulas as-types embedding is complete As we are mainly concerned with 
the cube from a point of view of logic, it is also interesting to see to which extent 
the systems of the cube are conservative over one another 
Two of the more complicated issues regarding CC are not treated in this 
Chapter, namely the strong normalization and the Church Rosser property for 
/Jrç-reduction on terms of CC Strong normalization will be dealt with in Chap-
ter 7 1 We discussed the Church-Rosser property in Chapter 5 1 From the 
normalization it follows by the techniques developed in Chapter 5 1 that the 
Church-Rosser property holds for ^-reduct ion in CC 
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6.2. The cube of typed lambda calculi and the logic cube 
We recall some definitions of previous chapters First remember that the Baren-
dregt's cube of typed lambda calculi (Definition 4 3 1) consists of eight PTS^s 
Each of them has 
The rules for each system arc 
λ -
λ2 
λΡ 
\ω 
λω 
λΡ2 
λΡω 
\Ρω 
S 
Λ 
as gì 
*,*, 
*!*) 
*!*) 
* 1 * ) 
* 1 * ) 
*!*) 
* > • * ) 
*!*) 
= {*,°}, 
= {* °) 
ven in the following table 
(π,*, 
(*.°) 
(°.*) (D,*) (*,D) 
(*.a) 
(D,*) (*,D) 
(π,ο) 
(°.D) 
(°,°) (°.°) 
The system APw is the Calculus of Constructions, sometimes called the Pure 
Calculus of Constructions to distinguish it from its variants and extensions We 
shall refer to it as CC The systems of the cube are usually presented as follows 
ΧΡω (= CC) 
λΡω 
where an arrow denotes inclusion of one system in another 
Remember that we also defined the logic cube (Definition 4 3 5), following 
[Berardi 1990] as follows It consists of eight PTS^s, each of them having 
S = Prop, Set, Type'', Type', 
Λ = Prop TypepSet Type' 
Sec. 6.2 The cube of typed lambda, calculi and the logic cube 129 
and the rules of each of the systems as given by the following table 
ÀPROP 
APROP2 
APROPu; 
APROPw 
(Prop, Prop 
(Prop, Prop 
(Prop, Prop 
(Prop, Prop 
APRED (Set, Set) 
(Prop, Prop 
APRED2 (Set, Set) 
(Prop, Prop 
APREDÜ; (Set, Set) 
(Prop, Prop 
APREDo; (Set, Set) 
(Prop, Prop 
(Type", Prop) 
(Type7, Prop) 
(Type", Type"), 
(Type", Type*) 
(Set, Type11) 
(Set, Prop) 
(Set, Type") 
(Set, Prop) (Type*, Prop) 
(Set, Type") (Type", Set) (Type?, Type") 
(Set, Prop) 
(Set, Type") (Type', Set) (Type", Type*) 
(Set, Prop) (Type', Prop) 
The systems are presented in a picture as follows. 
APROPw APREDu; 
APROP2 APRED2 
APROPw • APREDü) 
APRED APROP 
where an arrow denotes inclusion of one system in another. 
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Because we have convinced ourselves of the fact that the formulas-as-types 
embedding of a logic into the corresponding system of the logic cube is in fact an 
isomorphism, we can restrict our study of the formulas as types embedding into 
the systems of the Barendregt's cube to the study of the collapsing mapping H 
Remember that H is defined as the family of PTS-morphisms from logic cube to 
Barendregt's cube given by 
tf(Prop) = *, 
Я (Set) = *, 
Я(Турер) = D, 
tf(Types) = D 
6.3. Some more meta-theory for CC 
Before going into studying the systems, we want to make some further definitions 
This will also be necessary for the proof of strong normalization that will be 
given in a later chapter In the rest of this chapter we always assume that we 
are working in a system with sorted variables, so e g for the cube we have two 
sets of variables VarD and Var* See Definition 4 2 9 for details about the sorted 
variables 
6 3 1 D E F I N I T I O N For ζ a system of the cube we define the sets of kinds, types, 
constructors and objects as follows 
Kmd(C) = O-Term, 
Type(Ç) = *-Term, 
Constr(C) = a-Elt, 
Obj(C) = *-Elt 
Usually ζ will be clear from the context, in which case we omit it Note that 
Type(C) С Constr(C) 
Now we can apply Lemma 4 4 37 to conclude that 
Kind Π Type = 0, 
Constr Π Obj = 0 
This will be very useful when defining mappings on terms of a system of the 
cube A related property that is useful for defining mappings is given by Lemma 
4 4 39, which allows to distinguish cases according to the 'heart' of a term (See 
Definition 4 4 38 ) In the cube, the heart of a term A, h(A), is a variable, * or 
• From Lemma 4 4 39 we derive the following 
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6 3 2 LEMMA For A α well-typed term of the cube we have 
A e Kind о h(A) = *, 
A 6 Type =» h(A)eVarQ, 
A 6 Constr о h(A) e Varn, 
л e Obj о п(Д) e Var* 
In [Barendregt 1992], mappings on (subsets of the) well-typed terms of the 
cube are often defined on a specific subset of the pseudoterms T, and the case 
distinction in the definition is then made according to the level of terms This 
notion of 'level' is very close to our notion of 'heart', and in fact all the mappings 
in [Barendregt 1992] can be defined similarly by using case distinctions according 
to the heart of subterms We try to refrain from defining mappings on the 
pseudoterms, and instead define mappings only on the well-typed terms as much 
as possible, because we feel that this is more intuitive For completeness we define 
the notion of level though, and give the main property that one would want for 
it 
6 3 3 DEFINITION For M a pseudoterm of the cube, the level of M, j(M), is 
the natural number defined as follows 
h(M) = χ € Var* => І(М) = 0, 
h(M) = χ € VarD => B(M) = 1, 
h(M) = * =» |t(M) = 2, 
h(M) = О =• it(M) = 3 
The notion of level is closely related to the Automath notion of 'degree' 
(In Automath the numbering is reversed ) The main property for levels is the 
following 
6 3 4 LEMMA In a system of the cube, 
Г\-М A =• i(M) + 1 = І(А) 
PROOF Immediate consequence of Lemma 6 3 2 H 
One important mapping from the well typed terms to the untyped lambda 
terms we have already encountered The map |-| that erases all domains (ι e 
types in a λ-abstraction ) This is a very syntactical mapping, which leaves in 
a lot of type information that is of no importance for the underlying algorithm 
that the λ-term represents We therefore define a mapping |-|' that erases all 
type information 
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63 5 DEFIMTION The mapping |-|' from the objects of a system of the cube to 
the untyped lambda calculus is defined as follows 
|x| = x, 
\\x A M\ = Xx \M\, if Л is a type, 
\XaAM\ = |M|, if A is a kind, 
\MN\ = \M\\N\, if N is an object, 
\MN\ = \M\, if N is a constructor 
6 3 6 DEFINITION The λ-abstractions in a well-typed term of CC (but the defi­
nition immediately extends to pseudoterms of CC) are split into four classes, the 
0-, 2-, P- and ω-abstractions, as follows 
1 λ ι A M is a Q-abstraction if M is an object, A a type, 
2 Xa A M is a 2-abstraction if M is an object, A a kind, 
3 λχ A M is a Ρ abstraction if M is a constructor, A a type, 
4 λα A M is a ω abstraction if M is a constructor, A a kind 
We can decorate the Xs correspondingly, so we can speak of the λ0β λ„ of a term 
etc We now also define the notions of /3(r/)°-reduction, /?(r;)2-reduction, β(η)ρ-
reduction and /3(7y)"-reduction by just restricting reduction to the redexes with 
the appropriate subscript attached to the λ We use an arrow with a superscript 
above it to denote these restricted reductions, so —"#,, etcetera 
We want to state two of the most important properties of CC 
63 7 THEOREM CC IS strongly normalizing (All β reduction sequences starting 
from an M e Term (CC) are finite ) 
PROOF A detailed proof is given in Chapter 7 1 H 
A first proof of normalization can be found in [Coquand 1985], but the proof 
contained a bug as was remarked by Jutting Coquand repaired his own proof 
in [Coquand 1986] and together with Gallier he gave a (different) proof of strong 
normalization in [Coquand and Gallier 1990] There are various other versions of 
(strong) normalization proofs for CC in the literature All of them use a higher 
order variant of the 'candidat de réducibilité' method as developped by Girard for 
proving strong normalisation for his system F and Fw (See [Girard et al 1989] 
for the proof for system F ) The idea is to define a kind of reahsabihty model 
in which propositions are interpreted as sets of lambda terms (the reahsers) A 
detailed explanation of the method can be found in [Gallier 1990] The proof of 
strong normalization in Chapter 7 1 is given by defining a reduction preserving 
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mapping from CC to ¥ω. Then SN for CC follows from SN for Fix). This makes 
things slightly easier because we don't have to bother about type dependency. 
(Fa; is easier to handle than CC.) A complicating matter of Chapter 7.1 is that 
the proof is given for CC with a (conv^,,) rule. (That is, the P T S ^ CC.) The 
Strong Normalization of this system was an open problem up to now. 
Intuituively it is clear that the hard part (proof-theoretically speaking) of a 
proof of SN for CC should be the normalization of λ0 redexes. For one thing, 
it can be observed that this is the case for Fa;. In the proof of Chapter 7.1 this 
becomes also clear- The whole problem of SN for CC is reduced to the problem 
of SN for erased terms in Fa; (in which case we have only the 0-redexes left.) In 
[Coquand and Huet 1988], a version of CC is discussed in which the conversion 
rule is restricted to performing ßp- and ^-reductions. There it is called the 
restricted Calculus of Constructions. 
6.3.8. DEFINITION. The restricted Calculus of Constructions is the system CC 
with the (conv) rule restricted to /3pw-equality. 
Let us show that for that restricted case, SN is relatively easy (like in the 
simply typed lambda calculus.) 
Recall the definitions of /^-redex and /3p-redex of Definition 6.3.6: A /3-redex 
is a /J^-redex if it is of the form (\a:A.B)P with A a kind and В a constructor. 
A /9-redex is a /?p-redex if it is of the form (\x:A.B)t with A a type and В a 
constructor. We write — ^ and —*ß for the corresponding reductions. In the 
following we show that /3Pw-reduction is normalizing. 
6.3.9 P R O P O S I T I O N . The combination of β-reduction of Ρ -redexes andoj-redexes, 
β
Ρω
 -reduction, is normalizing in CC. 
P R O O F . The proof is in flavour and complexity quite close to the normalization 
proof for A—•. We assign to every term M of CC a pair (d,n), where d is the 
maximum of the depths of all /3PlJ-redexes in M and η is the number of βΡω-
redexes of maximal depth Then we proceed by contracting an innermost redex 
of maximal depth. That this procedure yields the /3Pl"-normal form is then shown 
by induction on the lexicographical ordering on the pairs (d, n). Before giving 
the definition of depth, let us remind us of the fact that there are the following 
three ways in which new /9-redexes can be created by a /^-reduction. 
{\x:A x)(\y:B M)Q ^ g (\y:B.M)Q, (1) 
(Xx-A.C[xQ]){\y:B.M) —»0 C[{\y:B.M)Q], (2) 
{\x:A\y:B.M)PQ — ^ (Xy:B[P/x}.M[P/x})Q, (3) 
where the last possibility can at the same time be an example of the second. 
Further there is one way in which existing redexes can be duplicated by a β-
reduction: 
{\x:A.M)C[{\y:B.P)Q] —>p M[C[{\y:B.P)Q}/x], 
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with χ having more then one free occurrence in M Now we define the depth of 
a ßp- or /^-redex by 
depth((Au A M)Q) = rank(type of \u A M), 
where the rank of a kind (the type of \Px A M от \
ш
а A M is always a kind) is 
defined by 
rank(*) = 1, 
rank(IT:r AB) = 1 + rank(B), if Л is a type, 
гапк(Па A B) = rank(A) + rank(B), if A is a kind 
All this is well-defined by the Uniqueness of Types property for CC (Lemma 
4 4 29) and the fact that if two kinds are β equal, their ranks are the same 
The normalization procedure is now by contracting each time an innermost ßPw-
redex of maximal depth If we define for any term M its complexity c(M) as 
the pair (d, n) with d the maximal depth of all /^-redexes and η the number 
of βΡω redexes of depth d in Μ, the normalization procedure as given above 
reduces the complexity of terms (in the lexicographical ordering ) We show this 
by distinguishing the three different possibilities for creating new redexes that 
are mentioned above (The duplication of redexes can only happen with redexes 
of rank smaller then r, so duplication is no problem ) 
• Note that, in the first case the contracted redex can not be a /?p-redex 
Further, if in the second case the contracted redex is a /?p-redex, the created 
redex is not a ßp"-redex 
• If, m the first two cases, the contracted redex is a /3w-redex of depth d (with 
as type of the λ-part Πα А В so d = гапк(Па A B)), the depth of the new 
redex is rank(>4), so the number of redexes of depth d is reduced by one 
• If, in the third case, the contracted redex is of depth d (with as type of 
the λ-part Пи А В so d = гапк(Па A B)), the depth of the new redex is 
rank(S), so the number of redexes of depth d is reduced by one (This uses 
the fact that the rank of a kind is stable under substitution ) S 
The restricted Calculus of Constructions is of limited interest, because it is 
not possible to first ßPw normalize and then perform only β02 steps to obtain the 
/3-normal form This is because e g a β2 reduction can create a /5p-redex (and a 
Дэ-reduction can again create β2 redexes) An example is 
(λ2<2 α-> * Qy){\px a r) — % (XPx a r)y 
The importance of the (strong) normalisation property lies in the fact that it 
gives a handle on the number of proofs of a proposition (One can for example 
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show that every closed term of type Nat is /3-equal to a numeral (i.e. a term 
of the form S(... S(Z)...).) Further, by using normalization one can prove the 
decidability of typing. 
6.3.10 THEOREM. In CC, given α context Г and a pseudoterm M, it is decidable 
whether there exists a term A with Г h M : A. If such a term A exists, it can be 
computed effectively. 
The proof is prooftheoretically hard beacuse it depends on normalization. 
Note therefore that type checking in the restricted calculus is much easier, due 
to the 'easy' normalization proof. 
Some hints towards a proof can be found in [Coquand and Huet 1988] and 
more details in [Coquand 1985] and especially in [Martin-Löf 1971]. See also 
[Harper and Pollack 1991] for an exposition on the decidability of typing for an 
extended version of CC, which also describes an algorithm for computing a type. 
6.4. Intuitions behind the Calculus of Constructions 
Let's first make some remarks about the impredicative coding of data types in 
(higher order) polymorphic lambda calculus. We feel this is necessary for a 
good understanding of CC. For this purpose it doesn't matter if we consider 
the versions that we called F and Fa; or the PTS/3-versions that we called Λ2 and 
Χω. Details of the encoding can be found in [Böhm and Berarducci 1985] and 
[Girard et al. 1989]. We just treat three examples 
6.4.1. EXAMPLES. 1. The natural numbers in À2 and λα; are defined by the 
type 
Nat := Πα : Prop.α—>(α—>α)—>α 
and we find zero and succesor by taking Ζ •= Ла:Ргор.Ах:а.А/:а—>α χ 
and S := An:Nat.Aa-Prop.Ax:a.A/:a—>a.f(naxf). Now it is easy to define 
functions by iteration on Nat, by taking for c:a, g:a—>σ, Itc<?:Nat—>σ as 
Itcp := \x:N3,t.xacg. It is also possible to define functions by primitive 
recursion, but this is a bit more involved and also inefficient. 
2. For σ a type, the type of list over σ is defined by the type 
List(tf) := Па:Ргор.а—>(σ—·α->α)—>α) 
and we find the constructors Nil := Ла:Ргор.Ат:а.А/:σ—>α—»α.ι and Cons := 
\t:al:\Àst(a).\aProp.\x:a.\f :σ—»α—>a.ft(laxf). Again function (like 'head' 
and 'tail') can be defined by iteration and primitive recursion over lists. 
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3 Also coinductive dat types can be defined in Λ2 and λω, which can be 
understood as greatest fixed points in a domain (the inductive data types 
correspond to smallest fixed points ) As an example we treat the type of 
streams (infinite lists) of natural numbers 
Str(Nat) = За (a-»Nat)&(a-»a)&a 
For convenience we write 
(f>9<x) (a~»Nat)&(a—>a)&¿a 
if ƒ a—>Nat, g a—*a and χ a, with projections πι, жі and π 3 Then we have 
destructors 
Head Str(Nat)-»Nat and Tail Str(Nat)-»Str(Nat) defined by 
Head = \s Str(Nat) sNat(Aaz (ж ^  ζ) (π 3 z), 
Tail = As Str(Nat) sStr(Nat)(Aaz \0k ka(niz)(Kiz){n2z(v3z)) 
It is possible to define function to Str(Nat) by coiteration and corecursion 
The impredicative data types of A2 and λω have a lot of structure already 
(Girard has shown that in λω one can define on the type Nat all recursive func­
tions that are provably total in higher order arithmetic ) It seems a good idea to 
use them for the domains of the logic So now we view λω not as higher order 
proposition logic, but as a term calculus in which one can construct functions (as 
λ terms ) Then, because we want to do predicate logic, we have to add to λα; 
the possibility of defining predicates on these new domains by adding the rule 
(*, D) to 7Z The kind A—•* then represents the type of predicates on A and 
we can declare variables of type A—** in the context This is the Calculus of 
Constructions, CC, the Pure Type System with 
S = * , α , 
A = * D, 
П = (*,*),(*,D),(G,D),(D,*) 
Using our understanding of higher order predicate logic, the sort * is the 
universe of both propositions and domains in which a whole range of (closed) 
data types is present There is however another way to see things This is to 
understand * just as the universe of propositions (refraining from understanding 
the propositions as domains), in which case a type like φ—>* (φ *) can be 
understood as the type of predicates on proofs of φ For practical purposes 
this latter approach doesn't seem to be so fruitful For example one can not 
distinguish between proofs that are cut-free and proofs that are not This is 
because lambda terms that are /3-equal (proofs that are equal via cut-elimination) 
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are identified If Pt is provable and t =p t', then also Pt' is provable If one is 
looking for these kind of applications, it is much more promising to use the 
'coding' of a logic in a relatively weak framework like Automath or LF There is 
however also the possibility to restrict the conversion rule of CC, such that only 
some convertible propositions are identified (A system like this is described in 
[Coquand and Huet 1988] ) 
It should be clear that in any of the two approaches the distinction between 
domains, objects and proofs is blurred propositions may contain proofs and 
there is no a prion distinction between domains and propositions On the other 
hand it does take the formulas-as-types approach very seriously in the sense that 
formulas are not only treated m the same way as the types (domains) but just as 
if they were types, putting them in the same universe Because of this mixing of 
formulas and domains, the Curry-Howard embedding from higher order predicate 
logic into CC is not complete The embedding from higher order propositional 
logic into CC (ι e if one refrains from understanding the propositions as domains) 
is complete 
We want to treat some examples to get the flavour of the system In these 
examples, the impredicative coding of data types will be used as described in 
6 4 1 First we want to discuss induction over the terms of type Nat and see to 
which extent Nat represents the free algebra of natural numbers Then we treat 
two formulas that represent specifications of programs This touches upon one of 
the most interesting aspects of CC To use it as a higher order constructive logic 
in which one can represent specifications as formulas (about data types ) From a 
proof of the formula the constructive content can then be extracted as a program 
(more precisely a lambda term typable in Χω ) A lot of work on this subject has 
been done in [Paulin 1989], we shall say a little bit more about this in paragraph 
67 
6 4 2 EXAMPLE We know from the normalization property that m CC each 
closed term of type Nat is /?-equal to a term of the form 
Xa * Xx a Xf a—»a ƒ( (fx) ) 
That is, modulo 0 equality the closed terms of type Nat are precisely the ones 
formed by S out of Ζ This induction property can be expressed in CC, but is 
not provable inside it To be precise, if we define 
I n d N a t = VP Nat-» * PZ—(Vi Nat P i — P ( S i ) H ( V i Nat P i ) , 
then IndNat l s n°t provable If we assume Indj^j., we still can't prove that the 
type Nat is the free structure generated by Ζ and S To establish this we have to 
add the premises Ζ T^jd $Z and Vi, y Nat (Si = Sy)—*{x = y) None of these 
two propositions is provable in CC In higher order predicate logic (working in the 
natural numbers-signature (N,Z,S)) these three assumptions are independent, 
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so we would have to add all three of them to obtain the free algebra of natural 
numbers In CC this is not so Due to the specific structure of the type Nat, the 
assumptions Ind¡\ia^ and Ζ ^^faj SZ suffice to prove the freeness of Nat (This 
is so because one can define Ρ Nat—»Nat with Indj\j
at h Vx Nat P(Sx) =jy[at x 
in CC ) 
6 4 3 E X A M P L E S 1 Abbreviate List(Nat) to List The proposition stating 
that for every finite list of numbers there is a number that majorizes all its 
elements can be expressed by 
V/ List 3n Nat Vm Nat m € I —> m < n, 
where m € I stands for 
VP List-»* (Vfc List P(Consmfc)) — Vfc ListVr Nat (Pk^P{Consrk)) -» PI 
and m < η stands for 
Д Nat-»Nat-» * (Vi Nat Л І І ) - » ( І , y Nat Rxy->Rx(Sy))->Rmn 
A proof of this proposition constructs for every list I a number η and a 
proof of the fact that η majorizes I From it one can extract a program of 
type List—»Nat that satisfies this specification 
2 Abbreviate Str(Nat) to Str The proposition that every (infinite) stream 
that is majonzable has a maximal element can be expressed by 
Vs Str (3n Nat Vm Nat m £ s —» m < η)—»(3η Nat 'η is maximum of s'), 
where m S s now stands for 
3p Nat Head(pStrTails) = m, 
and 'n is maximum of s' stands for 
(n e s)&c(Vm Nat m € s —» m < n) 
From a proof of this formula one would like to be able to extract a term 
of type Str—»Nat that computes the maximum of a stream, if it exists 
This means that we want to extract a partial function (the maximum may 
not exist), which is not possible, because in CC all functions are total 
(Due to the normalization ) In practice this is no problem, because the 
extracted function will produce an 'arbitrary' number in case there is no 
maximum This corresponds to the fact that in the proof of the formula, if 
s has no maximum we can take any number η to satisfy the conclusion 'n 
is maximum of s' It will be clear that the construction in the proof (and 
hence the algorithm) depends heavily on the proof of the premise that s is 
majonzable 
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6.5. Formulas-as-types of logics into the cube 
The Curry-Howard embedding from logics into the typed lambd calculi of the 
cube makes an essential distinction between on the one hand basic and functional 
domains (including the definable data types) and on the other hand predicate 
domains like A—»Prop The basic domains are interpreted as variables of type •, 
the functional domains as implicational formulas and the definable data types via 
the embedding of data types in system F The predicate domains are interpreted 
as kinds, e g A—>* D Using the logic cube we have described the formulas-as-
types embedding as a PTS-morphism In fact this was the reason for introducing 
the logic cube in the first place In this section we study the completeness of the 
formulas-as-types embedding into the different systems of the cube by studying 
the PTS-morphism Я from the logic cube into the cube Although the main 
concern of this Chapter is the Calculus of Constructions, we also look at the 
embedding into the other systems 
In fact there are other ways of interpreting PREDCJ in CC, but the one we 
describe here is what the înventor(s) of CC aim at (see [Coquand 1985] and 
[Coquand and Huet 1988]), and which is sometimes called the 'canonical embed-
ding' of higher order predicate logic into CC The same holds for the system AP2 
From [Longo and Moggi 1988] it becomes clear that the intention of the system is 
the formulas-as-types embedding of PRED2 into it in the way we have described 
it by the mapping Я In our setting the canonicity is partly forced upon by the 
syntax and therefore it is worthwile to also understand the embedding from a 
more semantical point of view 
It is well-known by now that the embedding into CC is not complete, ι e 
there are sentences that are not provable in PREDo; that become provable when 
mapped into CC We shall treat some examples of those sentences This incom­
pleteness result is sometimes referred to as the 'non-conservativity of CC over 
higher order predicate logic', but this terminology is a bit ambiguous because 
(non )conservativity actually only applies if a system is a subsystem of the other 
Therefore we shall use the more correct terminology of '(m)completeness of the 
embedding' here For the embedding into ЛР2 the question is still open, although 
there are reasons to believe that the embedding is not complete This was ex­
plained to us by [Berardi 1990a] and we shall discuss these reasons briefly later 
The embedding of PRED into AP is complete, as was shown independently by 
[Berardi 1988] and [Barendsen and Geuvers 1989] We shall give the proof of the 
latter, which uses a method developped by [Swaen 1989] to show completeness 
of the formulas-as-types embedding of full first order pedicate logic into Martin-
Lof's intuitionistic theory of types Although the completeness of the embedding 
into ΛΡ is quite non-trivial, the result is not very interesting from a practical 
point of view The logic PRED is too minimal to be of practical mathematical 
interest There is no notion of negation in it 
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6.5.1. The formulas-as-types embedding into C C 
Let's first remark that there are terms of type •, typable in CC in a context 
that comes from A P R E D U J , that do not have an intuitive meaning in higher order 
predicate logic, like α Prop, Ρ α—»Prop, t o r Px—»a Prop (Is Px—>a a domain 
or a proposition in APREDo>?) 
As has been pointed out already.one can refrain from predicate logic and 
view CC as a higher order propositional logic with propositions about (proofs of) 
propositions The typed lambda calculus corresponding to higher order proposi­
tional logic is APROPoi, which is exactly the same systems as λω So to under­
stand the embedding from P R O P O J into CC we just have to look at the inclusion 
of λω in CC Then all kind of rather exotic types can be understood as meta 
propositions about higher order propositional logic For example 
a * , P a - + * , i a l - P i - t Q * 
states that for α a proposition and χ a proof of a, if Ρ holds for x, then a holds 
We can go to arbitrary high levels of meta-reasoning, for example 
a *, Ρ α—•+, χ a,Q Pi—»*, у Px\- Px-^Qy * 
but also 
Ρ Πα • α—**, φ *, χ φ, у Ρψχ h P(Pipx)y * 
It is well-known that the inclusion of λω into CC is complete, ι e CC is conserva­
tive over λω This was proved independently by [Paulin 1989] and [Berardi 1989], 
we give the proof in paragraph 6 5 3 It is quite similar to the proof of conserva 
tivity of PREDn over PROPn that we gave in Chapter 2 1 
As already pointed out, the formulas-as-types embedding from higher order 
predicate logic in CC is not complete We now want to discuss some examples of 
sentences that are not provable in the logic but become inhabited when mapped 
into CC At the same time one obtains a better understanding of the logical 
merits of CC First we show that if one allows empty domains in the logic, the 
incompleteness is quite easy 
6 5 1 R E M A R K In CC, the existential quantifier has a first projection, similar 
to Martin-Lof's understanding of the existential quantifier as a strong Σ-type 
(See e g [Martin-Lof 1984] ) Remember that 
Эх Α φ = Πα • (Πι Α φ—>α)—>α 
in ÀPREDu; Now, in CC there is a projection function 
ρ (Эх Α φ)-*Α 
for Α,φ* Take 
ρ = \z (Эх Α ψ) zA{\x A\y φ x) 
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So, if 3x Α φ is provable one immediately obtains a closed term of type A by 
applying ρ In general there is no second projection, so the 3 is not a strong Σ 
(If, for example, Эх Α φ is assumed in the context, say by ζ Эх Α ψ, then ψ\ρζ/χ] 
is not provable ) Obviously, in APREDo» the existential quantifier has no first 
projection The expression (Эх Α φ)—*A can not even be formed if A Set, φ Prop 
6 5 2 LEMMA In APREDw, for χ i FV(tp), 
A Set, Ρ A—Prop, φ Prop \f (Эх A Px) D (Vx Α φ) D φ, 
but m CC there is a term M with 
Λ *, Ρ A—*, (¿> * h M (Эх A Px)—(Α—φ)-+φ 
PROOF Because the APREDu-context doesn't contain a declaration of a variable 
to A, we can't construct a term of type A, so we have no proof In CC, take 
M = Xz (Эх A Px) Xy (Α—*φ) y(px), with ρ as m Remark 6 5 1 H 
Even without using empty domains the embedding is not complete, as was 
first independently shown by [Berardi 1989] and [Geuvers 1989] We treat both 
counterexamples, starting with the latter as it is very short (but syntactic ) Both 
proofs give a counterexample already for the completeness of the embedding of 
third order predicate logic in so called third order dependent typed lambda cal­
culus (In this terminology, CC is higher order dependent typed lambda calculus 
and the system ΛΡ2 is second order dependent typed lambda calculus ) The coun 
terexample with empty domains above already works for second order dependent 
typed lambda calculus, it is not known whether one can find a counterexample 
without allowing empty domains 
6 5 3 P R O P O S I T I O N The formulas-as-types embedding of higher order predicate 
logic into CC is not complete 
P R O O F ([Geuvers 1989]) We use the fact that if χ g FV(<¿>), then Vx Α φ and 
A D φ can not be distinguished in CC (In APREDu they are distinguished by 
A Set or A Prop ) Take 
Γ = A Set, αΑ,φ Prop, Ρ Prop—Prop, ζ Р(Пх Α φ), 
and we try to find a proof t of 3β Prop Ρ(β—*φ) As no extensionahty has been 
assumed in the context, such t can't be found (Supposing there is such t, one 
easily shows that it can't be in normal form ) However, in CC one can take the 
type A for β because sets and propositions are not distinguished More precisely, 
in Γ' = A *, α Α, φ *, Ρ -к -ν*, ζ P(Ux Α φ), 
Γ' h λ 7 * Xh (Uß * Ρ{η-+φ)-+β) hAz 3β * Ρ{β-+φ) И 
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P R O O F ([Berardi 1989]) Define 
EXT = Πα, β Prop [α~β) - (α = β), 
where α«-»/? denotes (α—»/?)&(/?—»α) and = denotes the Leibniz equality on Prop, 
α =Prop Ρ = VP Prop—>Prop Ρα—*Ρβ This Έ Χ Τ ' is the extensionahty axiom 
for propositions Let's denote the CC-version of EXT by EXT', so 
EXT' = Πα,/? * (α->β) -> (α = /?) 
In CC this axiom has some unexpected consequences If we take A Set nonempty, 
then in CC 
aA\-M A^(A^A) 
for some M so from EXT' it follows that all generic properties that hold for A, 
hold for A—*A and vice versa This can be used to construct in CC a proof ρ 
with 
A *, α Α, ζ EXT' h ρ Л is a λ-model, 
where 
A is a λ-model = ЗА (A->A)-*A ЗАрр A-^A-^A 
App ο Λ = Ид—д& 
Λ о App = Ид 
This implies (among other things) that every term of type A-*A has a fixed 
point Of course, in higher order predicate logic, from EXT it doesn't follow that 
every function on a non-empty domain has a fixed point 
If we look for example at a context for Heyting arithmetic, 
Гяд = N*,QN,SN->N, 
z\ Vtx N (Sx =N Sy)^(x =N y), 
zi SO φ
Ν
 0, 
z3 ПР N^ * Р0^{Пу N Py^P{Sy))^(Uy N Py), 
then there is a term t in CC with 
Гяд, 2 E X T ' h i 1 Η 
6.5.2. The formulas-as-types embedding into subsystems of CC 
The formulas-as-types embedding into the systems in the left plane of the cube is 
certainly complete We have shown in chapter 3 1 that the embedding is even an 
isomorphism This leaves us with the other three systems of the right plane We 
do not treat the case of the embedding of APREDö; into λΡω, because we believe 
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that a conservativity proof can be given by simply adapting the proof for APRED 
and AP. More importantly this case is not of real interest, because the systems 
themselves are not of practical interest: They have just come up as a derivative 
of the definition of the cube as a fine structure for CC. (APREDuJ corresponds 
to PRED T , as it was defined in Definition 2.2.11. The systems PREDn T were 
introduced there for reasons of the semantics that we wanted to treat.) 
This leaves us with two cases, AP2 and AP. The first case is open and for 
the second case the formulas-as-types embedding is complete. Let us first say 
something about the embedding of second order predicate logic into AP2. 
First remark that the proofs of incompleteness of the embedding for CC 
(Proposition 6.5.3) also work for APn for any η > 2. So the formulas-as-types 
embedding from nth order predicate logic into nth order dependent typed lambda 
calculus is incomplete for η > 2. Further, if we allow empty domains in the logic, 
the incompleteness is easily shown: Lemma 6.5.2 also holds for APRED2 and AP2. 
Although we have no proof, there are reasons to believe that the embedding Η 
from APRED2 into AP2 is also incomplete if we do not allow empty domains in 
the logic. These reasons were provided by [Berardi 1990a] who suggests a proof 
of incompleteness. To understand the idea, we think it is best to look at an 
extension of APRED2 with polymorphic sets. 
6.5.4. D E F I N I T I O N . The system of second order predicate logic on polymorphic 
domains, APRED2P is defined by extending the system APRED2 with the rule 
(Types,Set) (i.e. extending APRED2 with polymorphic domains.) So APRED2P 
is the following PTS^. 
<S = Prop, Set, Typep,Types, 
A = Prop : Typep, Set : Type', 
Tl = (Set, Set), (Types, Set), (Set, Type"), 
= (Prop, Prop), (Set, Prop), (Type", Prop). 
So now for example 
Nat ·= ÜQ:Set a—*(a—>a)—>a 
is a basic domain. Similarly all the definable data types of the polymorphic 
lambda calculus are definable as sets in the system APRED2P. 
The system APRED2P is still a logic in the sense that there is a separation 
between domains, terms (among which are the propositions) and proofs. We can 
prove a proposition similar to Proposition 4.3.6 for APRED2P, which states this 
fact that the system is built up in stages. 
6.5.5. PROPOSITION, in APRED2P we have the following. If Г h M : A then 
Го, Г
г
, Г
Р
 h M . A with 
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• Γβ,Γτ-,Γρ is α permutation ofГ', 
• rD only contains declarations of the form χ : Set, 
• Γ7- only contains declarations of the form χ : A with Гд l· A : Set/Typep, 
• Гр only contains declarations of the form χ φ with Гд, Y-pl· ψ : Prop, 
• if A = Set/Type* , then TDl· M : A, 
• if Tl· A: Set/Type?, then TD,rTl· M :A 
The system APRED2 is a subsystem of APRED2P and the PTS-morphism H 
is still an embedding from APRED2P into ΛΡ2. (Hence APRED2P is consistent 
due to the consistency of AP2.) We have introduced APRED2P as a system in 
between APRED2 and ΛΡ2, because our argument already holds for APRED2P , 
which is more readily understood as AP2. 
A straightforward semantics for APRED2P is given by an arbitrary model for 
the polymorphic lambda calculus (to interpret the Set-part) with a second order 
predicate logic on top of it (giving the Prop-part for example the Tarskian se­
mantics). An arbitrary model for the polymorphic lambda calculus has a lot of 
specific structure and this may raise the question whether APRED2P is conser­
vative over APRED2. We don't have a definite answer to this, but we do have 
reasons to believe that the extension is not conservative. The idea comes from 
[Berardi 1990a]. 
Look at the context 
Γ := ASet, a, a'.A, z.a ФА a', 
which describes a similarity type in the logic. In APRED2 this similarity type 
has a finite model (without going into details about models, it will be clear that 
if we take for A the two element set, for A—*A the set-theoretic function space, 
for A—»Prop the set of subsets of A and so forth, this yields a model.) If we now 
look at a model for the similarity type Γ in APRED2P, we see that there are a 
lot of new domains (types of type Set) which will have an interpretation in the 
model as well. For example the domain Nat := IIa:Set.a—»(a—»a)—»a. In case of 
an empty similarity type, Nat could consistently be interpreted by a one element 
set (because Ζ Φ SZ is not provable in APRED2P in the empty context). In 
the similarity type Γ however, the interpretation of Nat has to be an infinite set, 
which makes it impossible for Γ to have a finite model in APRED2P. The point is 
that from а фа' one can prove Ζ Φ SZ and hence Sn{Z) ф Sn+l(Z) (for all n), 
viz. Suppose Ζ = SZ, then ΖΑα(λχ-.Α.α') =A SZAa(Xx:A.a') so α =¿ α', quod 
non. 
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6 5 6 FACT (Berardi) The similarity type (context) 
Γ = A Set, α, a' A, ζ а ф
А
 a' 
has a finite model in APRED2 but no finite model in APRED2P 
We want to stress here that we don't know how to use this fact (syntactically 
or semantically) to show the non conservativity, it may still be possible that, 
although Γ has essentially only infinite models in APRED2P, it still doesn't prove 
more APRED2-propositions then those alraedy provable in APRED2 from Γ It 
is easily seen though, that if APRED2P is not conservative over APRED2, then 
also the formulas-as-types embedding from second order predicate logic into AP2 
is incomplete 
Now we want to show the completeness of the formulas-as-types embedding 
from first order predicte logic (PRED) into AP We do this by showing complete­
ness of the PTS-morphism Η from APRED to AP As remarked in Chapter 2 1, 
the system PRED is on the one hand minimal (we only have Э and V), but on the 
other hand it has some extra features like higher order functions and λ-definable 
predicates that do not belong to the realm of 'standard' first order predicate logic 
that we have called PRED~' r in Definition 2 3 9 We are actually interested in 
the completeness of the embedding of P R E D " ^ into ΛΡ That it is sufficient to 
study the mapping Η is shown by Proposition 2 3 8 and Corollary 2 3 11 that 
establish the conservativity of PRED over P R E D - ^ 
As has been pointed out already, the system PRED is too minimal to be of 
real interest for practical mathematics, also because a system like AP is usually 
seen as a logical framework (like LF or AUT 68 that we discussed in Chapter 3 1) 
However, the completeness result can be extended a little bit to systems with a 
bottom type We are then considering the formulas-as-types embedding from 
PRED 1 to AP1, where PRED1 is the system defined in 2 2 14 and AP1 is AP 
extended with a constant type J_ * and a constant term £i with an extra rule 
Г Ь M i r h A * 
T\-ELMA A 
The system PRED 1 is more interesting because the full classical first order pred­
icate logic is a subsystem of it More precisely, there is a faithful embedding of 
classical first order predicate logic into PRED 1 by a double negation translation 
The embedding of classical first order predicate logic in to AP1 via the system 
PRED 1 is now complete, due to the completeness of the embedding of PREDX 
into AP1 
We now give the technical details of the proof of completeness of H APRED —> 
AP In [Barendsen and Geuvers 1989] this proof appears in a slightly different 
form The proof uses techniques developped in [Swaen 1989] to show complete­
ness of the formulas-as-types embedding from first order predicate logic into 
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Martin-Lof's mtuitiomstic theory of types A different proof of the same result 
can be found in [Berardi 1990] 
Following Proposition 6 5 5 (which also holds for APRED), we can write any 
context Γ of APRED in the format 
Г о , Г
т
, Г р І - М A 
where 
• Го, Γτ, Гр is a permutation of Г, 
• Го only contains declarations of the form χ Set, 
• Γτ only contains declarations of the form χ A with Γ β l· A Set/Typep, 
• Гр only contains declarations of the form χ φ with Гд, Γ τ h φ Prop 
Then, if Γ h M A, we have 
• if A = Set/Type' , then TDl· M A, 
• if Γ h Л Set/Type?, then YD, Г т h M A 
We shall refer to Гд a set-context, to Г г as an object-context, to Γ ρ as a proof-
context and to the concatenation TDST as a language context 
The question of completeness is whether for any APRED-context Γ β , Γ τ , Γ ρ 
and proposition φ with Γχ>, Γτ Ι- φ Prop, if 
H{TD, TT, Tp) h Μ Η{ψ) in АР, 
then there exists a term N with 
TD,TT,Yp\-N ψ in APRED 
In the following we assume for any APRED context Γ that 
1 Г = Г д , Г
т
, Г р 
2 Го is not empty, 
3 all declared sets in Гд are nonempty 
4 Tj- begins with a declaration β Prop and Γρ begins with ζ β 
The third and fourth clause are added for convenience, we shall refer to the/? Prop 
with ζ β as True In case there are empty domains in the logic, the completeness 
result would still hold with a slightly adapted argument If the second were not 
satisfied we would in fact be working in propositional logic The clause has as a 
consequence that we can always refer to 'the first declaration of a set variable in 
Γ' For this set variable we choose a fixed name 0, so we may in the following 
always assume that 0 Set is the first declaration of the APRED-context Γ 
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6.5.7. D E F I N I T I O N . For Γβ,Γτ a language-context and Δ a context of AP, we 
say that Δ is an elementary extension of H(TD,^T), notation Я(Гд,Гт) <g Δ 
if Δ Э H(TD,TT) and the extra declarations in Δ are all of the form χ:σ with 
H(TD, Γ τ ) h σ : * in λΡ. 
For example, Я(Гд, Γτ, Γρ) is always an elementary extension of Я(Гд, Γτ)· 
We now define a mapping | - | p from AP to the objevt language of APRED 
6.5.8. D E F I N I T I O N . The mapping | - | p from terms of AP to terms of APRED is 
defined as follows. 
(0 l* l p ·= Set, 
(«) l D l p 
{in) \x\p 
(iv) \x\p 
(υ) \Пх:А.В\р 
Types, 
0, if χ is a variable of type •*, 
x, for χ another variable, 
:= | B | p i f A:*, 5:D, 
:= Пх:\А\Р.\В\р else, 
(w) \Xx:A.M\p = \M\"iî A:*, M:B:D, (for some B), 
= \X:\A\P.\B\P else, 
(vii) \PM\P = |P |" i f M:A:*,P:B:D, (for some A,B), 
= |P | P |M| P else 
The definition extends immediately to contexts of AP, where a declaration of the 
form χ : • • • —Hr is removed. 
That the mapping | — | p is indeed from AP to APRED is justified by the 
following Proposition. 
6.5.9. P R O P O S I T I O N . 
Δ h M . A (m XP) => | Δ | Ρ h \M\P • \A\P. 
P R O O F . By induction on the derivation of Δ h M : A in АР. И 
6.5.10. F A C T . If Г д , Г
т
 l· M : A(: Set), then | Я ( Л ) | Р = A and | Я ( М ) | Р = M. 
(Note that Я is the identity on these kind of terms.) 
6.5 11. COROLLARY. For Δ Э Я ( Г 0 , Г т ) , say Δ Ξ # ( r D , Γ τ ) , Δ ' we have 
Δ h M : A(: *) => rD, TT, | Δ ' | Ρ h | M | P : \A\P. 
P R O O F . Immediate by the fact that | Я ( Г д ) | р = Γβ and for a declaration χ . A 
in Γτ, if ASet, then \x:A\p = x:A and if УІ:Турер, then | z | p Ξ 0 (and in that case 
this declaration doesn't play a role anymore). И 
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All this means that | — | p is a mapping back from terms of ΛΡ to the object-
language of APRED that does not change the terms that originated from the 
object-language 
Now we define a mapping back from AP to the proof-language of APRED, 
so now types in AP will become propositions and objects will become proofs of 
APRED 
6 5 12 DEFINITION Let Δ Э # ( Г 0 , Г7) The map Tr on constructors of AP in 
Δ is defined as follows 
(г) Tr(a) = True, if a Set € VD, 
(n) Tr(a) = a, if a —»Prop € Г7-, 
{in) Tr(Ax AM) = Ах|Л|рТг(М), 
(tv) Tr(Qt) = Tr(Q)|t|p, 
(v) Тг(Пі AB) = Πι | Л | Р Тг(Л)-»Тг(Я) 
6 5 13 PROPOSITION For Δ ш> H(FD, Г т), say Δ = Н(Г0, Г т), A' we have 
Δ l· С Πΐ! Αι Пх
п
 Α
η
 * in XP 
=> rDt Гт, |Δ' |Ρ h Tr(C) |Лі|р-> -*|/ln|p-»Prop гп APRED 
PROOF By induction on the derivation Note that if A * m AP, then \A\P con 
tains no object variables Furthermore, if Δ F- M A( *), then Γο,Γτ, |Δ' |Ρ r-
|M| P И | р by Corollary 6 5 11 И 
6 5 14 COROLLARY For Δ э> #(Γ 0,Γτ·), saj/ Δ = Η(ΓΩ,ΓΤ),Α' we have 
Al· A + ιn\P^ΓD,Γτ,\A'\
rl·Tr{A) Prop m APRED 
6 5 15 LEMMA IfTD\- A Set m APRED, ¿Леп 
3M[TD, Гт, Г Р г- M True <-» Тг(Л)] гп APRED 
(7o 6e precise we would have to write Tr(H(A)) in stead ofTr(A), but H is the 
identity on terms of type Set ) 
PROOF Immediate from the definition of Tr H 
6 5 16 LEMMA For А з> H{TD,TT), say A = Η{Γ0,ΤΤ),Δ', with A l· А, В * 
and A l· t В we have 
Tr(A)[|i|p/x] Ξ Tr(A[t/x}) 
and if A =0 A', then 
3M[TD, ΓΥ, \A'\" l· M Tr(A) <-• Тг(Л')] in APRED 
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PROOF. The first is easily proved by induction on the structure of A. The second 
follows from the fact that Тг(Л) =ß Tr(A'), which is justified by the first and the 
Church-Rosser property. H 
6.5.17. PROPOSITION. For each language-context Гд, Γ χ and φ with Г^, Гг Ь φ : 
Prop we have 
ЗМ[Г
В
,Г
Т
 h M : ¥ H Тг(Я(р)). 
(Note that Η is the identity on expressioons of type Prop, so we can skip it.) 
PROOF. By induction on the structure of ψ. By Lemma 6.5.16 we may assume 
that φ is in normal form. 
(base) If φ = at\ • • • t
n
 with a a variable, then Tr(ip) = φ by the fact that 
|<,|P = <,. (Fact 6.5.10.) 
(Э) Say φ = Φ^χ with φ,χ.Ρτορ. Then Тг(р-»^) = Vx:|(¿>|p.Tr(y?)-»Tr(^). 
Now we are done by IH The variable χ will not occur free in φ—up and 
one easily constructs the required derivation trees. 
(V) Say φ = Пх.А.ф with A : Set. Then Тг(Пх:А.ф) = Пх:\А\г.Тг(А)-^Тг{ф). 
Now by Fact 6.5.10 and Lemma 6.5.15, Па::|Л|р.Тг(/1)-»Тг( >) is equivalent 
to Пх:Л.Тг( >), so we are done by IH. И 
6.5.18. DEFINITION. For Δ э> Я(Г 0 ,Г Т ) , say Δ = Я(Го,Г т),Д', we define the 
context TR(A) as 
TR(A) :=r D , r T , |A | p ,Tr(A) , 
where Тг(Д) is defined by replacing every declaration z:A in Δ' by z' : Tr(A). 
(We have to make sure that the declared variables in Тг(Д) are different from the 
ones in |Δ|Ρ.) 
6.5.19. PROPOSITION. Let Δ э> r D , r T , then 
Δ h M : A{: *) m λΡ=> 3W[TR(A) h Ν . Tr(A)] m ÀPRED. 
PROOF. By induction on the derivation of Δ h M : A in AP. 
(var) M = χ then either χ:A in Г^ or in Δ'. In the first case Tr(A) <-> True 
and in the second case і:Тг(Л) e TR(A). 
(app) Say 
Δ h M : Пх-.А.В Δ h t : A 
A \- Mt : B[t/x] 
By IH, TR(A) h N : Тг(Пі:АЯ) ΞΞ ПХ:|Л|Р.ТГ(Л)—Tr(ß) and TR(A) h 
Q : Jr(A). We also have TR(A) h |Í|P : \A\>, by Corollary 6.5.11. So we 
may conclude TR(A) l· N\t\*Q : ТГ(Я)[|<|Р/І] = Jr{B[t/x\). 
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(λ) Say 
Δ , ι Β Κ Μ С AhYlx ВС * 
А Ь Xx В M Пх ВС 
By IH, TR(A,xB) г- N Tr(C) TR{A,x B) =TR{A),x \B\?,x'Tr(B), 
so we have 
TR(A) I- \x \B\P Xx' Ъ{В) N Пх \B\P T r ( ö ) - T r ( C ) ΞΞ ΤΓ(ΠΖ В С) 
(conv) We are immediately done by Lemma 6 5 16 S 
6 5 20 COROLLARY The embedding H from APRED into XP is complete, ι e if 
Γ £>, Γτ is α language-context with Гд, Tj \- φ Prop and Τ ρ a proof-context, then 
H{TD,rT,rP)l· Μ Η{φ) inXP^3N[TD,rT,Tpl· Ν φ m ÀPRED 
P R O O F H{YD, ΓΤ, Γρ) is an elementary extension of Γο, Γτ, so by the Proposi­
tion we have 
Г 0 , Г т , | Г р | * , Т г ( Г Р ) Ь Я Tr(v) 
for some term N Now all declarations in |Гр | р are of the form у В where В Set, 
so we can substitute other terms for each of these variables Furthermore, for 
every В for which у' В € Тг(Г
Р
) we have 3MTD,TT \- Μ В *-> Jr{B) by 
Proposition 6 5 17 So we can replace each y' Tr(ß) by у" B, at the same time 
substituting My" for y' inside У (These variables do not occur in Тг(і/з) ) We 
obtain a term N' with 
Г о , Г
т
, Г р І - І ' φ 
By again applying Proposition6 5 17,we can transform this N' into a N" with 
Г0,Гт,Гр\- Ν" φ Η 
6.5.3. Conservativity relations inside the cube 
We now want to address the question of conservativity inside the cube of typed 
lambda calculi and the logic cube We first look at the cube of typed lambda 
calculi, because the situation for the logic cube is very similar There are four 
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results that do the whole job, resulting in the following picture 
Χω λΡω 
ΧΡω 
where an arrow denotes a conservative inclusion and a dotted arrow denotes 
a non-conservative inclusion By transitivity of conservativity (if system 3 is 
conservative over system 2 and system 2 is conservative over system 1, then 
system 3 is conservative over system 1), it is no problem to fill in the picture 
further (Draw the arrows between two non adjacent systems) We can collect all 
this in the following Proposition 
6 5 21 PROPOSITION For Si and 5г two systems in the cube of typed lambda 
calcuh such that Si Ç £2 
S2 is conservative over S\ О 5г φ ΧΡω &¿ Si φ XP2 
PROOF It suffices to prove the following four results 
1 If S2 D Si, 5Ί a system of the lower plane in the cube, then S2 is conservative 
over Si (Proposition 6 5 22 ) 
2 If S2 a system in the right plane of the cube, Si the adjacent system in the 
left plane, then S2 is conservative over St (Proposition 6 5 25 ) 
3 ΧΡω is not conservative over AP2, 
4 Χω is conservative over A2 (Corollary 2 4 27 ) 
The fourth is a consequence of Corollary 2 4 27, saying that PROPo) is conser­
vative over PROP2 and of the fact that PROPw and PROP2 are isomorphic 
to, respectively, Χω and X2 via the formulas as types embedding (See para­
graph 4 3 1 and especially Proposition 4 3 4) The third was verfied in detail by 
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[Ruys 1991], following an idea from Berardi The idea is to look at a context Γ 
in ΛΡ2 that represents Arithmetic Then Γ with ΛΡ2 is as strong as second order 
Arithmetic and Γ with ΧΡω is as strong as higher order Arithmetic Hence we 
can use Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that in λΡ2 one can 
not derive from Γ that Γ is consistent in AP2 On the other hand in ΧΡω one can 
derive from Γ that Γ is consistent in ΛΡ2 Hence the non conservativity В 
We first prove the Proposition about conservativity of systems over systems 
m the lower plane The Proposition was also proved in [Verschuren 1990] in a 
slightly different way 
6 5 22 PROPOSITION Let 5Ί be α system of the lower plane and S2 be any system 
of the cube such that 5j Ç S2 Then 
Г h S l В * 1 
Г hS 2 M В \ =>· Г h S l M в 
Г and M in normal form J 
PROOF By induction on the structure of M 
applic Say M = xP
x
 P
n
 Then χ Uyl C\ D\ 6 Γ, so 
Γ 1-5, d *, 
Γ hs2 fi d 
Now by IH, Γ h-s, Λ C
u
 so Γ h S l χΡλ D^PJy^] We can now go 
further with P2 We know that Оі[Р\/у\] -»β Пу2 С? Di with 
r h S l c 2 * 
Also 
Гг-52Р2 C2, 
so again by IH Г \~sì P2 C2 and hence Г h S l xPiP? ^[^г/Уг] Con­
tinuing in this way upto η we find that Γ l·^ χ Pi P
n
 D
n
[P
n
/y
n
] with 
D
n
[P
n
/y
n
] = В Now by one application of the conversion rule (using 
Г h S l В *) we conclude Г l· xP¡ Pn В 
abstr Say M = Xx A N Then В —>β Их AC (because A in normal form) So 
Г h S l Пі А С -к and Γ, χ A hs2 M С (by Stripping and the conversion 
rule) We can apply IH to conclude Y,x A h S l M С Now we are done 
By one λ-abstraction and one conversion we conclude Г r-Sl Xx AM В 
El 
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The side condition Γ in normal form has just been added for convenience (in 
giving the proof ) It is not essential and it may be dropped 
We now prove the conservativity of the right plane over the left plane The 
idea is to define a mapping that removes all type dependencies This mapping 
will go from a system in the right plane to the adjacent system in the left plane 
and is the identity on terms that are already well-typed in the left plane Hence 
the conservativity The proof is originally independently due to [Paulin 1989] 
and [Berardi 1990] The first described the mapping from ΧΡω to λω in the first 
place to use it for program extraction, the second described the collection of four 
mappings (which is a straightforward generalisation of the mapping from ΧΡω 
to Χω) to give a conservativity proof The mappings are very much related to 
similar mappings one can define from predicate logic to proposition logic to prove 
conservativity of the first over the second 
6 5 23 DEFINITION ([Paulin 1989] and [Berardi 1990]) Let S2 be a system of 
the right plane and S\ the adjacent system in the left plane The mapping 
[-] Тегт(5г) —» Term(Si) is defined as follows 
[G] = D, 
[*] = *. 
[i] = i, for χ a variable, 
[Πι AB] = [В] if А*, В D, 
= Πι [Α] [Β] else, 
[ХхАМ] = [M] if A*, MB D, (for some B), 
= Xx [A] [M] else, 
[PM] = [P] if Μ Α*, Ρ В d, (for some A, В), 
= [P][M] else, 
6 5 24 REMARK The side conditions in the defintion are justified by the Clas­
sification Lemma (4 4 37) We could also have distinguished cases according to 
the heart or the level of subterms (See Lemma 6 3 2 and Lemma 6 3 4) 
The mapping [—] extends straightforwardly to contexts The following jus­
tifies the statement in the definition that the mapping [—] goes from the right 
plane to the left plane 
6 5 25 PROPOSITION ([Paulin 1989],[Berardi 1990]) Let S2 be a system in the 
right plane and S\ the adjacent system in the left plane of the cube 
r h S 2 M A=>\T\\-Sl[M] [A] 
PROOF By a straightforward induction on the derivation of Г hs2 Л/ Л H 
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6 5 26 COROLLARY ([Paulin 1989],[Berardi 1990]) For S2 a system in the right 
plane and S^ the adjacent system m the left plane of the cube we have 
S2 is conservative over S\ 
P R O O F The only thing to check is that for M 6 T e r m ^ ) , [M] = M This is 
done by an easy induction on the structure of M И 
The conservativity relations in the logic cube (Definition 4 3 5) are as follows 
(An arrow denotes a conservative extension, a dotted arrow a non-conservative 
extension ) 
APROPo; APREDw 
APROP2 APRED2 
APROPw -APREDû 
APROP -APRED 
6 5 27 P R O P O S I T I O N For S\ and S2 two systems m the logic cube such that 
Si Ç S2 
S2 is conservative over 5] О S2 φ APREDo; h S\ φ APRED2 
P R O O F Completely analoguous to the proof for the cube of typed lambda calculi, 
of Proposition 6 5 21 IS 
In Chapter 2 1 we also discussed first order predicate logic with (PRED) 
and without (PRED - ^) functional domains We stated a conservativity result of 
PRED over P R E D _ / in Proposition 2 3 8 In Chapter 4 1 we saw that APRED 
corresponds to PRED and we also defined the system APRED - ^ that corresponds 
to P R E D _ / (Definition 4 3 7) The conservativity of PRED over P R E D _ / can 
now easily be stated and proved in terms of typed lambda calculi Let therefore 
Sec 6 6 Consistency of (contexts of) CC 155 
Я' APRED - ' — APRED be the PTS-morphism defined by 
tf'(Set) = Set, 
tf'(Fun) = Set, 
Я'(Ргор) = Prop, 
Я'(Туре*) = Type", 
Я'(Туре') = Type* 
It is easy to verify that H' is almost the identity for M a term of APRED - ', if 
Μ φ Fun, then H'(M) = M We have the following Compare with Proposition 
238 
6 5 28 PROPOSITION For Г о context and σ, Prop m APRED_/, 
Γ r-pRED Μ φ => nfiX) r-pRED-/ nf{M) η]{φ) 
So the embedding H' is complete with respect to provability and PRED is conser­
vative over P R E D - ' 
PROOF By induction on the derivation S 
6.6. Consistency of (contexts of) CC 
As the embedding Я from APREDLJ into CC is not complete (CC proves more 
propositions than APREDu;), one may wonder whether there are propositions 
that CC can not prove, or to pose the question differently, is CC consistent7 
That this is the case can be shown quite easily by giving a two-point model for 
CC (See [Coquand 1990] ) The type * is interpreted as {0,{0}} (or {0,1} in 
the language of ZF) and if h M A, the interpretation of M is in the set A 
This model is also called the 'proof irrelevance' model (e g in [Coquand 1990]) 
because in the model all proofs of a proposition are mapped to the same element 
0 So the model also implies that 
-нЭМр- M аф
А
 a for h ο, α' А] 
The interpretation will be such that the proposition ±( = Ua Prop a) is inter­
preted by 0, so 
- 3 M [ h M _L], 
that is, CC doesn't prove J. We shall make the model construction precise here 
It is in fact a model construction for Χω Using the mapping [—] of Definition 
6 5 23, we find that it is also a model for CC So the consistency of CC follows 
from the consistency of higher order propositional logic and the conservativity 
of CC over Χω (Proposition 6 5 21 ) It is not so easy to construct the model 
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immediately for CC, a problem that is solved in [Coquand 1990] by describing 
the model for a variant of CC Here we use the mapping [—] from CC to Χω for 
this purpose 
Before constructing the model we want to recall some properties of Χω that 
will be used They have already been stated in Proposition 4 3 4 First, the set 
of kinds of Χω (those terms A for which Γ h Л • for some Г) can be described 
by K, where 
К =+,\K^K 
Second, no proposition-variables are subterms of propositions or constructors, ι e 
Г h M A Kind => Г' h M A Kind, 
where Г' consists just of those declarations χ В in Г for which Г l· В Kind 
These two properties imply that we can build the interpretation in three stages 
by first giving a meaning to the kinds, then to the types and constructors and 
then to the objects Also recall that the variables are seperated into two sets, Var* 
for object-variables and VarD for constructor-variables The first will be denoted 
by Latin characters, the latter by Greek characters 
In general, an interpretation of terms of λω uses a valuation ξ of constructor-
variables and a valuation ρ of proof-variables In our simple model all free object-
variables have the value 0, so we only need ξ For convenience we think of 
contexts of λω as being split up in а Γ°, containing the declarations of constructor 
variables, and а Г*, containing the declarations of object variables 
6 6 1 D E F I N I T I O N (I) The valuation ξ satisfies Γ° (notation ξ \= Va) if for all 
a A 6 Γ α , ξ[α) is in the interpretation of A (A •, so A doesn't contain any 
free variables ) 
(и) The valuation ζ satisfies Γ (notation ξ (= Γ) if ξ satisfies Γ° and for all 
χ A 6 Г*, the interpretation of A under ξ is not empty (A *, so A can only 
contain free constructor-variables ) 
6 6 2 D E F I N I T I O N For Γ H M A we define the interpretation function [-] 
Τβιτη(λω) —• Sets as follows 
1 For types, [•] = 2 and [/c
x
—>A:2]| = Щ -* [k2] (for ku k2 € K), where the 
latter arrow denotes set theoretic function space 
2 For constructors, let ξ be a valuation of constructor-variables such that 
е и г
ь 
[ПхАВ]( = l i f V a 6 H [ [ B ] e ( l = o ) = l], 
= 0 else, (for Α Ο,Β * ) , 
μ-Β] { = И ] е - [ я ] { , (for л, в *), 
[PQ\ = IP]([Q]V 
[XaAP]( = Χα€[Α]([Ρ\ΐ(χ=α) 
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3 All objects are interpreted as 0 
Here, λα € U V(a) denotes a set-theoretic function Further we identify all 
singleton sets (like e g [A], -» [>1]{) with 1 and we use the fact that no proof-
variables occur in propositions 
By induction on derivations one can prove the following property 
6 6 3 PROPOSITION If Г l· M A, then for all valuations ξ with ξ\=Τ, [M]^ 6 
Hit 
It is good to realise here that for example for Γ = χ _L(= Πα * α), there is 
no ξ with ξ \= Γ, so in this case the conclusion of the proposition is vacuously 
satisfied 
6 6 4 COROLLARY Χω, and hence CC, is consistent 
PROOF For all valuations ξ, [J.L = 0 All valuations satisfy the empty context, 
so if h M J., then 0 € 0, quod non В 
One may wonder whether EXT' = Πα,/? • (α«-»/?) —» (α = , β), is consistent 
in CC That this is the case can be seen by using the proof-irrelevance model of 
Definition 6 6 2 The interpretation of EXT' in the model is 1, so if CC would 
prove EXT'—»J., CC itself would be inconsistent, quod non The same argument 
applies to show that CC with classical logic is consistent Define 
CL = Πα * α V -ία 
Then 
[CL] = 1, 
so ζ CL is a consistent context A more interesting example is the Axiom of 
Choice Let 
AC = ПР Л — Я - * (Пі А Зу В Pxy) -> (3/ A-^B Πι A Px(fx)) 
Applying the mapping of Definition 6 5 23 we obtain 
[AC] = VP * (Л-В&Р) -> (А->5)&(Л-Р) 
Now [AC] is inhabited by a closed term in Χω, so AC is not inconsistent in CC 
(by the consistency of Χω ) Notice that in all these cases the proof of consistency 
of an assumption is done by giving a model in which the assumption is satisfied, 
for EXT and CL the proof-irrelevance model and for AC the system Χω 
In some (quite trivial) cases it is even possible to use CC itself as model If 
the context Γ consists only of declarations ι A with A D or Α =ρ zt\ t
v 
with ζ a variable, then Γ is consistent Contexts of this kind are called strongly 
consistent in [Seldin 1990] 
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6 6 5 P R O P O S I T I O N ([Seldin 1990]) Strongly consistent contexts of CC are con 
sistent 
P R O O F Let Γ = x\ A\, ,x
n
 A
n
 be a strongly consistent context and suppose 
that Γ h M -L for some M Now we consecutively substitute closed terms for 
all free variables that are declared in Γ, such that all the assumed propositions 
become T ( = Πα α—>a) It works as follows if х
г
 Л, € Г with Г l· Л, •, then 
At =0 Uy В *, (with FV(ß) С { х ь , x,-i}) and we substitute \y Β* Τ for xt, 
where the B' are the terms in which the substitution for x b , x,-i has already 
been done If χ zt\ tp( •) with ζ a variable, we substitute χ by λα * Αχ α χ, 
which is of type Τ If we denote this substitution by *, we can conclude from 
Γ h M _L and the Substitution Lemma that l· M* _L So Γ is consistent by 
the consistency of CC И 
The techniques described above to show that a context is consistent are not 
sufficient to handle the more interesting examples For mere proof theoretic 
reasons it will for example not be possible to show the consistency of Y HA (defined 
in the second proof of Proposition 6 5 3) with these techniques This would give us 
a first order consistency proof of higher order arithmetic These kind of contexts 
have to be handled by a normalization argument Assuming the inconsistency of 
Γ HA, show that a proof of J. in THA can not be in normal form, and so there is 
no such proof In [Seldin 1990] one can find a detailed proof of the consistency of 
a context that represents Peano Arithmetic in a system that is a slight extension 
of CC Coquand shows in [Coquand 1990] by a normalization argument that the 
context 
INF = Л * , а Л , / Л - М , Я Л — Л - > * 
z\ Vx A (Rxx)—>J_, z2 Vx, y, ζ A Rxy^Ryz—*Rxz, z$ Vx A Rx(fx) 
is consistent When contexts become larger, a consistency proof by the normal­
ization argument can of course get very involved Semantics is then a very helpful 
tool for showing consistency and in general to show the non-denvabihty of a for­
mula from a specific set of assumptions Of course one has to use more interesting 
models then the one of 6 6 2 to establish this In [Streicher 1991] there are some 
examples of this technique using reahsabihty semantics 
Knowing that a certain context is consistent is of course not enough to use 
it safely for doing proofs Due to the incompleteness of the formulas as-types 
embedding, a well-understood context that is beyond suspicion in higher order 
predicate logic, may have unexpected side-effects when embedded in CC Further­
more, CC has a greater expressibihty then higher order predicate logic so we may 
also put in the context axioms that do have a meaning but can not be expressed in 
the logic An example is given by the axiom of definite descriptions that makes a 
generic statement about all domains It is described in [Pottinger 1989] as follows 
DD = Va * VP a - * г (3·χ α Ρ χ ) Ρ(ιαΡζ), 
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where 
3\x:a.Px := (3x:a.Px)&¿{Vx,y:a.Px->Py->[χ =
a
 y)) 
and ι is a term of type Va: * .ЧР:а—> * .(3\x:a.Px)—»a. (One сап take some fixed 
closed term for ι but also declare it as variable in the context.) We assume the 
intended meaning of DD in PREDw to be clear. Together with classical logic, 
the axiom of definite descriptions has an unexpected side-effect in CC. 
6.6 6. PROPOSITION. [{Pottinger 1989]] 'Classical logic' and 'definite descriptions' 
yield proof irrelevance in CC 
We have already encountered the semantical notion of proof irrelevance in the 
discussion of the model in 6.6.2. It can also be expressed in purely syntactical 
terms as the phenomenon that for all propositions φ, all proofs of ψ are Leibniz-
equal. It is then formalised in CC by the proposition 
PI := VQ: * Sx, y:a.(x =
a
 y). 
Of course, PI holds in the proof-irrelevance model of 6.6.2 (the interpretation of 
PI is 1), so PI doesn't imply inconsistency. However, if we intend to use CC 
for predicate logic it is clearly undesirable: if Γ proves PI, then any assumption 
α Φ a' makes Γ inconsistent. We see that PI, which is a very useful principle for 
proofs, is a very odd principle when applied to domain-objects. Because of the 
treatment of domains and propositions at the same level, principles about (proofs 
of) propositions have unwanted applications to the domains. 
The proof of Proposition 6.6.6 in [Pottinger 1989] uses an adapted form of a 
proof by Coquand ([Coquand 1990]), showing that CC with classical logic and a 
derivation rule for a strong version of disjoint sum yields proof irrelevance. Let's 
also state this result, but not by adding a derivation rule but by adding an axiom, 
which really amounts to the same as the rule used in [Coquand 1990]. (Using the 
result by Reynolds that polymorphism is not set-theoretic, Berardi has proved 
that in CC, classical logic with a stronger form of definite descriptions (replacing 
the 3! by 3) implies PI. See [LEGO-examples] for details.) 
6 6.7. PROPOSITION ([Coquand 1990]). 'Classical logic' with 'disjunction prop­
erty for classical proofs ' implies proof irrelevance in CC 
Here we mean by 'disjunction property for classical proofs', that for с : CL in 
the context and φ : •, αφ is in the smallest set of proofs of φ V -<φ that contains 
all proofs that are obtained by V-introduction from a proof of φ or a proof of 
->φ. Put in syntactical terms this says that, for г and j the injections from A to 
AM B, respectively from В to A V B, the proposition 
4P:{A V B)^ * .( і:Л.Р(гх))-( х:5.Р(;х))->Р(с (р) 
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holds So proof irrelevance follows from the context 
cl CL, zVa • (a + -IQ)(C/Q), 
where for A, В *, 
Л + В = Xy A V В VP (Л V ß ) - * (Vi Л Р(гх)Н( х В P{jx))->Py 
In presence of CL also the reverse can be proved, so we can construct a proof ρ 
with 
c/CLbp PI <-> (Va * (а +->a)(cla)) 
The implication from right to left is the most interesting In [Coquand 1990] it is 
proved by using the fact that if in Γ one can construct A •, Ε Α—**, ε *^>A 
and a proof of Va * a <-» £(ea), then Γ proves J_ 
6.7. Formulas about data-types in CC 
Having seen the incompleteness of the formulas-as-types embedding of higher 
order predicate logic in CC, we shall now see that the distance between CC and 
PREDu; is not so large when it comes to propositions about inductive data types 
This follows from a recent result by Berardi, which we shall discuss here only for 
what concerns the implications for the formulas-as-types embedding For details 
and proofs we refer to [Berardi 199+] The point is that for purposes of deriving 
programs from proofs, it doesn't seem to make sense to declare a theory in the 
context Instead one uses the definable impredicative data types and inductive 
predicates on them, as is done in the examples of 6 4 3 This is not the place to 
discuss in detail the topic of extracting programs from proofs in CC, for which we 
refer to [Paulin 1989], but to get some flavor we treat the first example of 6 4 3 
Roughly, the program extracted from the proof is the λω-term obtained by the 
mapping [—], as defined in Definition 6 5 23 
Suppose t is a proof of 
Ш List 3n Nat lim Nat 'm 6 / —» m < η' 
m the context α Indj^
a
t Then in Χω we have 
α ΠΡ * P->(Nat->P->P)->(Nat-»P) h [<] List->(Nat χ Nat—Truei-»True2), 
where Truei and Тгиег are some trivially provable propositions Now [i] still 
contains computationally irrelevant information, the real program to be extracted 
should be something like Xx Nat ^([f.]*!) List—»Nat, where * substitutes some 
closed term for α in [t] Of course it is not irrelevant what we substitute for a, 
but the general picture should be clear From the proof of the specification one 
can obtain the program that satisfies the specification In [Paulin 1989] it is also 
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shown how to extract from the proof the logical content which is a proof that 
the extracted program satisfies the specification. Some parts of the proof have 
computational content while others don't. Therefore, to mechanize the extraction 
proces, in [Paulin 1989] the type * is divided in Prop, Data and Spec, the first 
consisting of the propositions with purely logical content, the second consisting 
of the propositions with purely computaional content and the third consisting of 
propositions containing both logical and computaional content. 
In view of the discussion of the example above it is an interesting question 
whether CC proves more propositions about inductive data types then higher order 
predicate logic does. It is clear that we have to be more precise if we want to have 
a negative answer, because in general the answer will be positive. (E.g. in CC we 
can still prove EXT —• 3x:Nat.Sx = N
a
t x ( s e e ' п е second proof of Proposition 
6.5.3) and Indj\j
a t&(Z ^ N a t SZ) -» Пх,y:Nat.(Sz =jsj a t Sy)->(x = N a t y) (see 
Example 6.4.2.)) First we have to consider only the strongest version of inductive 
data types, called parametric data types in [Berardi 199+]. A parametric data 
type is in set-theoretic terms the smallest set X closed under some fixed operators 
(functions of type A¡—>A2—>... —*An—>X, where η > 0 and each At is X or an 
already defined parametric data type.) If D is a parametric data type this implies 
that the induction and uniqueness properties for D are satisfied. In algebraic 
terms, a parametric data type is just a free (or initial) algebra. Further we have 
to restrict ourselves to a specific class of propositions, what Berardi calls the 
propositions on functional types. The functional types are the ones obtained by 
putting arrows between the parametric data types, further there are the so called 
logical types, which is the class of (higher order) predicate types on functional 
types. The propositions on functional types are the propositions obtained from 
the basic propositions by the usual logical connectives D, V,&, -i, V¿, and 3¿, 
where L is a logical type The basic propositions are those propositions obtained 
by applying an inductive predicate to the right number of terms (of the right 
type), so this class is already quite big. (Inductive predicates are minimal subsets 
among those closed under some fixed monotone constructors; they can be defined 
in higher order predicate logic by the higher order quantification over all such 
predicates. For example <C Nat χ Nat and G С Nat χ List of the Examples 
in 6.4.3 are inductive predicates.) In [Berardi 199+] all this is defined in set-
theoretic terms and then translated into CC. Following [Berardi 199+], we do 
not denote this translation explicitly (but there are no ambiguities about this.) 
The main result of [Berardi 199+] is now saying that for ψ a proposition in 
the set Pos, if Γ h Μ:φ in CC for some term M, and Γ is satisfied in the model 
PER, then φ is provable in Set theory. Here PER is some model based on the 
interpretation of propositions of CC as partial equivalence relations on Λ (the 
set of untyped lambda terms.) The model-construction is in [Berardi 199+]; we 
will not go into it here but state the important facts that for all parametric 
data type D, the interpretation of Indo in PER is not empty, which means that 
г.Indo is satisfied. The set of propositions Pos consists of those propositions on 
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functional types that are built up from the basic propositions using Э, ,&,-і 
and Vx:D, 3x:D (for D a parametric data type) with the restriction that a Vx:D 
that is not bound may only occur in a positive place. (The Vi:Nat for example, 
is bound if it appears as Vi 'Nat.(< (x,n)—» .).) 
One of the obvious examples where the result applies is the first of 6.4.3. 
Berardi shows that also the statement of Girard's normalization theorem, saying 
that all typable terms in system F are strongly normalizable, is in Pos. It is of 
the form 
m:Te.UA:Ty.Oft{t,A) D 3n:Na.t.m'-Te.nm:Na.t.Redd(t,t',m) Dm<n, 
where the type of pseudoterms Te and the type of types Ту are parametric data 
types and Oft С Те χ Ту and Redd С Те χ Те χ Nat are inductive predicates 
with Oft(t, A) if ί is of type A m F, Redd(t,t',m) if t reduces to t' in m steps. 
We see that the restrictions on the form of the propositions is not very serious; a 
specification will usually be of the form Ylx.D3y.D'.P(x,y) with P(x,y) G Pos. 
Further the result is very general, as there are no restrictions at all on the shape 
of Γ or M. So Γ may even contain assumptions that can not be expressed in set-
theoretical terms: As long as the assumptions are satisfied in PER, the conclusion 
is valid 
It would be interesting to see whether the result discussed above can be 
rephrased syntactically by extending APREDo; with inductive data types and de­
scribing a formulas-as-types embedding from the extended higher order predicate 
logic to CC. This extension of APREDo; can be defined by adding a scheme for 
inductive types (by allowing a kind of least fixed point construction for positive 
type constructors), but also by extending APREDo) with polymorphic domains 
As we know how to define inductive data types in polymorphic lambda calculus 
and the formulas-as-types embedding from APREDo; to CC immediately extends 
to APREDo; with polymorphic domains, we want to say a bit more about the 
latter possibility. Let APREDo;? be the following Pure Type System. 
S = Prop, Set, Type'', Type', 
A = Prop : TypepSet : Type", 
П = (Set, Set), (Type', Set), (Type*, Set) 
= (Set, Type*), (Type?, Typep), 
= (Prop, Prop), (Set, Prop), (Type*, Prop). 
So this is APREDo; with (Type8, Set): a higher order predicate logic built on the 
polymorphic lambda calculus in stead of the simple theory of types. Note the 
similarity with Definition 6.5.4. In view of the description of parametric data 
types in the beginning of this section it is natural to leave the rule (Typep, Set) 
out of the system to eliminate things like ria:Set.(a—>*)—>a : Set. This is an 
option that we want to leave open. 
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The formulas-as-types embedding from A P R E D Ü ; P into CC is now induced by 
the formulas-as-types embedding from APREDw into CC of Definition 3 2 6, so 
it is the PTS-morphism H with 
H(*) = *, 
H (Set) = * , 
ЩТуре") = D, 
Я (Type8) = D 
This immediately shows that APREDwp is consistent (In fact the mapping 
Я shows that all extensions of A P R E D C J with rules of the form (s,s'), s,s' 6 
{Prop, Set,Typep, Type5}, are consistent ) The embedding Я is not complete, the 
same counterexamples as for A P R E D U J do the job (See the proof of Proposition 
6 5 3 ) However, if we restrict ourselves to propositions in the set Pos, we may 
still be able to prove that if 
z\ Indo,, ,г
п
 Ind D „,a Indj^[at,6 Ζ ^jy[at 5 Z Ь Μ φ in CC, 
then there is a proof Ρ in A P R E D Q J P with 
Z\ Indpj, ,z
n
 Indß n ,a Indjya t ,ò Ζ / j^ a t S Ζ l· Ρ φ, 
where D\, ,D
n
 are the parametric data types that occur in φ (We omit the 
mapping Η for reasons of readability ) In view of the proof of the original result 
in [Berardi 199+], we have a strong feeling that this adapted completeness of the 
formulas-as-types embedding from ÀPREDOJ P into CC holds However, it is not 
as general as the original result, one would like to allow more assumptions then 
just those stating the parametricity of the data types Still the matter could 
be interesting for further investigations, because it may give a more syntactical 
handle as to which propositions about data types are provable in CC 
Let's end this section with the remark that, just like for the system APRED2P, 
it is an open question whether APREDo;p is conservative over APREDLJ The same 
reasons for believing that APRED2P is not conservative over APRED2, apply to 
APREDo>p A possible non-conservativity result does, however, not affect the 
use of the system APREDu>p when the use is restricted to proving the kind of 
propositions about parametric data types that we discussed above 
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Chapter 7 
Strong Normalization for βη in 
the Calculus of Constructions 
7.1. Introduction 
In this Chapter we prove the strong Normalization for CC with βη conversion 
rule We shall denote this system by СС/з,, to distinguish it from CC^, which 
is the original Calculus of Constructions, with only 0 conversion Similarly we 
have Fw^, and Fu^,, 
One of the main problems with proving SN^, for CC^,, is that we do not know 
whether Term(CC^) is closed under 77-reduction We know that SR, holds for 
CCJ (Lemma 4 4 32), but that doesn't immediately imply SR,, for CC^, One 
thing to do is to prove S N ^ for C C ^ , which immediately implies S N ^ for C C ^ 
(because the set of terms of the latter is a subset of the set of terms of the first) 
We choose to prove first SR,, for CC^,, and then SN^, for CC^, directly On the 
one hand this is more natural and on the other hand we have found in Chapter 
5 1 a simple criterion for SR, to hold, which also applies to СС^, 
7.2. Meta-theory for CC with /^-conversion 
In the section where we studied the meta theory for general Pure Type Systems 
we have seen some properties that we could only prove for PTS^, whereas we 
would like to have them also for the other notions PTS^,, and P T S ^ In fact 
this was one of the reasons for introducing PTS^, in the first place We couldn't 
prove SR, for PTS/3,, so we introduced P T S ^ One of the properties that we 
were unable to prove for both PTS^, and PTSj^, is the Classification Lemma, 
4 4 37 As this Lemma is very important for defining mappings on the set of 
typable terms in an easy way, we shall show that the Lemma does hold for C C ^ 
So, in the following we use the syntax with sorted variables, as it was described 
in Definition 4 2 9 
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7.2.1. S U B L E M M A The system CCß^ has the following (expected) properties. 
1. If M e Term(CCßri), Μ =
βη
 О, then M = D. 
2. There are no terms of the form Пи:Л.О m CCßv. 
P R O O F . 1. If Μ =
βη
 • , then Μ -»β О by the Key Lemma 4.4.18. We can 
not have the situation that Г h M : A, because this implies (using the 
Stripping Lemma 4 4.27 and the Key Lemma 4.4.18) that there must be an 
axiom (• : s) among the axioms of C C ^ . So there is an θ € {*, Π} with 
M = s. It is easily seen that the s can only be •. 
2. Suppose Uu:A D e Term(CC^). Then Γ Η Πω: А О : В for some Г and В. 
So Г, и' A h • : s for some sort s, which is not the case. И 
7 2.2. L E M M A . CCßv satisfies /3^-preservation of sorts (Definition 5.2.7). That 
is, for A and A' terms of CCßv, Г and Г' contexts of CCßv and s, s' G {*, О}, 
Г Ь A -s ) 
Г' h А' : s' L => s = s' 
A =
βη
 A' J 
P R O O F . By induction on the structure of A we show 
A' e Тегт(Г') ì 
Г h A : a \ =* Г' h A' П. 
A =ßv A' J 
Then we are done because, by Uniqueness of Types (Lemma 4.4.29), a term can 
not at the same time be a type and a kind. We distinguish cases according to 
the possible structure of A. 
• A = AiA2. Then Г h А^.Пи-.С.О, which is not possible. (Sublemma 7.2.1.) 
• A = \u:Ai.A2. Then A can not be of type О by the Stripping Lemma 
4.4.27. 
• Α Ξ Uu:Ai.A2. Then A' -»ß Tlu:A[.A'2 with (among other things) A2 =βη 
A2 and Γ,χ:Αι h A2 : •. We are now done by induction hypothesis. 
• A = *. Then Α' -»βη •, hence Г' Ь A' : • and we are done. S 
7.2.3. COROLLARY (Classification in С С ^ ) . In ΰΰ
βη
 we have 
Kind Π Type = 0, 
Constr Π Obj = 0. 
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P R O O F Note that, just as in the proof of the Classification Lemma 4 4 37, it 
suffices to prove the following two statements (let s, s' € {*, • } ) 
Γ h A s, ΓΗ A s' => s Ξ s', 
Γ h M A s, ΓΗ M A' s' => s = s' 
These follow immediately from Lemma 7 2.2, using Uniqueness of Types IS 
7 2 4 COROLLARY CCßv satisfies strengthening and SR^ 
P R O O F In Chapter 5 1 we have shown that a P T S ^ that satisfies /^-preservation 
of sorts satisfies strengthening (Lemma 5 2 10) and SR,, (Corollary 5 2 11) H 
7.3. The proof of SN for βη in CC 
We now turn to the proof of strong normalization for /3r?-reduction in the Calculus 
of Constructions with /Jrç-conversion This is the most general property about 
normalization in versions of CC that one would want It implies SN for β(η)-
reduction for CC with /3(7/)-conversion The proof we give here is a generalisation 
of the proof of SN/3 for CC^, given m [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] 
Before giving the proof we want to see why S N ^ for C C ^ does not follow 
immediately from SN^ for CC^ by a 'postponement of 77-reduction' argument 
(That is, we strongly believe that there should be some 'easy' combinatorial 
argument deriving one from the other, but we haven't been able to find it ) The 
postponement of η still works, as was shown m paragraph 4 4 2 From it we 
get that SN^ for CC^ implies S N ^ for CC^ Now the problem is that the set of 
typable terms of C C ^ is larger then the set of typable terms of CC^ An example 
is given by the term 
\x P(Xy A My)-* * \z Ρ M xz 
which can be typed in CC^,, but not in CC/3 if y £ FV(M) 
We do have the following, which says that it is enough to prove strong nor­
malization for /3-reduction on CC^, 
7 3 1 P R O P O S I T I O N 
CCßn И SN0 =• CCß„ И SNßv 
P R O O F The proof follows immediately from Theorem 4 4 9, which says that 
X \= SN^ =>· J. X \= SN^,, if A- is a set of pseudoterms closed under /3-reduction 
Note that Term(CC^^) is closed under β and η (The first by SR^ for arbitrary 
PTSs, the second by Corollary 7 2 4 ) So Term(CC^) = | Term(CC^) and we 
are done В 
Although the Proposition says that it is sufficient to study /3-reduction, we 
prove S N ^ for СС/з,,, because the proof of SN^ for ϋΟβ
η
 would be exactly the 
same 
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7.3.1. Obtaining S N ^ for CC from S N ^ for ¥ω 
We define a reduction preserving mapping from C C ^ to ¥wßn The mapping is 
the same as the one in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991], where it was defined as a 
mapping from CC^ to Fw¿j to prove the strong normalization property for CCß 
The problem with the extension to C C ^ is that we don't have all the meta theory 
for CCg1 that was used in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] for the CC/j case In the 
following we verify that the whole argument can still go through 
The original intuition of the mapping is due to [Harper et al 1987] who define 
a /^-reduction preserving mapping from LF to λ-+ to prove the strong normal­
ization of LF The map ¡—J that will be used can be seen as a higher order version 
of the map defined by [Harper et al 1987], although things get quite a bit more 
complicated here It's also possible to restrict the map [—] to Term(AP2), to 
derive the result A2 |= SN^ =>• λΡ2 (= SN
ur
, 
The map [—] doesn't work uniformly on the terms of C C ^ That is, we can't 
define [—] such that for all Γ, M and A, 
Гг-сс , M Л 4 [ Г ] Н
Г ч
, [ М ] [A] 
To show that [—] really maps terms of CC^, on terms of Fu^rj, one has to define 
another map r from types and kinds and sorts of CC to types and kinds and 
sorts of FbJßn such that 
T\-ccBv M А=>т{Т)Ь
Гш0ч[М] τ(Α) 
In order to get a feeling for the mappings [—] and τ we give some heuristics 
(following [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] ) 
The idea of the mappings in [Harper et al 1987] is to replace redexes that use 
type dependency by λ—»-redexes We follow this idea, so let for example Л be a 
type such that 
Г Нес,, F А^ * Г hCCßv i А 
r\-cc
ertFt * 
then [—] and τ must erase all type dependencies such that 
r(T) \-
Р
щ
вч
 ІП τ(Α)^* Т(Г) bFußv M r{A) 
Γ Γ - F ^ I F Í ] т(*) 
is sound This is solved for LF by taking [Ft] = [F][t], т(Д-+*) = т(Л)—0 
and т(*) = 0, where 0 is a fixed type variable A redex that is obtained by type 
dependency, say (λχ A M)t, with A a type, M a constructor and t an object, is 
replaced by (λζ 0 Да: т(А) [М\)[А\Щ, where г is a fresh variable This term is 
then typable in the system without type dependency and also the possible redexes 
in A are preserved by the abstraction over ζ 0 and the application to [A] 
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If we add polymorphism the situation gets more complicated Let for example 
Г Н
с с > т і F П о * α->α Γ hCC/3ri σ * 
Γ I-CÇJ, F a σ _ > σ 
then 
τ(Γ) h ^ „ [Fl τ(Πα * o - α ) τ(Γ) h f w „ [α] О 
Γ I-F«,, [ Μ τ ( σ ^ σ ) 
must be sound This means that taking τ(Πα * α—»α) = 0—»τ(α—>α), [Fa] = 
[FJ[a] doesn't work (The application is not sound ) But also the option taking 
τ(Πα * α—>a) = Πα * α—»α, [Fa] = [F]r(a) doesn't seem right, because the 
possible reductions in α are not preserved The solution is to do both and take 
τ(Πα * α—»α) = Πα • 0—>α—>α, 
¡Fa] = [F]r(a)H 
This implies that a higher order abstraction should have a different interpretation 
too For example the interpretation of F Πα * α—»α now has to be applied to 
two arguments The solution for the case F Ξ λα * λχ α χ is to take something 
like λα * λζ 0 λχ α χ, but the general picture is of course quite a bit more 
complicated because kinds can have much more structure (and have objects as 
subexpresions) then in Fo;^ Therefore we define a mapping ρ which provides a 
type for the image of τ (so we have Γ ^ccßTI А В => г(Г) г-г-;?
ш/, т(Л) р{В) 
for A a type constructor or a kind) 
The mapping ρ in fact just takes what is usually called the 'order' of a kind, 
in terms of the underlying Fu^,, kind The definition is as follows 
7 3 2 DEFINITION The map ρ {ü} и Kind(CC^) -» Kmd(F^T,) is defined by 
1 p(*) = p(D) = *, 
2 ρ(Πα AB) = p{A)^p(B) if Л is a kind, 
3 р(Пх A B) = p(B) if Л is a type 
Note that the case distinction in the Definition is allright in CC^,, As the 
mapping ρ removes all type dependencies and all variables we have the following 
easy properties (Also use the fact that for A and В typable terms, if Α =ρ
η
 В, 
then Л is a kind if and only В is This was proved in Lemma 7 2 2) 
7 3 3 FACT For А, В kinds of CC^,, и a variable and M a term, 
1 p(A[M/u] = p(A) Ξ p(A)[M/u], 
2 A =/*, В => p{A) = p(B) 
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We now want to devote some attention to the interpretation of types and kinds 
under [—], before giving the definition of τ For example, if Γ b~ccßri A * and 
Γ,α A hccB, В D, then we want т(Г) \-Flllßii [Πι A B\ τ (Π) The intended 
interpretation of * under τ was 0 (some fixed type variable ) This leaves us with 
the possibility to also take r ( P ) = 0 and to take [Πι A Bj = c[A][B][c'/x], with 
с some term of type 0—>0—»0 and c' some term of type т(А) 
So it will be required that we have fixed terms of every type and every kind 
in Fujßv However, not every type in Fuißv is inhabited by a closed term and 
therefore it seems necessary to extend the syntax with a possibility of having 
(closed) constants of all types However, this becomes a very complicated system 
(what if we substitute a term in a constant of a not-closed type7) and it turns 
out that we can stay away from these kind of atrocities The solution is to work 
in a fixed context 0 *, d J_ (J. = Πα * α) in FCJ^, and define a fixed term cA A 
for every type or kind A 
We give the definition of τ, reflecting the intuitions about preservation of 
reductions etc 
7 3 4 D E F I N I T I O N The map r {D}uKind(CC^)uConstr(CC^„) -» TermtFw/j,) 
is inductively defined by 
r (*) 
τ(α) 
τ(Πα A В) 
т(Пх А В) 
τ{\αΑ M) 
т(ХхАМ) 
τ{ΜΝ) 
Τ\ΜΝ) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
r(D) = 0, 
о, 
П а р ( Л ) т ( Л ) - т ( 5 ) 
Пхт(А)т(В) 
\ар{А)т{М) 
т(М) 
τ{Μ)τ{Ν) 
т(М) 
if Л is a kind, 
if Л is a type, 
if Л is a kind, 
if Л is a type, 
if N is a constructor, 
if TV is an object 
The definition by cases is correct by Classification for CC/3ÏÏ, Corollary 7 2 3 
That the range of r is indeed a subset of TerrT^Fu^,,) will be stated in Lemma 
7 3 9 The mapping τ deletes object variables and therefore type dependency, 
and is compatible with substitution and reduction, as is stated by the following 
fact (Proofs are by induction on the structure of the terms, using the Stripping 
Lemma 4 4 27 and Fact 7 3 3 ) 
7 3 5 F A C T For Л, В kinds of C C ^ , χ an object variable, a a constructor vari­
able, <5 a constructor and M an object of C C ^ , 
1 T{A) does not contain free object variables and τ(Α[Μ/χ]) = τ{Α), 
2 T(A[Q/a}) = T(A){r(Q)/a}, 
3 A —>0 В =• т{А) — * 0 τ(Β) or T(A) = T(B), 
4 Л —•„ В =* т{А) — „ т{В) 
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Using the mapping τ we now define the mapping of contexts of CC^,, onto 
contexts of ¥ωρ
η
 This mapping will be called τ too, although it is not defined 
straightforwardly by applying τ to all types and kinds in the context The reason 
for this is that constructor variables have to be 'split' in a constructor variable 
and an object variable, replacing a Am the context by α p(A),x
a
 τ(Α), 
where x
a
 is some fresh object variable connected with a This splitting has to 
be done because a Π- or λ-abstraction over a constructor variable is replaced by 
two abstractions 
To make this splitting precise we assume an injection of г Var •-• Var* 
such that Var* \ i(VarD) is countable, consisting of those object variables that 
are used in the derivations in C C ^ (so an object variable г(а) is always 'fresh' ) 
Notationally we don't work with the injection г but write x
a
 for г(а) So for 
every variable α 6 VarD we have a fresh variable x
a 
7 3 6 DEFINITION The mapping τ on declarations and contexts is defined as 
follows 
1 For A a type in CC^, χ an object variable, 
T(X A) = χ T(A), 
2 For A a kind in CC^,,, α a constructor variable, 
τ{α A) =a ρ{Α),χ
α
 τ {A), 
3 For Γ = Ui A\,U2 Αι, , u
n
 A
n
 a context in CC^,,, 
τ(Γ) = 0 *,d ±,т(щ Аі),т(и2 A2), ,т(ипАп) 
The 0 * in the context serves as the image of • and • under r Further it 
is used as the canonical inhabitant of * and canonical inhabitans for the other 
kinds of Ρωβη are built from it In fact we could have left it out and used any 
closed Fu^-type for it The d J. in the context is necessary to have a canonical 
inhabitant for every type It is essential for the construction of the reduction 
preserving mapping [—] 
7 3 7 DEFINITION Canonical inhabitants of types and kinds in г(Г), denoted by 
c
A
 for A a type or kind, are defined as follows 
(г) с* = О, 
(и) сл~в = Xa А с в , for А^В a kind, 
(ггг) сА = dA, for A a type 
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Note that cB[N/u) = cB^N/^ for all kinds and types B, variables и and terms 
N Further note that the inhabitant cA of A is independent of the context in 
which A is typed (it only depends on the specific choice of the variables 0 and d, 
which are constants relative to our exposition ) Before showing the soundness of 
τ 
Γ l·CC|¡r| M A=> τ(Γ) \~Fvßv т{М) p{A), for M not an object, 
we treat some examples of the application of the mapping τ to a CC^-term 
7 3 8 E X A M P L E S These examples are also meant to show the connection (at 
least computationally) between r and the Mohnng-Berardi mapping from CC^ 
to Fb when it comes to constructors 
1 τ(Πα * α—»α—>Û) = Па • 0—»α->α, 
2 τ(Πα * α—>α—»α—••) = Πα • 0—»α—»α-+0, 
3 τ(λα • Αχ α XP α-* * Ρ χ) = λα • \Ρ * Ρ 
7 3 9 L E M M A For Μ e Term(CC/3,), M not an object, 
rhcc^M A^T(T)hFu0vT(M) p(A) 
P R O O F The proof is the same as in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991] for CÇa, so by 
induction on the derivation We treat the case that the last rule was (app) and 
the case that the last rule was (λ) (In the proof we omit the subscript under 
the turnstile as it will always be clear from the context whether we are working 
in CC^, or in Fu>ßn ) 
(app) Say M = PQ and Γ h M Uu В С, Tl· Ν Β,Α = C[P/u] Now PQ is 
a constructor, and hence Ρ is We distinguish subcases between Q being 
a constructor or an object 
If Q is a constructor, we find by induction hypothesis that τ(Γ) l· r(P) 
p{TluBC)(=p(B)•^p(C))Άndτ(Γ)l·τ(Q) p(B) By one (app) we find 
т(Г) h T{P)T(Q) p{C) and we are done because T{P)T(Q) = r{PQ) and 
p(C) = p(C[Q/u}) 
If Q is an object, we find by induction hypothesis that т(Г) l· т(Р) 
p(Uu В C ) ( = p{C)) We are done because T(P)T{Q) = т{Р) and p(C) = 
p{C[Qlu)) 
(λ) Say Μ Ξ Au В N and Г, и В l· N С, Г h Пи В С * / D We distinguish 
subcases between В being a type or a kind 
If ß is a type, we have т(\и Β Ν) = T(N), p{Uu В С) = р(С) and further 
by induction hypothesis т(Г),и т(В) l· r(N) p(C) By substituting с т ( в ) 
for и we find т(Г) l· τ{Ν) p{C) 
If В is a kind, then τ (Au Β Ν) = Xu ρ(Β) τ{Ν), р(Пи В С) = р{В)^р(С) 
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and further by induction hypothesis т(Г),и p(B),x
u
 т(В) h τ(Ν) p(C) 
By substituting c T ( f l ) for x
u
 we find т(Г),и p(B) \- τ{Ν) p(C) Now also 
τ(Γ) h p(B)-»p(C) D, and hence т(Г) l· Xu p{B) r{N) p{B)->p(C) В 
7 3 10 DEFINITION The map [-] from Term(CC^) \ {O} to Term(Fu)0Tt) is de­
fined inductively by 
M 
M 
[α] 
[Πι А В] 
[Πα А В] 
[λχ А М] 
[λα А М] 
[ΜΝ] 
[ΜΝ] 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
с°, 
X 
х
а 
с°-°-°И][Я][с^)/х] 
(Ρ^^°ΐΑ]ΐΒ][εή^/
α
,α^/χ
α
] 
(\zOXxr(A)[M])[Al 
(λζ 0 λα р(А) Хх
а
 т(А) [M])IA], 
[M][N], 
[Μ]τ(Ν)[Ν], 
if χ € Var*, 
i faeVarD , 
if Л a type, 
if A a kind, 
if A a type, 
if Л a kind, 
if N an object, 
ή N a. constructor 
Here ζ is always assumed to be a fresh object variable 
The definition by cases is allright by the Classification for CQj,,, Corollary 
7 2 3 It is not very difficult to verify that the mapping preserves β- and ψ 
reductions, which will be stated in 7 3 16 That the image of the mapping [—] 
is indeed a subset of TeriT^Fu^,,) is stated by the following lemma It is only 
in the proof of this lemma that we really have to add something to the proof of 
strong normalization for β in CC^ (apart from the quite non-trivial verification 
of a lot of meta-theoretical facts for CC^,, of course, but this has already been 
done in Chapter 4 1 ) What we have to do extra here is to verify that for A and 
8 types in CCßr,, if Α =ρ
η
 В then τ(Α) =β
η
 r(B) For ССд this problem was 
easily settled by the Church Rosser property, which we lack here This turns out 
to be not so easy We can not just redo the reduction expansion path from A to 
В to get τ{Α) =β
η
 τ(Β), because τ removes abstractions (and hence redexes ) 
Also constructors can be /ÎTj-equal to objects, like in λα * α =β
η
 Xx J. χ, and 
although objects are not in the domain of r, this may have an effect on the βη-
conversion An example where the equality between A and Bis really established 
in a different manner then the equality between τ{Α) and τ{Β) is the following 
λα ±—> * λχ ± αχ =β
η
 λα * —> • λβ * αβ, 
and 
τ(\α -L—>* λχ ± αχ) = λα * α =β
η
 λα *—>* λβ * αβ = τ(λα *—>* λβ * αβ) 
In this case the two images are still ^-equa l , but one could imagine that there 
are dirtier tricks That there are however no dirtier tricks is shown in Lemma 
7 3 13 For the proof of that Lemma it is convenient to modify the mapping r a 
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bit to a mapping τ' from the erased terms to erased terms (Here we mean the 
erasure | — | that removes only the domains, it was defined in Definition 4 4 11) 
We then define r' by induction on the structure of terms, distinguishing cases 
according to the heart of specific subterms (The notion of 'heart' of a term A, 
b(A), is defined in Definition 4 4 38 ) 
7 3 11 DEFINITION Consider the set E which is obtained from the set {ü} U 
Κιηά(00/3,,) U Constr(CCy3T;) by first applying the erasure mapping | — | and then 
closing down under -»
βη
 On this set E we define the mapping r' by induction 
on the structure of terms as follows 
T'(*) 
Λ<*) 
τ'(Ώα А В) 
τ'(Ώχ А В) 
τ'(Χα M) 
τ'(Χχ M) 
r'(Mh) 
τ'(M Ν) 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
τ'(α) = ο, 
û , 
Па р(А) т'(А)->-
Пх т'(А) т'(В) 
Ха т'(М) 
т'(М) 
τ'(Μ)τ'(Ν) 
т'(М) 
т'(В) if α 6 Var0, 
if χ e Var*, 
if a e VarD, 
if ι £ Var*, 
if h(N) e Varn, 
if h(/v) € Var* 
The definition is justified by Lemma 4 4 39 
7 3 12 FACT If Л 6 {Π} и KindtCC^) U Const^CC^), then 
\т(А)\=Л\А\) 
7 3 13 LEMMA For А, В terms of CCp
v
, not objects, 
Α=0ηΒ^ τ(Α) =0η τ(Β) 
PROOF Immediately from the following 
Α=0ηΒ => \Α\=βη\Β\ 
=> τ'(\Α\)=0ητ'(\Β\) 
=> \τ(Α)\=
βη
\τ(Β)\ => τ(Α)=
βη
τ(Β) 
The first is a standard property of | —|, the third is justified by the fact that we just 
stated and the last step is also a standard property of | —| (See Corollary 4 4 17 ) 
This leaves us with the second step Suppose \A\ =
βη
 |ß|,say |Л| -»ßv Q
βη
«- \B\ 
Then we can copy all the reduction steps from |Л| to Q and from | S | to Q in 
the r'-image A precise proof of this fact can be given by verifying that the 
properties of 7 3 5 also hold for τ', ι e for χ an object variable (x e Var*) and a 
a constructor variable (a 6 VarD) 
1 T'(A) does not contain free object variables and τ'(Α[Μ/χ]) = τ'(Α), 
2 r'(A[Q/a\) = T'(A)[r'(Q)la], 
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3 A — ^ В => т'(А) ^0 r ' (ß) or т'{А) = т'{В), 
4 А —», В => т'(А) —», r '(ß) И 
7 3 14 LEMMA 
Thee» M A => τ(Γ) h ^ „[M] г(Л) 
PROOF By induction on the structure of terms as in [Geuvers and Nederhof 1991], 
using Lemma 7 3 13 and the Stripping Lemma 4 4 27 We treat the cases for M 
being a Π-abstraction, a λ-abstraction or an apphcatioin 
Π-abstr Say M = Пи В С and note that A can only be * or Ρ By induction 
hypothesis we obtain that τ(Γ) I- [ß] 0 and τ(Γ,ιιΑ) h С 0 Now 
we distinguish cases according to whether В is a type or a kind 
If ß is a type, т(Г, и В) = т(Г),ит(В), so by substituting с т ( в ) for и 
and applying c°-°~0 to [B] and [C][cT<-B)/u\ we conclude that т(Г) h 
c0-*0^°[ß|[C][cT(flVu] 0 and we are done 
If ß is a kind, т(Г, и В) = г(Г), и p(ß), і
ц
 т(В), so by substituting c ' ( B ) 
for и, cT<B> for x
u
 and applying c ° ^ ° to [ß] and lC][c"^/u,cT^/xu} 
we conclude that т(Г) h ^ " ^ " [ В Ц С І ^ ^ и . ^ ^ ^и] 0 and we are 
done 
λ-abstr Say M = Xu Β Ρ and note that (by the Stripping Lemma 4 4 27) 
A =£,, Пи В С with Г, и S h Ρ С By induction hypothesis we obtain 
that т{Г,иВ) \- [P] T{C) and т(Г) h [В] 0 Now we distinguish 
cases according to whether ß is a type or a kind 
If ß is a type, т (Г> ß) = т(Г),и r (ß) Now τ {В) and т(С) are both 
types, so we can do a λ-abstraction and we obtain т(Г) h Au r (ß) [PJ 
Пи τ(β) т(С) From this we easily conclude that 
τ(Γ) I- (Xz OXu r(B) [Pl)[ß] Пи r (ß) г (С) Now we are done because 
from Пи ß С =
βη
 A it follows by Lemma 7 3 13 that Пи r (ß) т(С) =0η 
τ (A) and we can apply the conversion rule to obtain what was to be 
proved 
If β is a kind, т(Г, и В) = τ (Г), и p(ß), х
и
 т(В) Now r (ß) is a type 
and p{B) is a kind, so we can do two λ-abstractions to obtain т(Г) h 
Xu p(B) Xx
u
 т(В) IP] Пи p(B) т(В)-*т{С) From this we easily con­
clude that 
т-(Г) h (Лг ОЛи p(ß) Лх
и
 τ(β) [P])[ß] Пи p(ß) т(В)->т(С) Now 
again we are done because from Пи В С =ρ
η
 A it follows by Lemma 
7 3 13 that Пи т(В) т{С) =
βη
 τ(Α) 
apphc Say M = PQ with Γ h Ρ Пи ß С, Г h Q ß such that А =0п C[Q/u] 
By induction hypothesis we find that т(Г) h [Ρ] т(Пи ß С) and 
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τ (Γ) l· [Q] τ(Β) We distinguish subcases according to whether Ρ 
is an object or a constructor 
If Q is an object then В is a type, so [PQ\ = [P][Q] and т(Пи В С) = 
Пи т{В) т{С) We can conclude that т(Г) h [PQ] r(C)[IQ]/u] and 
we are done by the fact that T(C)[[Q]/U] = r(C) =0η τ(Α) (by Lemma 
7 3 13) 
If Q is a constructor then В is a kind, so [PQ] = [P]r(Q)inteQ and 
T(UUBC) = Uu p(B) т(В)^>т(С) We can conclude that т(Г) l· 
[PQ] T(C)[T{Q)/V] and we are done by the fact that T{C)[T(Q)/U] Ξ 
T(C[Q/U]) =0η τ (A) (by Lemma 7 3 13 ) Η 
7 3 15 LEMMA For M e Term(CCßv), χ € Var*, Q € VarD, jV an oijecí and Q 
a constructor, 
1 [M[N/x]] = [M[[N]/x]], 
2 [M[Q/x]] = [M][T{Q)/a,[Q}/xa] 
PROOF Both by induction on the structure of M, using the fact that a term 
p(A) does not contain any free variables and that a term τ(Α) does not contain 
any free object variables Further one needs some (easy) substitution properties 
for the canonical inhabitants of types and kinds like 
c
T{A)[{N]/x] = cTiAWx», 
c"
(A)[[W]/x] = c*AW'i\ 
c^[r(B)/a,lB]/x
a
] = cTW°», 
с
р{А)[г(В)/а,1В]/х
а
] = (f^81^ И 
7 3 16 THEOREM FOT M, M' e Term(CC^), 
Μ ^ 0 η M' => [M] -~γη [M1] 
PROOF By induction on the structure of M The only interesting cases are 
when the reduced 0- or 77-redex is M itself, which are handled by distinguishing 
subcases according to the domain of the lambda abstraction We only treat the 
cases for which the domain is a kind (The cases for which the domain is a type 
are similar but easier ) 
• M = (Xa A N)Q with A a kind Then 
[M] = (Xz 0 Xa p(A) Xx
a
 r(A) [N])[A]r(Q)[Q] 
= [N[Q/a]\ = [M] 
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• M = \a A Na with A a kind Then 
[M] = (Xz Ο λα p(A) Xx
a
 т{А) 1Щах
а
)[А] 
7 3 17 THEOREM 
Fun h SNfb, => CC0ri \= SN0ri 
PROOF An infinite /3r;-reduction sequence in C C ^ yields an infinite /^-reduction 
sequence in ¥ωρ
η
 by the mapping [—] Η 
One can be a bit more careful in the last proof and use the positive formulation 
of Strong Normalization for every term M there is an upperbound to the length 
of all reduction sequences starting from M Then one can show that, from an 
upperbound to the length of /îrç-reductions starting from [MJ, one can compute 
an upperbound to the length of βη reductions starting from M 
7.3.2. Strong Normalization for /Зту-reduction in Fu 
The proof of Fujßn |= SN^, will be done by first proving that βω- reduction is 
strongly normalizing and that the combination /?2l"-reduction is strongly normal­
izing Using this, we then show that, if /3°-reduction is strongly normalizing on 
the erased terms (the erasure here is the 'typed' erasure defined in 6 3 5, different 
from the one defined in 4 4 11, which is totally syntactical), then /3-reduction is 
strongly normalizing In this way we avoid the need to define the so called 'candi­
dats de réducibihté' as typed sets, as is done for example in [Girard et al 1989] 
This makes the exposition more perspicious and clearly points out where the 
proof is essentially complex (in proof-theoretical terms ) This idea of proving 
strong normalization (reducing the problem to the set of underlying type-free 
terms) is applied to the polymorphic lambda calculus in [Mitchell 1986] (see also 
[Scedrov 1990]) 
7 3 18 PROPOSITION 
Fup,, И SN/*,. 
PROOF We only have to consider the constructors, because an infinite βηω-
reduction in a term of Fa;/}, will always be due to an infinite /J^-reduction in a 
subterm that is a constructor 
The proof is now by defining a /?7/-reduction preserving mapping [—] from the 
constructors of ¥<j}ßn to the objects of λ—» such that a constructor M к becomes 
an object [M] [k], where [k] is defined inductively as follows 
[*] = 0, 
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where O is some fixed type variable to be declared in the context The reduction 
preserving mapping [—] on constructors is 
[a] = a, 
[Xlaka] = Hc^/a], 
[\a kP] = Xa [к] [Ρ], 
[PQ] = [P][Q], 
where for к a kind of Φωβ
η
, the fixed object c'*l of type [k] is defined induc­
tively by taking c° as a fixed variable of type 0 in the context and defining 
c
*i—*2 _ χ
χ
 [/¡.J
 С
[*2І \y
e
 t h
e n
 j ,
a v e
 f
or
 ρ
 a
 context containing only declarations 
of constructor variables, 
Г (-л,,, Ρ к=>0*,<?0,[Г]Ь
х
^[Р] [к], 
where the extension of [—] to contexts is the straightforward one El 
7 3 19 LEMMA For M, M' ξ Теггт^Я^), objects, 
#{X2s in M) = #(A2s in M') - 1, 
#(λ 2 ί m M) = # ( λ 2 ί m M'), 
|М| ' = |М' | ' 
PROOF The only way in which the number of As of a certain form can increase 
by a reduction step is when the λ of this particular form occurs in Q and 
(λι A N)Q —* N[Q/x], 
with χ free in N more then once So we look for each case of the lemma at a 
/3-redex of the above form in the premise and check the conclusion 
1 (λ2α К N)Q —>2 N[Q/a] Then Q is a constructor, so it does not contain 
any objects as subexpressions, so it certainly contains no A2s So the number 
of A2s is reduced with one 
2 (Х
ш
а К N)Q —^+¡3 N[Q/a] Then Q is a constructor again and so it contains 
no A2s The number of A2s in the term remains the same 
3 By the definition of the erasure | — |', which removes all type information 
A /^-reduction step will always be inside a type of the object M, so 
\M\* = |M'|' A/^-reduction step inside M is of the form (λ2α К N)Q —> 2 
N[Q/a] After applying | - | ' the first becomes \N\' and so does the second 
(г) 
(и) 
(ггг) M 2 
— > 0 1 M' 
M 
M 
or M 
ι 
*ßt 
ω 
— * ß n 
>βτ) 
M' 
M' 
M' 
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7 3 20 LEMMA 
PROOF Suppose we have an infinite reduction sequence 
Μ
λ
 - % „ M2 - % 4 M3 - % , 
in Fuißv By Proposition 7 3 18 we know that all the M, must be objects and that 
this infinite reduction can not have a tail 
Λί
η
 >βη Λ^π+1 >βη M
n+2 * βη 
So the infinite /^""-reduction sequence contains infinitely many /^-contractions 
By Lemma 7 3 19 this is not possible a βη2 contraction reduces the number of 
A2s by one and a /^""-contraction does not change the number of A2s So there 
can be no infinite /^"-reduction in Fw^ И 
7 3 21 PROPOSITION 
MM € 0Ь|(^,,)[5У (|М|') =• SN(M)] 
PROOF Let M be an object such that SN(|M|') holds Suppose we have an 
infinite reduction sequence 
M — >
β η
 Μ
λ
 — > 0 η Μ2 —*fh, 
in ¥ωβη Then all Ml are objects of Υωβη By Lemma 7 3 20, only finitely 
many /?7/2u,-contractions are performed after one another, so the sequence contains 
infinitely many /^-contractions Now we can apply | —|' to obtain an infinite βη-
reduction sequence starting from |M| ' (using Lemma 7 3 19 ) This contradicts 
SN(|M|'), so there is no infinite βη reduction sequence starting from M SI 
The Proposition is telling us that we only have to check that the set of erasures 
of objects of Ρωβη satisfies SN/з,, in order to prove 
¥ω
βη
 \= S N 3 T J 
This will be done by extending the well known method of computabihty pred­
icates to the higher order case This method can be seen as the building of a 
model of ¥ωβ
η
 inside the untyped lambda calculus, where types become sets of 
strongly normalizing terms and the interpretation (modulo a valuation ρ that 
assigns untyped terms to the free variables) of a term M of type σ is an untyped 
term in the set that is represented by σ The Strong Normalization property then 
follows from the fact that one can take the identity for the valuation p, in which 
case the interpretation of M becomes |M| ', which is then Strongly Normalizing 
by the construction of the model 
Let in the following SN С Λ be the set of untyped lambda terms that is 
Strongly Normalizing under /^-reduction (By posponement of ^-reduction and 
the fact that η-reduction itself is Strongly Normalizing on Λ, this is the same as 
the set of terms that is Strongly Normalizing under β reduction ) 
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7 3 22 DEFINITION A set of untyped lambda terms X is saturated if 
1 XcSN, 
2 VQ 6 SNVx e Var[iQ e X], 
3 VQ, M,Pe SU[M[P/x]Q e X => (Xx M)PQ e X] 
Note that SN is itself saturated and that all saturated sets are nonempty 
The types of Fwp
n
 will be interpreted as saturated sets This requires some 
closure properties for the set of saturated sets which will be proved in Lemma 
7 3 24 The kinds of Fu^,, will be interpreted as the set-theoretic function spaces 
except for the kind * which will be interpreted as the set of all saturated sets 
Recall that 
Κ\πά(¥ω0η) = Κ =*\K^K 
7 3 23 DEFINITION For к € Kind(Fu;/j,,), the set of computabihty predicates for 
k, CP(fc), is defined inductively as follows 
CP(*) = {X I X С Л is saturated}, 
СРГА-»*2) = {f\f CP(k,)^CP(k2)} 
The interpretation of a kind к in the intended model will now be by taking CP(fc) 
7 3 24 LEMMA The set of saturated sets is closed under arbitary intersections 
and taking function spaces That is, 
1 for I a set and Χ
τ
 saturated for all ι € /, 
Г\
геІ
Х1 is saturated 
2 for X and Y saturated, 
X^Y = {M e A | WN e X[MN € Y}} is saturated 
PROOF The closure under arbitrary intersections is easy to prove For the clo-
sure under function spaces, let X and Y be saturated sets and take X—>Y as in 
the lemma It is easy to see that all M e X—*Y are SN Further, for χ a variable 
and Q G SN, we have that for all N e X, xQN e Y, because N is SN and У is a 
saturated set Finally, for Q,M,P e SN with M[P/x]Q € X-*Y, we know that 
VJV e X[M[P/x}QN € Y] So VJV e X[(Xx M)PQN € Y] by the saturatedness 
of Y, so (Xx M)PQ e X->Y H 
One may wonder why we need the saturated sets (a specific class of subsets 
of SN) and can not just interpret all the types by the set SN itself However, this 
breaks down on the fact that SN—>SN φ SN (For example, λχ xx $ SN-+SN ) 
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7.3.25. DEFINITION. For Γ a context of Fo^,,, a constructor valuation of Γ (no­
tation ξ \=a Γ) is a map ξ : VarD —> \JkeKCP{k) such that 
a : к € Г => ξ(α) € CP(Jfc). 
7.3.26. DEFINITION. For Γ a context of Fw^ and ξ a constructor valuation of Γ, 
the interpretation function 
[ - ] [ : r - C o n s t r ( F ^ , ) ^ UkeK CP(fc) 
is defined inductively as follows. 
Η 
I^][ 
[λα k.Q]¡ 
[σ~*τ]Γ( 
|[Πα:Α;.σ][ 
= ξ(α), 
= ¡PiÜQ]T(: 
= \feCP(k).[Q]\la=I), 
= Mtr-Mer, 
=
 п/еСР(к)Ы((
а
=/)-
In most situations the Г will be clear from the context, and will therefore not be 
mentioned explicitly. 
The definition is justified by the Stripping Lemma 4.4.27 and the following 
Lemma, which states that the interpretations of the constructors are elements of 
the right computability predicate. 
7.3 27. LEMMA. For Г a context of Fwßn, Q,k 6 Term(Fuipv) and ξ =^o Γ, 
Γ h Q : fc(:0) => [ Q ] { G CP(fc). 
PROOF. Easy induction over the structure of Q. H 
7.3.28. LEMMA. For Γ a context of Fwßr,, Q,P e T-Const^F^,,), α 6 VarD and 
(г) [Q[P/a]\t = [Q]([a„lPÌ(), 
(„) Q=ßlP => IQÌ(={P\ 
PROOF. The first by an easy induction over the structure of Q. For the second 
it is sufficient to prove 
Q —»*, Ρ => IQ\( = ¡P]v 
which is easily done, by induction over the structure of Q. That this is sufficient 
follows from the fact that the Church-Rosser property for /Jrç-reduction and Sub-
ject Reduction for /?r?-reduction hold for Foi^,. The first is easy by the separation 
of contexts in Fu;. (See Proposition 4.3.4. In the discussion that ends Chapter 
5.1 we have pointed out how to prove CR^ for such a system.) SR^ for Fu^, is 
a consequence of Corollary 7.2.4 (but there are easier ways to obtain this result). 
И 
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7 3 29 DEFINITION For Γ a context of FtLi^  and ξ (=• Γ, an object valuation of 
Γ with respect to ξ (notation ρ, ξ \= Γ) is a map ρ Var* —» Λ such that 
χ σ e Γ =¡- ρ(ι) € [σ]£ 
7 3 30 DEFINITION For Γ a context of Fu;^ ,, and ρ and ξ valuations such that 
ρ, ξ f= Γ, the interpretation function 
[ - β r - O b j ( F ^ ) - A 
is defined inductively as follows 
Η = Pix), 
[PQìl = lñrplQÍP, i fg is an object, 
{PQfp = [P]^, if <3 is a constructor, 
{Xx σ Qfp = \x lQ]rplx = I ) , if σ is a type, 
[\akQ]rp = [Qfp, if к is a kind 
In most situations the Г will be clear from the context, and will therefore not be 
mentioned explicitly 
The interpretation of objects of ¥шр
п
 does not use the valuation for the con­
structor variables at all We could therefore have given the previous definition 
without mentioning the ξ, letting ρ be an arbitrary mapping from Var* to Λ We 
put the restriction on the ρ because on the one hand it is the natural restriction 
to make for an interpretation function and on the other hand it will be needed 
for the theorem we are to be proving 
The fact that the interpretation of objects does not depend on the interpre­
tation of the types is also expressed by the following fact 
7 3 31 FACT For M an object, ρ a valuation as in the definition and χ the vector 
of free variables m M, 
[M]p = \M\4p[S)/í\, 
where p(x) is the vector obtained by consecutively applying ρ to χ 
7 3 32 DEFINITION For Γ a context, M an object and σ a type of Fu^,, Γ models 
M of type σ, notation Γ (= Μ σ is defioned by 
Γ μ M a = ν
Ρ
,ξ\ρ,ξ И Г =* [М]
р
 6 И { ] 
7 3 33 THEOREM For Г о context, M an object and σ a type of Fußn, 
Fl· Μ σ = » Γ | = Λ ί σ 
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PROOF. By induction on the structure of M we prove that if ρ, ξ [= Γ, then 
[M] 6 [σ]£. So let ρ and ξ be valuations such that ρ, ξ \= Γ. 
• M = χ € Var*. Then χ:τ e Γ with τ =0η σ. So {Μ\ρ = ρ(χ) 6 [TJ£ and 
[τ], = [σ]£ and we are done. 
• Μ Ξ XX:T.Q with τ a type. Then Γ,χ:τ h Q : μ for some μ with σ =ρ
η 
τ^μ. By IH [QJ„( l.=p) e [μ]£ for all ρ e [τ] { ) so [Ax:r.Q]pp e {μ\ for all 
ρ € [r]{, so [Ax:r.Q], e [r\^\p\ = \σ\. 
• Μ Ξ Ла:/с.С>, with fc a kind. Then Г, œ.k h Q : τ for some r with σ = ^ 
Паі .т . By IH [Q]p e [т]„„. = л for all ƒ G CP(fc), and so [\a:k.Q]p = 
[СЬеп / б С Р ( л ) [г1 4 ( а : . л = И { · 
• M = PQ, with Q an object. Then Г h Ρ : τ->μ and Γ h Q : r for 
some τ and μ with μ
 = / 3, σ. By IH [P] p 6 [τ]£-ν[μ]£ and [Q]p € [r]£, so 
[PQ\P = ¡PllQl e Mi = M{. 
• M = PQ, with Q a constructor. Then Γ h Ρ : Па.к.т and Г h Ç : к 
for some r with r[Q/a] =
βτ) σ. By IH [P]p e [т]4-»ДОе and [Q], e [r]£) 
so [PQ]p = [P]P[QÌP e [μ]£ = И £ . By Induction Hypothesis [P]p € 
n/6CP(fc)[r]ç(a=/)· Further we know that [<5]£ € CP(fc), so in any case 
IPQ]P = ПС И«а:-
в
)· H 
7.3.34. THEOREM. 
VM 6 ObKflj/jOlÄVflAil')]. 
PROOF. Let M be an object of ¥ωβ
η
, say that Г and σ are a context and a type 
such that Γ Ь M : σ. Then Γ f= M : σ by the previous theorem. 
Now we define canonical elements ck in the sets CP(fc) as follows. 
e := SN, 
с*'-*' := λ/ € СР^О-сЧ 
For the constructor valuation for Г we take ξ with ξ(α) = ck if a:fc € Γ (and ξ(α) 
arbitrary otherwise), and for the object valuation for Γ with respect to this ξ we 
take ρ with p(x) = x. 
Now ρ, ξ |= Γ and so (Ai] e ¡σ]£. This implies that |M| ' is Strongly Normalising, 
because [M] = |M| ' and [σ]£ С SN. Η 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
At the end of this thesis we want to make some remarks about points that deserve 
some extra attention We first try to make the situation around the proof of 
SN^, and ΌΟΝβη for C C ^ clear In the middle of all the general Lemmas and 
Propositions it may have become a bit obscure what exactly is required for these 
proofs Then we compare the PTS- syntax with a different formalization of Pure 
Type Systems which has a more 'semantical' nature 
8.1. Confluence and Normalization 
8 11 R E M A R K If one wants to study the confluence of /îrç-reduction in a Pure 
Type System, one should be looking at the property CON^, ι e 
Γ h M, N A with M =0nN 4 M 1 N, 
because C O N ^ is not a consequence of CR^, on the well typed terms This 
because a /Î7/-reduction-expansion path from M to N can contain terms that are 
not typable (Μ =β
ν
 N means that they are equal as pseudoterms ) For these 
non-typable terms, CR/з,, on the well-typed terms does not apply 
The proof of CON/34 for СС/э,, in this thesis is done in the following steps 
1 Prove the Key Lemma 4 4 18 
2 Prove SR^ (Lemma 4 4 30) This is relatively easy, by induction on deriva­
tions, using the Key Lemma 
3 Prove SR, This follows quite easily from the fact that CC^, satisfies βη-
preservation of sorts (See Definition 5 2 7, Lemma 7 2 2 and Corollary 
7 2 4 ) 
4 Prove Fui0V |= CON^, This is easy, by the fact that contexts in Fo^,, 
can be separated (See paragraph 5 3 for a proof of CON^,, of a calculus 
containing Fu/βη ) 
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5. Prove Fu)ßv =^ SNßv. This is hard; the proof in paragraph 7.3.2 is done by 
first showing that it is sufficiënt to prove SN^ for erased terms. The proof 
uses Φωβ
η
 \= CON^. 
6. Prove CC/3, |= SN^. This is hard. It is done by defining a reduction 
preserving mapping from ΟΟβ
η
 to Fuiß,,, so the proof uses Fu^,, f= SN^. 
7. Prove СС/з^  |= CON^. This is hard; it requires C C ^ =^ WNÍ4, so it uses 
СС^, |= 5Νβ
η
. The proof in Chapter 5.1 is for a more general case. For 
CQj,, it suffices to prove Lemmas 5.2.2, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, Proposition 5.2.3 and 
Theorem 5.2.6. 
Obviously, the fourth, fifth and sixth item can be compressed to one, namely 
to prove CC/3,, \= SNp
v
. Up to now there is however no other proof of this fact 
then the one given in this thesis along the lines sketched above. 
Some issues immediately come up here. First that we prove Strong Normal­
ization whereas we only need Weak Normalization (usually this property is just 
called Normalization) for the proof of CR^. Also in other situations, Weak Nor­
malization often suffices. (For example to prove consistency of a context.) This 
raises the following conjecture. 
8.1.2. CONJECTURE. For all Pure Type Systems ζ, 
ζ μ WNßM =• с h SN0M. 
Another thing that we do not know is if Strong Normalization for a system 
with (conv^) implies Strong Normalization for the system with (conv^,,). The 
problem is that if we extend the conversion rule with η, there are more well-
typed terms. (See the discussion in the beginning of section 7.3.) Our intuition 
says that this extension can not affect the normalization, so we have the following 
conjecture. 
8.1.3. CONJECTURE. For all Pure Type Systems ζ, 
ζ with (conVß) \= SNß(v) => ζ with (convßr)) (= SNp^). 
Finally we still have the open problem whether CON/j,, holds for all Pure Type 
Systems. We strongly believe that this is so and raise the following conjecture. 
(Motivated by Proposition 5.3.2.) 
8.1.4. CONJECTURE. In all Рите Type Systems, 
Г h M:A 
Г h M': A 
M =0„ M' 
M \ M' 
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For each of these questions, a counter-example showing that the property does 
not hold would probably be much more interesting then a proof. (Which makes 
it unlikely that they will soon be proved, unless there are 'easy' proofs.) 
There are reasons to believe that Conjecture 8.1.4 is false. It was shown 
to us by Werner that Confluence of /flrç-reduction conflicts with a fixed point 
combinator. Let us state this precisely for the system λ* with (conv^) rule. A 
fixed point combinator in λ* is a term 
Y : Πα: * .(α—»α)—»α 
such that 
YaF =
βη
 F{YaF) 
for σ : * and F : σ—>σ. 
8.1.5. FACT. [Werner 1993] If λ* has a fixed point combinator then λ* ^ C O N ^ 
and λ* ^ CR/J,, 
The proof is more general and applies to all PTSs that have a sort * for which 
(•,•) is a rule and for which there is a sort s such that (s,*) is a rule and * : s is 
an axiom. Hence we have the following Corollary by the fact that XU \= C O N ^ . 
(A proof of this fact was sketched in section 5.3 ) 
8.1.6. COROLLARY. In the system \U there is no fixed point combinator. 
Up to now it is not known whether there exists a fixed point combinator 
in λ*. Our conviction that C O N ^ holds has led us to believe that there is 
no fixed point combinator. (There is a so called 'looping' combinator, which is 
a family of combinatore Y0, ΥΊ, У2,..., all of type Πα: * .(α—>α)—>Q, such that 
Y
n
aF =β F(Y
n+ioF). See for example [Coquand and Herbelm 1992].) 
8.2. Semantical version of the systems 
In fact the Confluence property (Conjecture 8.1.4) is the one that justifies the 
use of Pure Type Systems with (conv/j,,) in the first place. 
If one wants to give a semantics to a Pure Type System, one only wants to 
assign a meaning to the well-typed terms. The pseudoterms are just introduced 
because they make meta-theory easier, being so closely related to the untyped 
lambda calculus. Even those who are just interested in syntax will agree with the 
point of view that only the well-typed terms have a meaning. This point of view 
implies that if two well-typed terms are equal, but only via a path that passes 
through the non-typable terms, then these terms should not really be considered 
as being equal. 
Because pseudoterms do not have a semantics, a 'semantical' presentation 
of Pure Type Systems would not contain a conversion rule of the form that we 
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have The side-condition in the conversion rule would be stated by an equality 
judgement of the form Г h M = N Л in stead of an equality condition on 
the set of pseudoterms This equality judgement would then be axiomatised in 
such a way that Γ Ι- M = N A holds only if there is a reduction-expansion 
path from M to N that passes through the set of well typed terms of type A in 
Г Obviously, this is also the intended meaning of the equality in the conversion 
rule of a Pure Type System If Г (- А, В Type and A =p
v
 B, then it should be 
the case that the equality of A and В can be established via a path that passes 
through the set of Г-types only However, when we consider ^-equality it is 
not clear that this intended meaning is also the actual meaning (If one only 
considers /3-equahty this is obviously the case, due to CR^ on the pseudoterms ) 
8 2 1 DEFINITION The semantical version of a Pure Type System X(S,A, TV¡) 
has the following rules The typing rules are (sort), (weak), (var), (Π), (λ), and 
(app) as for ordinary PTSs (To denote that we are in a semantical version we 
write h_ in the rules ) The conversion rule is 
(conv^) Γ h = M A T\-=A = В 
Г Ь
=
 M В 
The judgement Г h
=
 A = В s is generated by 
Г h
=
 Xx Α Μ Πι С O Th
=
N С 
(β) 
(ν) 
(axiom) 
(sym) 
(trans) 
Γ h
=
 (λι A M)N = M[N/x] D[N/x] 
Γ h
=
 M ПхАВ 
Г h
=
 Xy A My = M UxAB 
Г Ь
=
М A 
T\-
=
M = M A 
Г h
=
 M = N A 
Th
=
N = M A 
ГЬ=М = Ν Α Γ\-
=
Ν = Q A 
Y\-=M = Q A 
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Γ h
=
 A = A' s
x
 Γ, χ A h
=
 В = В' s2 (Π-eq) — if (а,,а2,аз) €7г, 
ГЬ
=
Пх AB = Пх А' В' s3 
Г h
=
 А = A' s Γ,xAl·
=
 M = Μ' В Γl·
=
UxAB s 
(λ-eq) ! 
Г h
=
 Ai A M = \x A' M' Ux A В 
Г\-
=
 M = M' Πι AB Γ h
=
 Ν = Ν' A 
(app eq) 
(conv-eq) 
Γ\-
=
ΜΝ = M'N' B[N/x] 
Γ l·
=
 M = M' A Γ h
=
 A = В s 
Г h= M = M' ß 
We would like to be able to show the equivalence of our version of the syntax 
of Pure Type Systems and the semantical version in the sense that, if ζ is a PTS^,, 
and (= the semantical version of ζ, then the following holds 
Γ \-
ζ
 M A ì 
Γ h
c
 N A \ ο Γ Ι-
ζ
_ M = Ν A 
Μ=0ηΝ J 
Now, the method for proving this is by showing that CON^, holds for С as it 
was expressed in Conjecture 8 14 
Γ\-
ζ
 M A ) 
Г к
с
М ' Л \=>M\M' 
Μ = 0 η M' J 
Let us focus on a possible proof of the equivalence of ζ and ζ
=
 to see why CONg,, 
is so essential The implication from right to left should be relatively straightfor­
ward by showing that, if Γ h í= M = Ν A, then Μ =β
η
 Ν as pseudoterms and 
Γ h í= Л/ Л It is obvious from the rules of ζ- that the first holds The second 
is by induction on the derivation of Γ h^ _ M = N A 
The implication from left to right is more interesting It implies the following 
statement 
(l)If M and N are two terms that are typable with the same type in a context, 
then they are equal via a /?7?-reduction-expansion path 
through the well-typed terms 
It is even impossible to imagine that one could prove the implication (=>) without 
having first proved (1) Obviously, the way to prove (1) is by proving CON^, 
This stresses the importance of the final open problem (8 1 4) that we raised 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift behandelt het verband tussen logica's en getypeerde lambd-
calculi, in het bijzonder door bestudering van de zogenaamde 'formules-als-types' 
inbedding Deze inbedding geeft een betekenis aan logische bewijzen (het ware 
misschien beter te spreken van 'afleidingen') in termen van getypeerde lambda 
termen Een belangrijk gevolg hiervan is dat de bewijzen een getrouwe lineaire 
representatie krijgen in een formeel systeem Dit heeft aanleiding gegeven tot 
belangrijke toepassingen, allen gebaseerd op de mogelijkheid tot het manipuleren 
van bewijzen binnen een formeel systeem Men denke hierbij aan de computer-
venficatie van bewijzen en aan de mogelijkheid om uit een bewijs van een uit 
spraak van de vorm Vx 3y φ(χ, y) een algoritme te extraheren dat voor iedere χ 
een y berekent waarvoor φ(χ, y) geldt In dit proefschrift wordt met name gekeken 
naar de formules-als-types inbedding zelf en tevens worden de bijbehorende sys­
temen van getypeerde lambda calculus uitgebreid bestudeerd Slechts zijdelings 
wordt in de hoofdstukken 3 1 en 6 1 enige aandacht besteed aan de toepassingen 
De formules-als-types inbedding werd voor het eerst formeel beschreven in 
[Howard 1980], die ook de eerste was die de terminology 'formulas-as-types' ge­
bruikte Het manuscript van dit artikel dateert al uit 1968 en veel van de 
ideeën uit dit werk zijn nog ouder en gaan terug tot Curry (zie bijvoorbeeld 
[Curry and Feys 1958]) Howard stelt zich met name tot doel een interpretatie 
te geven van de intuitionistische logische voegtekens volgens de zogenaamde 
Brouwer Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretatie Volgens deze BHK inter 
pretatie (zie bijvoorbeeld [Troelstra and Van Dalen 1988]) wordt een voegteken 
verklaard door te zeggen wanneer iets een bewijs is van een uitspraak die opge-
bouwd is met behulp van dat voegteken Howard geeft een formele semantiek van 
intuitionistische bewijzen in termen van een getypeerde lambda calculus door een 
interpretatie te geven van de introductie en eliminatie regels van de voegtekens 
De introductie regels voor Э en V corresponderen bijvoorbeeld met λ-abstractie 
en de eliminatie regels voor Э en V met applicatie Het werk van Howard is later 
verfijnd en uitgebreid door onder andere Martin-Lof en Girard 
Een andere benadering werd gekozen door de Bruijn in het Automath project 
[de Bruijn 1980], die onafhankelijk van Howard een soort van formules-als-types 
inbedding definieerde Deze inbedding heeft een andere vorm, met name vanwege 
het feit dat de Bruijn niet gericht was op bewijstheoretische bespiegelingen maar 
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op een veel praktischer doel het formaliseren van wiskundig redeneren op een 
computer Het verschil in vorm zit hem erin dat men niet zoekt naar getypeerde 
lambda calculi die getrouw met logische systemen corresponderen, maar dat men 
een systeem probeert te vinden dat kan dienen als raamwerk (logical framework) 
voor wiskundig redeneren Dit raamwerk zal dus vrij 'kaal' zijn en alleen die 
onderliggende principes bevatten waar alle wiskundigen het over eens zijn In de 
eerste plaats is de Bruijns werk dus een poging om deze onderliggende principes 
boven tafel te krijgen, met als mogelijk gevolg dat, zodra deze principes gefor-
maliseerd zijn, deze geïmplementeerd kunnen worden als een programma voor 
verificatie van wiskundige redeneringen 
Uiteraard kunnen ook de lambda-calculi a la Howard geïmplementeerd wor-
den Met name voor de toepassing van het extraheren van algoritmen uit bewijzen 
blijken deze systemen het meest geschikt te zijn Het is uiteraard ook mogelijk 
om beide benaderingen te gebruiken binnen een systeem 
Het voornaamste deel van dit proefschrift is gewijd aan de formules-als-types 
inbedding a la Howard Interessante vragen hierbij zijn of de inbedding volledig is 
en in hoeverre zij een isomorfisme is Volledigheid van de inbedding betekent hier 
dat voor alle formules φ uit de logica, als er een term is van type φ in de getypeerde 
lambda calculus, dan is φ bewijsbaar in de logica Isomorphie wil zeggen dat de 
inbedding een structuur behoudende bijectie op het niveau van bewijzen is Het is 
ook van belang eigenschappen van de getypeerde lambda-calcuh zelf af te leiden 
In de eerste plaats om met behulp van die eigenschappen iets over de formules-
als-types interpretatie te zeggen, maar verder zijn deze eigenschappen ook van 
belang voor de implementatie van de calculus Tot slot hebben zij vaak ook 
belangrijke corollana in de logica's 
De twee belangrijkste van deze eigenschappen zijn confluence en normalisatie 
Zowel in de logische taal (zeker als die hogere orde is) als op de bewijzen is er 
een notie van reductie en een daaruit voortvloeiende notie van gelijkheid In de 
logische taal worden deze meestal gerepresenteerd door de β- (of /37)-)reductie en 
gelijkheid Deze wordt vaak de definitionele gelijkheid van de taal genoemd De 
gelijkheid op afleidingen komt voort uit de reductie-relatie die bestaat uit het 
elimineren van sneden Nu is het zo dat in de bijbehorende getypeerde lambda 
calculi zowel de definitionele gelijkheid als de gelijkheid op afleidingen gerepre 
senteerd worden door β of βη gelijkheid (afhankelijk van wat men precies als 
definitionele gelijkheid in de taal neemt en hoe men precies de notie van snede 
definieert ) De confluentie eigenschap (die zegt dat twee termen die gelijk zijn 
ook een gemeenschappelijk reduct hebben) is van vitaal belang om te laten zien 
dat met alle termen aan elkaar gelijk zijn De normalisatie eigenschap (die zegt 
dat iedere term reduceert naar een term in normaal vorm, ι e een term die niet 
verder gereduceerd kan worden) is van vitaal belang om de consistentie van een 
(logische) theorie te laten zien 
Dit proefschrift is opgebouwd uit de volgende componenten 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van logische systemen, van eerste orde proposi-
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tielogica tot en met hogere orde predicatenlogica, m de klassieke en ïntuitionis-
tische varianten We beschrijven en bewijzen eigenschappen en verbanden zoals 
beslisbaarheid en conservativiteit 
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een gedetailleerde bescnjvmg van de formules-als-types 
inbedding, zowel die à la Howard als die à la de Bruijn We geven een gedetailleerd 
bewijs van de isomorfie van eerste orde predicatenlogica en een corresponderende 
getypeerde lambda calculus 
In Hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we een algemeen raamwerk voor de beschrijving 
van getypeerde lambda-calculi, de zogenaamde 'Pure Type Systems' We bewi-
jzen een reeks eigenschappen voor deze systemen en geven voorbeelden van Pure 
Type Systems die corresponderen met logica's uit Hoofdstuk 1 
In Hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we de confluence van /377-reductie in getypeerde 
lambda calculi Confluentie van /3-reductie is relatief eenvoudig, maar voor βη is 
het algemene probleem verrassend moeilijk Het algemene resultaat dat we hier 
bewijzen is dat confluentie geldt voor βη als het Pure Type System normahzerend 
is 
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat over de Calculus of Constructions (CC), een getypeerde 
lambda-calculus gedefinieerd door Coquand en Huet waarin de hogere orde log­
ica ingebed kan worden door middel van de formules-als-types inbedding We 
bestuderen CC en zijn fijnstructuur en de inbedding van logica m (subsystemen 
van) CC 
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een gedetailleerd bewijs van sterke normalisatie van βη-
reductie in CC (Sterke normalisatie betekent dat er geen oneindige reductie 
paden zijn ) 
Tenslotte bespreken we in Hoofdstuk 8 nog een aantal vermoedens die naar 
voren komen naar aanleiding van de bewijzen van confluentie en normalisatie 
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Stellingen 
Definieer de afbeelding [—] van de volle één-soortige eerste orde predica-
tenlogica naar de hogere orde propositielogica als volgt 
[x] = I , 
[Rh tn] = R\ti\ [t„], 
[φ 3ψ] = [φ] Э [Φ], 
[<pL·*] = [<р]кЩ, 
[φνψ] = И [ 4 
Ь ] = ι[φ], 
[ix φ] = Vi M, 
[3ι φ] = Эх [φ] 
Dus bijvoorbeeld [Vx Px э Px] = Vx Px Э Px (De χ aan de linkerzijde 
is een objectvanabele, de χ aan de rechterzijde een propositievariabele 
Evenzo is de R aan de linkerzijde een relatiesymbool, de R aan de rechter­
zijde een hogere orde variabele ) In feite is het bereik van de afbeelding 
[-] een zeer kleine uitbreiding van de tweede orde propositielogica 
De afbeelding [—] is getrouw maar niet volledig 
Er is geen fixed point combinator in het Pure Type System XU. (Met 
dank aan Benjamin Werner ) 
De hogere orde propositielogica (PROPu>) is een conservatieve uitbrei­
ding van de tweede orde propositielogica (PROP2) Het bewijs maakt 
gebruik van het feit dat complete Heyting algebra's een getrouw en vol­
ledig model voor PROP2 vormen 
Als Δ een verzameling formules en φ een formule van PROP2 is en 
Δ ЬряоРи; φ met afleiding Θ, dan is het in het algemeen niet waar dat 
de normaal vorm van Θ, verkregen door middel van snede-ehminatie, 
een afleiding van Δ HPROP2 Ψ is 
In getypeerde lambda-calculus komt dit overeen met de volgende twee 
feiten Laat Γ een context en σ een type van A2 zijn Dan 
Τ\-
Χω
Μ σ ф rh A 2 nf( i t f ) σ, 
Γ \-
Χω
 Μ • σ => 37 [Г h A 2 Ν σ] 
Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat er tot nu toe geen zuiver syntactisch 
bewijs van de conservativiteit van PROPu over PROP2 is gevonden 
De beperking van de getypeerde lambda-calculus met recursieve typen 
λμ tot de calculus Αμ+, waar alleen μ-abstracties over positieve type 
schema's zijn toegestaan, is geen echte beperking Voor ieder type σ van 
λμ kan een type σ' van λμ + geconstrueerd worden zodat σ « σ' Daaruit 
volgt dat alle lambda termen getypeerd kunnen worden in λμ+ 
1 
5 Het bewijs van Corollaxium 15 1 5 in [Baxendregt 1984] is met volledig 
Het onderdeel (=>·) dat zegt 
M heeft een /3-nf => M heeft een βη-ηί 
is inderdaad triviaal, maar het is niet waar dat η contracties geen nieuwe 
redexen kunnen creëren 
6 Het is bekend dat het m de Calculus of Constructions met mogelijk is 
0 / 1 te bewijzen (0 en 1 zijn hier de polymorfe Church numerals ) 
In de inconsistente systemen λ*, \U~ en XU kan 0 ^ 1 natuurlijk wel 
bewezen worden, maar zelfs met een bewijs in normaalvorm 
7 Zij AN het Pure Type System met βη conversie gedefinieerd door 
S = Ν, 
A = Ν χ Ν, 
П = Ν χ Ν χ Ν 
Als voor AN de Church Rosser eigenschap voor /3^-reductie (CR^4) geldt, 
dan geldt CR^,, voor alle Pure Type Systems 
8 De relatie -»¿ met 
t -»¿ и als t -»β t' en и is een domem van t' voor zekere i', 
is in het algemeen met welgefundeerd op de verzameling van welgety-
peerde termen van een Pure Type System (Een domein van t' is een 
term die in t' voorkomt als het type van een A-abstractie ) 
Dit is problematisch voor een mogelijk bewijs van confluentie van βη-
reductie m Pure Type Systems die met normaliserend zijn 
9 Naast het verschil m inkomen is het belangrijkste verschil tussen AIO's 
en oude-stijl promovendi dat de eerste, naast de taken van de oude stijl 
promovendi, ook nog de verplichting hebben onderwijs te volgen De 
AIO's moeten niet van de universiteiten eisen dat ze onderwijscursussen 
verzorgen ter compensatie van het financiële offer In plaats daarvan 
moeten ze proberen de onderwijsverplichtingen zo laag mogelijk te hou-
den 
10 Het hebben van een ervaring van diep inzicht is niet hetzelfde als het 
hebben van diep inzicht Het eerste kan op diverse manieren bereikt 
worden, het tweede alleen door middel van serieuze studie 
2 


